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Abstract 
Growth models contain strong predictions regarding the effect of fiscal policy on the 
steady state growth path. Fiscal policies have no effect on the steady state growth rate 
in the neoclassical model whereas fiscal policy does feature in the steady state of 
endogenous growth models. The number of alternative policies which have been 
found to effect growth in the endogenous growth models is large as one of the few 
restrictions placed upon policy in the models is which sector of the model is affected, 
demand or supply. Only policies that are included in the supply side of the model 
affect the growth rate. 
Despite the strength of the growth predictions regarding fiscal policy in growth 
models the empirical relationship between the two has proved more difficult 
establish. Even when comparisons are made between studies that purport to correct 
for many of the statistical biases present in the data, non-robustness still abounds. We 
believe that this non-robustness can in part be explained by a failure to adequately 
account for the predictions from the theoretical models. We use four conclusions 
from our review of the theoretical literature (the method of financing changes in 
policy, differences between the transition and the steady state, the assumption of 
homogeneity of expenditures, and the direct versus indirect effects of policy) to 
provide the shape for new empirical tests. We find that once done, the strength of the 
empirical relationship is increased and matches the predictions from the basic public 
policy endogenous growth model of Barro (1990). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"The conduct of government is the testing ground of social ethics and civilised 
living. Intelligent conduct of government requires an understanding of the economic 
relations involved; and the economist, by aiding in this understanding, may hope to 
contribute to a better society" 
Musgrave (1959) pp. iii-iv 
Two features which may be said to have characterised the economies of developed 
nations over the last 30 years are: the slowdown in the growth rate of output, and that 
governments have on average appropriated an increasing proportion of GDP. Figure 
1.1 displays evidence of the second of these. The average level of government 
expenditure in the 13 OECD countries expressed as a percentage ratio to GDP 
increased from 27.8% in 1970/74 to 35.6% in 1985/89, while the average growth rate 
of the 13 OECD countries included in Figure 1.1 fell from 4.21% in the period 
1970/74 to 1.14% per annum in 1985/89. Unsurprisingly it has been argued that the 
increased intrusion of government into the workings of the economy is crucial for 
explaining the slowdown in growth and has caused living standards to be below 
those which could have been achieved. The aim of this thesis is to investigate and 
extend the theoretical and empirical links between the mix of fiscal policies and 
growth. 
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Figure 1.1: Government Expenditure as a Percentage Ratio of GDP 
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The expansion of government expenditure has been criticised principally on the 
grounds that it has been directed towards consumption expenditures. The political 
sensitivity of social security expenditure and the need to finance increasing national 
debt has meant that public investment has been targeted as the easy political option 
(Oxley & Martin (1991)). This can be seen in Figure 1.2 below: despite the increased 
appropriation of GDP evident in Figure 1.1 the 13 OECD countries included in the 
sample have cut hack on government capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(Spain is the exception) from an average of 3.77% in 1970/75 down to just over 2.5% 
in 1987/922. It can also be seen from this sample that the UK currently spends the 
lowest proportion of its GDP on government capital (1.3% in 1987/92), although in 
turn, it can also he argued that the lower growth rate justifies a lower stock of puhlic 
capital. 
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Figure 1.2: Public Investment (% GDP) in OECD Countrires, 1970/75 
- 
1987/92 
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Simply considering the changing expenditure pattern of countries over the period 
provides an incomplete perspective on the changing role of government. Attention 
has, therefore, also been attracted to the method of financing as an explanation for the 
slowdown in growth. Within the average country expenditures are mostly funded out 
of income tax, social security tax and goods and services tax revenues. From Figure 
1.3 it would appear the relative importance of these tax revenues has changed very 
little over the period. These aggregate figures hide substantial differences however, 
in both the revenue breakdown between countries and the changes in the revenue mix 
within countries over the period. Some countries, for example Belgium, have 
collected an increasing share of revenue from income taxes rather then taxes on 
goods and services while others, such as the UK, has adopted the opposite strategy. 
Germany and the US have collected a decreasing proportion of revenues from taxes 
on income and goods and services taxation over the period in favour of increased 
revenues from social security taxation, while Finland has not changed the makeup of 
its tax revenues over the period. 
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The maximisation of the growth rate is not the only objective of governments but 
examining this objective has the advantage over alternatives, such as improvements 
in social welfare, that there is a readily available supply of data through which to test 
the models of government behaviour. Given that in theory the maximisation of 
welfare is the principal aim of government we must assume in the thesis that the rate 
of improvement in social welfare and the growth of output are positively correlated. ' 
The failure to find growth effects from a particular type of policy is not then an 
indication that this policy should he replaced. Indeed, assuming that its stated 
objective is being net, then the failure to find growth effects from a particular policy 
may in fact justify this policy over the range of possible alternatives. 
1.2: Theoretical Literature 
The theoretical relationship between fiscal policy and the growth of output is 
reviewed using a class of model known as economic growth models. These models 
Figure 1.3: Tax revenues by Type, Percentage Ratio of Total Revenues 
4 
investigate the underlying causes of growth over long periods of time (rather than 
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short run fluctuations due to the business cycle). Growth models come in two main 
forms, neoclassical (Solow (1956), Swan (1956)) and endogenous (Romer (1986), 
Lucas (1988)). Both models are identical in terms of the conclusions they reach 
regarding the effect of fiscal policy on the level of GDP; where they differ is in the 
effect of fiscal policy on economic growth. 2 
Central to any model of economic growth is the production function: the idea that at 
a point in time a firm's output can be described as a function of the available inputs. 
By mixing together physical capital, labour, land and technology in various 
combinations firms are able to produce different types of output? Growth in output 
depends upon the economy finding more, or improving the quality, of these inputs 
over time. However, increasing the amount of any one input very quickly does not 
lead to fast growth in output in the long run because of diminishing returns in the 
accumulation of inputs (adding an additional unit of an input increases output but by 
less than the previous unit of input). 
The accumulation of physical capital is determined in such models by the firm's 
investment decision, whereas growth in the size of the labour force and to the level of 
technology are determined by nature (they increase at an independent exogenous rate 
over time). ' Diminishing returns to investment imply that firms find it profitable to 
invest only when new labour becomes available to use new machines (growth in the 
labour force); and as the productivity of workers using the existing stock of machines 
5 
' This assumption lets us over come problems such as; revealing households true preferences; or 
determining whether the new allocation of resources is efficient (Musgrave (1959)). 
2 There are many ways in which endogenous growth can be introduced into the model we concentrate 
only on public investments as the source of endogenous growth. For a more complete review of the 
literature see Aghion & Howitt (1998). 
3 We abstract from the idea of human capital as an input in the production function in order to 
simplify the discussion. An extension to include human capital is relatively easy to make (Rebelo 
(1991)) and this is done later in the chapter. This abstraction changes none of the basic results. 
4A branch of the literature has looked at the reason firms choose to invest in product design and R&D 
(for example Romer (1990)). The implications of government policy for growth are in many ways 
identical to those when technical progress is exogenous and so we do not consider them in detail. A 
simple model where government policy determines the growth in the efficiency of labour (Krichel & 
Levine (1995)) is given in Chapter 2 Section 2.4.1. 
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improves (technological progress). ' Assuming the size of the labour force is constant 
then new investment in capital and the growth of output will only be as fast as the 
rate of technical progress allows. ' 
From this description of growth models it appears that, if governments are to have a 
positive effect on the long run growth rate of a country then they are constrained to 
chose policies that facilitate technical change. The interactions of economic agents in 
this model yield an allocation of resources which is optimal (because of the 
assumption of a full and perfectly competitive set of markets). Any intervention by 
the government into these markets can serve only to distort the optimal resource-mix 
and reduce the growth rate. Additional roles may, therefore, only be found if there 
are imperfections in the functioning of markets within the model. 
According to Musgrave (1959) government intervention can be justified when: (i) the 
allocation of resources is sub-optimal; (it) the distribution of income is unethical; and 
(iii) the macroeconomy requires stabilisation. The growth literature has tended to 
concentrate on the first of these roles, the allocation of resources. ' 
Market failure may take several forms but the most common example given in the 
literature is the divergence between the private and social returns to investment 8 If 
there are benefits that accrue to society as a whole from the investment decision of 
firms, and these firms are not compensated for the positive externalities of their 
investment, then the amount of investment in this input will be below that which 
Technological change is limited in the model to improvements in the efficiency of labour. 
6 Technical progress offsets the diminishing returns to capital investment that would otherwise limit 
growth. 
We discuss briefly some of the literature relating to the other objectives of government further below 
along with the potential interrelationship with the allocation of resources. 
8 We do not look at models where divergence between private and social returns exists for a whole 
class of capital goods, such as the externality to capital accumulation (learning-by-doing) in Romer 
(1986) or the externalities to human capital accumulation in Lucas (1988). These models advocate 
subsidies rather than the public provision of capital described here. 
6 
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society would optimally choose. Co-ordination of firms to invest together will not be 
possible, as the incentive not to bear the costs and only reap the benefits will be too 
strong. This is usually described as the public good nature of capital, and transport 
infrastructure, street lighting and policing are the examples usually given, but this 
could also be extended to include education and health care. ' 
Government correction of this market failure through the public provision of this 
input raises the marginal product of capital and encourages faster investment and 
growth. In the neoclassical model the effect of this policy is only temporary, as 
private capital and public capital are not close enough substitutes. Good policies shift 
the path of output upwards but do not permanently affect the slope of this path (Agell 
et al. (1997)). In contrast, in the endogenous growth model the effect on the returns 
to investment are so large that the diminishing marginal returns to capital which 
otherwise limit growth are permanently offset. More investment leads to faster output 
growth, which in turn means that more public investments can be afforded which 
encourages yet more investment. A virtuous circle is formed. Technological change 
is no longer the key to economic growth and instead it is the accumulation of 
resources. 10 Therefore, government policies that encourage the accumulation of 
reproducible factors of production raise the long run rate of growth of a country. 11 
The improved allocation of resources through the correction of market failure by the 
government may be undone if the taxes used to finance the provision of the necessary 
goods and services reduce the incentives to accumulate factor inputs. Taxes on the 
reproducible inputs lowers their return discouraging investment lowering the growth 
9 The model justifies government provision of productive expenditures not their production. This 
distinction is made in order to ignore the possibility that the efficiency of the public sector in 
producing these inputs is below that of the private sector. We briefly review such a model in Section 
2.4.2 in Chapter 2. 
'o In most of the endogenous growth models we describe we hold the level of technology constant. 
" Given the scope for intervention provided by the government in growth models it is common to 
approach this relationship through a discussion of the relationship between the level of government 
spending and taxation and the growth of GDP. For an introductory discussion of the relationship 
between, the level of fiscal variables and, the level of income and the growth of fiscal variables and 
the growth of income see Sundrum (1990). 
7 
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rate and the steady state level of the capital stock. 12 There is an excess burden from 
government intervention on the optimal allocation of resources. 13 If the negative 
distortionary effects of taxation outweigh the positive benefits to public investment 
(as may happen when the level of expenditure becomes too large) then the level and 
growth of output will be lowered by this combination of policies (Barro (1990)). 
Immediately the differences between the new and old growth theories offer 
alternative explanations for the slowdown in growth. The neoclassical model 
suggests that the level and the mix of fiscal policy has no power as an explanatory 
variable of growth rates. Any correlation between the two is instead due to changes 
in the perceived role of government in, for example, social welfare provision 
(Wagner's law). Increases in the level of national income have led to increased 
expenditures on social welfare. Only in the endogenous growth model is the mix of 
fiscal policies consistent with the view that governments have caused the slowdown 
in growth. 
Public policy endogenous growth models can themselves be separated into two main 
types. The first strand encompasses those models in which fiscal policy helps to 
endogenise the rate of growth of the model (for example Barro (1990), Devarajan et 
al. (1996), Capolupo (1996)). Examples of these models tend to be concentrated, and 
better developed, in one-sector models and require taxation and government 
expenditure to be included together. For this reason this type of model is not 
encountered until Chapter 4. The second strand concerns those models in which 
fiscal policy is effective in the presence of endogenous growth. 14 This sort of model 
tends to be used when the characteristics of the fiscal instrument are such that it is 
not capable of endogenising the rate of growth, for example in two-sector tax models 
12 It should be obvious from these descriptions that we do not consider the possibility of market 
failure due to non-perfectly competitive markets. Indeed we retain the assumption of perfect 
competition throughout in order to simplify the analysis. As a point of note in models in which 
monopoly power is required to provide the incentives for R&D investment (see Aghion & Howitt 
(1998) for an excellent description of these models) then under certain conditions its removal would 
in fact lower the growth rate. 
" If there is more than one reproducible factor accumulated by economic agents then the relative 
taxation of these inputs becomes important. Such issues are taken up in Chapter 3. 
14 Endogenous growth being achieved by some means other than fiscal policy such as constant returns 
to capital. 
8 
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(Rebelo (1991), Lucas (1990), Mendoza et al. (1997)), and where public goods are 
subject to congestion in one-sector models (Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992)). The 
models can be found throughout Chapters 2 to 4. We use both types of endogenous 
growth model because the conditions under which fiscal policy is the source of 
endogenous growth are fairly limited and a concentration on only one strand of the 
literature would severely restrict the way in which we could capture the effects of 
fiscal policy in a growth model framework. is 
It should be noted that when using these models throughout the thesis we make the 
strong assumption that all changes in fiscal policy are permanent. That is we do not 
allow any forward looking behaviour from agents in the model. Relaxation of this 
assumption would have implications for both the theory and empirical testing. 
1.3: Empirical Literature 
The clarity of the relationship between fiscal policy and the growth of GDP present 
in the theoretical model does not translate itself across to the empirical literature. 
Indeed, the empirical literature has produced results which can only be described as 
diverse and, therefore, of little value when trying to explain the role of government in 
the growth slowdown. As an example of this diversity the relationship between 
transfer payments and growth has been estimated as positive (and significant), 
negative (and significant) and insignificant by various authors despite using similar 
data sets and similarly specified regressions (for details see Chapter 5). Variability in 
the estimates such as this has led to the suggestion that the use of fiscal variables in 
growth regressions be abandoned as they are more likely to represent underlying 
`symptoms' of growth performance rather than have any direct relationship 
themselves (Sala-i-Martin (1997)). 
A number of recent, more careful, studies have attempted to alter this conjecture 
(Fuente (1997), Mendoza et al. (1997)). These studies account for many of the 
statistical problems typically encountered when estimating growth regressions but, as 
 Examples of this sort of switching can be found in the literature, for example Barro & Sala-i-Martin 
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further demonstrated in Chapter 5, a comparison of their results serves only to make 
the empirical relationship appear even weaker. It is possible the lack of a consistent 
methodology combined with the continued presence of statistical biases which infect 
the results could explain some of the diversity but not all. However, there are a 
number of theoretical issues which need to be addressed and which have not yet, or 
have only incompletely, been incorporated into empirical tests. The empirical section 
of this thesis develops the theoretical issues we raise in Chapters 2 to 4 into a series 
of tests. 
1.4: Some Qualifications 
There is a limit to the number of different government interventions we can explore 
in the thesis and by concentrating on the direct effects of policy on growth we have 
chosen to ignore some important, closely related issues (some of these have already 
been highlighted in the text). 
1.4.1: Budget Deficit 
One element of fiscal policy that we ignore in our theoretical discussion is that of the 
government budget deficit. In the simple models that we consider government budget 
deficits behave as if they were lump-sum taxes and have no effect on the rate of 
growth (Ricardian Equivalence holds). As we do not consider household preference 
functions where Ricardian Equivalence is violated (such as in overlapping 
generations models) from a theoretical perspective this omission does not appear to 
be serious. In addition the empirical section of the thesis uses the deficit term to 
collect statistical error and although included in the regressions this is not discussed 
explicitly. Instead we refer the reader to Tanzi & Zee(1997) for an extensive 
discussion of the possible relationship between budget deficits and growth and to 
Levine & Krichel (1996) for an example of an endogenous growth model which 
allows budget deficits. 
(1992). 
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1.4.2: Macroeconomic Stability 
Growth models abstract from the idea of the management of the macroeconomy by 
assuming as essentially classical short-run structure of the model. There is no 
unemployment and it is relative rather than absolute prices on which agents' 
decisions are based. That is, the classical dichotomy between nominal and real 
sectors of the economy holds. The long run aggregate supply curve (LRAS) is 
vertical around the full employment output level and the economy is on the 
11 
maximum of the production possibility frontier. This therefore provides no scope for 
the use of Keynesian demand management policies. The assumption of perfect 
foresight rules out the possibility that expectations can systematically be incorrect 
and all regime shifts (such as changes in government) are fully anticipated. From this 
perspective the role of government is limited to implementing policies which shift 
the supply curve. 
Attempts have been made in the literature to incorporate some long run effects from 
instability in the macroeconomy (see Barro (1995,1996) and Bruno & Easterly 
(1996,1998) as an introduction to the topic) where the most likely effect of this 
uncertainty is on investment decision of firms. The empirical relationships between 
macro-instability and growth are non-robust. As Temple (1998) writes, "a common 
conclusion from this literature is that although `policy matters' we do not yet have 
any clear idea which elements of policy are crucial. s16 
1.4.3: Income Inequality 
In the standard model all households are identical and therefore the re-distribution of 
wealth between them is irrelevant. However, it is possible to extend the endogenous 
growth model to consider the likely growth effects of inequality in income between 
households (Alesina & Rodrik (1994), Persson & Tabellini (1994)). The link with 
fiscal policy is generated by the political economy literature and by the consistent 
finding in the empirical literature of a negative relationship between inequality and 
16 Temple (1998) pp. 41 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
growth. For example in Perotti (1996) we find that economies with an uneven 
distribution may actually have slower growth rates. 
1.5: Outline of the Thesis 
We use the remainder of this chapter to discuss the basic form of the growth models 
12 
we use throughout the thesis. This allows us to conserve space elsewhere in the thesis 
but also to highlight how fiscal policy might be introduced into growth models and 
the mechanisms by which it is effective in the endogenous growth model but not in 
the neoclassical model. We begin with a description of the neoclassical model, then 
move to the `AK' and Romer-type one-sector endogenous growth models before 
finally discussing the two-sector endogenous growth models. We do not provide a 
full description of the dynamics of the models, preferring instead to concentrate on 
the derivation of the steady state and to understand the conditions under which 
endogenous growth occurs in the models. Detailed references where full descriptions 
of the models can be found are made throughout. 
Public policy is introduced into growth models in Chapters 2 and 3. These discuss 
respectively expenditure and taxation policies. We begin in both of these chapters 
with a discussion of policy irrelevance in the neoclassical model before describing a 
simple one-sector growth model (which we develop as a neoclassical model when 
certain assumptions hold). Once we have explored some of the developments of this 
basic one sector model we move to public policy in two-sector endogenous growth 
models. Chapter 4 integrates these two halves of the government budget firstly into a 
neoclassical model, then into a one-sector model and finally a two-sector model. The 
two halves of the government budget constraint are brought together in order to 
highlight their interdependence. 
The empirical half of the thesis begins in Chapter 5 with a review of the literature. 
We also use this chapter to draw out some of the failings of this literature both in 
terms of (i) the statistical bias which might be present, and (ii) the limitations of the 
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models it claims to test. Chapters 6 to 9 conduct the empirical tests and Chapter 10 
concludes. 
1.6 Assumptions of the model 
1.6.1 The Neoclassical Model 
This section offers a general description of the assumptions underlying the growth 
models used throughout this thesis and to which we can later add fiscal policy. We 
describe the consumption and production sectors of the economy and solve for the 
equilibrium time paths of consumption and capital. The description of the models 
borrows extensively from Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) and the reader is referred to 
this text for a more complete description. " 
We assume a decentralised economy, closed to international trade, which has an 
equal number of identical households and identical firms. The rate of labour 
augmenting technological progress, (Ä) and the rate of growth of population, (L) 
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are exogenous and constant (`4 
- 
x, 
L= 
n). " A continuum of perfectly competitive AL 
households and firms are assumed to have the following properties. 
Behaviour of Households 
The representative household is infinitely-lived and chooses consumption and 
saving to maximise its dynastic utility. That is, we assume throughout that the 
Ramsey (1928) preference function, first introduced into the growth literature by 
17 We do not extend the neoclassical model to include human capital accumulation (Mankiw, Romer 
& Weil (1992)). If human capital is a reproducible factor of production then the speed of transition to 
the steady state and the effect of policy on the steady state is faster (De Long (1996)) but the effect on 
the long run growth rate of output is still zero. 
18 We normalise the number of adults at time 0 to unity, so that the labour force at time t is given by 
L(t)=e". Likewise we normalise the available technology at time 0 to unity, so that the level of 
technology at time t is given by A(t)=e'". 
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Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), holds. The preferences of the representative 
household are given by the following function, 
00 Equation 1.1 u 
-f e-°u(c)8t 
o 
where c, is consumption per person (C/L), p is the constant rate of time preference, 
(p>O), and u(c) is given by the following CIES utility function, 
cl"a 
-1 Equation 1.2 u(c) 
_ 1-Q 
which has a constant rate of intertemporal substitution Q19 Household utility is 
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maximised subject to a budget constraint, equation (1.3). The assets of the household, 
a, rise with income, w+ ra, and fall with consumption, c. The flow of income is 
made up of the return from capital, r20, and the returns from labour, w21. 
Equation 1.3 a= ra +w-c 
In order to rule out the possibility of chain letter debt finance the net present value of 
assets is constrained to being asymptotically nonnegative. If we also assume that 
agents do not leave assets at the end of time, then the transversality condition is given 
by, 
Equation 1.4 lim{a(t) exp[-fjr(v) 
- 
n]dv]} a0 
1-00 
19 The felicity function u(c) has the usual properties regarding the returns to consumption u'(c)>O, 
u"(c)<0 as well as satisfying the Inada conditions u(c)-; ºooas c- 0, and W(c) --iO as c-400. 
20 Interest income can be either positive or negative depending whether the household at that point in 
time is a debtor or creditor to other households. The representative household must hold a net zero 
position in equilibrium. 
21 Each agent supplies inelastically one unit of labour per unit of time for which they receive a wage 
which clears the competitive labour market. 
u This constraint limits the amount of borrowing each household is able to undertake in order to 
prevent households from rolling over their debt into future periods indefinitely and effectively gaining 
the first unit of consumption for free. That is, we prevent households from consuming more than the 
value of their initial wealth plus lifetime earnings. 
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Household utility (equation (1.2) is substituted into equation (1.1) for u(c)) and 
maximised subject to the household budget constraint (equation (1.3)). From this 
maximisation the growth path of consumption (known as the Euler equation) can be 
derived, 
Equation 1.5 Yc °C=1 (r - p) 
. ca 
The growth of consumption is given by the return to saving, r, less the rate of time 
preference, p, divided by the rate at which households are willing to substitute 
consumption across time, a. 
Behaviour of Firms 
Each firm has access to a constant returns to scale production function in which 
capital, K, labour, L, and a labour augmenting technology term, A, are inputs 
(equation (1.6)). 
Equation 1.6 
If we re-write capital as a ratio to effective labour, ka 
function becomes, 
Equation 1.7 
Y= F(K, AL) 
. 
AL 
, 
then the production 
v=f(k), 
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The production function is assumed to satisfy the Inada conditions, most notably that 
each input is subject to positive but diminishing marginal returns. 23The technology 
used to produce consumption or capital goods is identical such that a unit of output 
can be used either for consumption or investment in the capital stock. The evolution 
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of the capital stock is determined by investment net of depreciation. 24 Equation (1.8) 
also represents the resource constraint of the economy. 
Equation 1.8 k-f (k) 
-c- (x +n+ 8)k 
The competitive firms' flow of profits is given by the value of its output less its costs 
for capital and labour (equation (1.9)), 
Equation 1.9 
.m 
F(K, AL) 
- 
(r +. )K 
- 
wL 
The cost of capital is set by perfect competition at the rate r, which is equal to the net 
marginal product of capital, 'F 
- 
8, (where gis the constant depreciation rate of 
capital). Capital and loans are equivalent stores of value for households and therefore 
the net marginal product of capital equals the returns households receive from 
making loans. This assumption links the production and consumption sides of the 
model. The competitive wage rate is equal to the marginal product of labour, 
S 
The equilibrium profit the firm receives is zero (factor payments exactly offset total 
output) through the assumption of perfect competition and constant returns 
technology. 
Steady State 
Steady state occurs in this model when consumption and capital grow at a constant 
rate. The growth path of consumption can be found by substituting the net marginal 
product of capital, 
bF 
- 
8, into the Euler equation (equation 1.5) for the interest rate. 
23 The Inada conditions lim(FK) = lim(FL) _ 00, lim (FK) = lim (FL) =0 hold for equation K-0 L-'0 K-OD L-00 
(1.6) and equivalently lim(fk) _ 00,1im(fk) =0 for equation (1.7). k-º0 k-ºoo 
24 An implication of this assumption is that the prices of consumption or new capital are identical and 
set at unity. 
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Equation 1.10 Yc °-° 
The growth path for capital is given by equation (1.8). Equations (1.8) and (1.10) 
along with the initial capital stock and the transversality condition, 
lim{k exp(-f [f (k) 
-8-x- n]dv)} = 0, provide a system of equations which JýW 
describe the time paths of consumption and capital. The steady state can be shown 
graphically in Figure 1.4 as combinations of c and k in which the growth of the 
consumption and physical capital effective labour ratios are constant, c=k=0. u 
The steady state is then given at the intersection point A where the capital stock/ 
effective labour ratio is constant at k*. The capital/effective labour ratio is constant 
when the growth of the capital stock is exactly equal to the growth rate of labour and 
technology. Differentiating k=K with respect to time to yield AL 
kKLA 
k= 
(-) 
- 
(L) 
- 
(-) 
-0 and then substituting for the growth rates of labour and 
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technology, L=n, Ä=x, implies the capital stock grows at the rate 
K-x+n. If we 
assume Cobb-Douglas technology then the growth rate of output can be found by 
differentiating the production function with respect to time, 
Y=aK+ (1- a)(L + A) and substituting for the growth of capital, technology and YKL A' 
labour. The growth of output is therefore also equal to, 
y=x+n. 
^w 
25 The c(k) line provides the stable path for the transitional dynamics of the model, the details of 
which can be found in Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
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Ci 
K 
Figure 1.4 : Phase Plane Diagram of the Steady State in the Neoclassical Growth Model 
If there is no growth in technology or the labour force, 
L=A=0, 
then the growth LA 
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rate of capital and output are both equal to zero because of diminishing marginal 
returns to capital. This result implies that if fiscal policy helps to determine the 
growth of technological progress or population growth, then it also affects the growth 
rate of output in the neoclassical model (Peacock & Shaw (1971)). Under such 
circumstances we prefer to describe the source of growth in these models as 
endogenous rather than exogenous, and provide an example of such a model in 
section 2.4.1 (Levine & Krichel (1996)). 
In the public policy endogenous growth models that we describe in the following 
chapters, a constant positive rate of steady state growth is possible in the absence of 
labour or technology growth. In the one-sector models this occurs by preventing the 
private returns to capital from declining towards zero over time, i. e. the Inada 
condition lim (FK) =0 does not hold; while in the two-sector models this is achieved K-00 
through the separate endogenous accumulation of human capital. Growth is then a 
product of capital accumulation (and human capital accumulation in the two-sector 
models), not of technological change or labour force growth as in the neoclassical 
model. The endogenous growth literature uses two main forms of one-sector model. 
The first is the constant returns to capital, or `AK', model (Jones & Manuelli (1990)); 
and the second is the externalities, or Romer-type, model (Romer (1986)). Despite 
the fact that these models are essentially both `AK' models we highlight the 
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distinction because the Romer-type model allows fiscal policy to provide the engine 
for growth. We discuss a two-sector endogenous growth model in Section 1.2.4 
1.6.2 AK Endogenous Growth Models 
In the ` AK' model (Jones & Manuelli (1990)) a constant positive steady state growth 
rate of output is an assumption rather than a result of the model. There are constant 
returns to capital, which implies that the marginal product of capital, and therefore 
the rate of interest and the growth rate, is constant in the steady state. The violation 
of the Inada condition of diminishing marginal returns to capital is crucial for these 
results. We assume for simplicity that the supply of labour is constant and therefore 
remove it from the production function. The capital term is then generally interpreted 
as encompassing both physical and human capital as a means of justifying the 
assumption of constant returns. The firms' production function described in equation 
(1.6) above now reads as, 
Equation 1.11 Y= F(K) AK. 
The net marginal product of capital 
'=A-S, 
can be substituted for the interest 
rate in the consumption growth equation to yield the consumption growth equation, 
Equation 1.12 yc 
_ (T 
[A 
-S- p] 
The steady state growth rate is then a positive constant value if A> S+p. 26 The 
growth rate of consumption is therefore independent of the capital stock in this 
model, which results in permanent differences in growth rates across countries. 
Z6 We impose the condition that A>8+p> 
1-Q (A 
-5- p) so that utility is bounded and the 
a 
transversality lim{k(t)e-tAýaý` }=0 condition holds. 
I-CO 
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Fiscal policies affect the steady state growth rate in these `AK' model because they 
amount to shifts of the technology parameter A. Changes in fiscal policy therefore 
lead to permanent differences in growth rates across countries. Endogenous growth is 
not caused by fiscal policy in the ` AK' models as this has been made one of the 
assumptions through constant returns to capital. We use these models extensively in 
Chapters 2 and 3 when we limit the available choice of policy variables to consider 
only one half of the government budget, and again in Chapter 4 when public goods 
are subject to congestion. 
1.6.3 Romer-type Endogenous Growth Models 
The Barro (1990) public policy endogenous growth model we discuss in Chapter 4 
works on a identical principle to that of Romer (1986). There is some form of 
`externality' to the accumulation of capital, which leads to constant returns to capital 
at the aggregate level. In Romer the accumulation of capital increases the stock of 
generally available knowledge, so there is learning-by-doing. Aggregate knowledge 
is a non-rival, non-excludable input into each firm's production function, available to 
all at zero cost. Knowledge accumulation and therefore growth is endogenous to the 
economy but is assumed by each individual firm to be exogenously determined 
because the effect of its own investment is small and non-appropriable. This 
assumption is important because it allows us to retain the assumption of perfect 
competition at the firm level. The production function for the individual firm (using a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form) is given by, 27 
Equation 1.13 ye AKi'K'-a 
There are diminishing marginal returns to physical capital but constant returns across 
physical capital and knowledge. This assumption of constant returns to scale across 
capital and knowledge is crucial, for when we aggregate across all firms we arrive 
back at an `AK' type of production function. 
Equation 1.14 Y- AK 
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The marginal product of capital is constant and the economy has again a sustainable 
positive constant growth rate in the steady state. In the Barro-type endogenous 
growth model expenditure policy acts upon the production function in a manner 
similar to that of learning-by-doing in the Romer model. In this way certain fiscal 
policies become the engine for growth. This result rests heavily on the use of a 
particular mix of policy variables. 
1.6.4 Two-sector Endogenous Growth Models 
21 
Diminishing returns to capital are prevented in the two-sector models by the separate 
endogenous accumulation of human capital. The amount of human capital 
investment is determined endogenously by utility-maximising households and is 
produced using alternative technology to that of consumption goods. Equation (1.15) 
describes the production of consumption goods and physical capital investment, and 
equation (1.16) the production of human capital. 
Equation 1.15 Y=C+ K+ bK 
= 
A(qG)'9' (vK)a (UH)1-a 
Equation 1.16 H+ &H 
- 
B[(1- O)G]QZ [(1- v)K]'1 [(1- u)H]1-n 
The terms v, u, (1-v) and (1-u) describe the fraction of human and physical capital 
used in the production of capital goods and human capital. We assume, as do Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), that the production of human capital is relatively intensive 
in human capital and that the technologies are different (a-17). Both sectors are 
described by Cobb-Douglas production functions and for this reason the model will 
display constant steady state rates of growth (indeed in the steady state C, K, H and Y 
all grow at a common rate). ' 
27 We assume no growth in the stock of available labour and so remove it from the production 
function for simplicity. 
28 It is not necessary for sustainable growth for both sectors of the economy to exhibit constant returns 
to scale in K and H and the reader is referred to Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995 Ch. 
-5 pp. 198) for a description of the conditions necessary for endogenous steady state growth. 
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If we maximise the utility function in the usual way we get a time path of 
consumption that does not look unusual in comparison to those described above, 
Equation 1.17 rc °1 [A(vK)(1 a) - S- pJ 
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Since H and K grow at identical rates in the steady state then the marginal product of 
physical capital is constant and the economy exhibits a sustainable rate of growth. 
The derivation of the growth rates of human and physical capital is more complex 
than the equivalent one-sector case and instead the reader is referred to Barro & Sala- 
i-Martin (1995) for details. 
The inclusion of fiscal policy is not necessary to endogenise the growth rate in these 
two-sector models 29 Indeed if fiscal policy performs the same function as in the 
Romer externality type model then there are problems of how to model increasing 
returns to scale in a dynamic optimisation framework and retain the assumption of 
perfect competition. One possible means of overcoming this problem is to model 
fiscal policy as affecting the accumulation of human capital only (Capolupo (1996)). 
A second possible method is to restrict the form of government expenditures such 
that they amount to one-off shifts in the level of technology through the parameters A 
and B. 30 Fiscal policy then behaves in the same way as in the one-sector `AK' 
models. 
1.7 Conclusions 
Diminishing returns to capital investment in the neoclassical growth model, means 
firms only find it profitable to invest as the technology in the economy improves. In 
contrast, in the endogenous growth model output growth is not limited by 
diminishing returns and instead grows as fast as firms investment in the factors of 
29 In the case of the two-sector models with government expenditure this appears to be a major source 
of their lack of development in the literature. 
3o A third possible means is to remove the assumption of perfect competition altogether. There are 
currently no examples of fiscal policy in a growth model with imperfect competition. 
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production. These different descriptions of the causes of growth have in turn 
differing implications for government policy. Under the neoclassical growth model 
governments are restricted to adopting policies which encourage technological 
change if they wish to permanently raise the growth rate, whereas in the endogenous 
growth model policies which encourage factor input accumulation induce faster 
growth. The endogenous growth models therefore offer governments a much broader 
range of effective policies to choose from, and it is the scope of this choice that we 
focus on in the next three chapters. Chapter 2 considers government expenditures, 
Chapter 3 taxation and Chapter 4 brings both halves of the budget constraint 
together. Only in the last of these three chapters does government policy actually 
provide the ` engine for growth'. 
Chapter 2 
Government Expenditures in Models of Economic Growth 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we noted that the government can increase the growth rate of 
the economy if it supplies the goods and services to the private sector in which there 
would be sub-optimal investment in the absence of intervention (i. e. there is some 
form of market failure). In the neoclassical model the returns to these public 
investments are not sufficiently large to prevent the diminishing returns to capital 
investment which limit growth, whereas in the endogenous growth model they are. 
Within this chapter we must depart from this general description of the differences 
between the neoclassical and endogenous growth models because in order to 
concentrate solely on government expenditures we assume they are financed using 
lump-sum taxes. Lump-sum taxes have the advantage that they have no effect on the 
decisions of households or firms and so do not `pollute' the effects of expenditures 
on growth, ' but the disadvantage that, unlike distortionary taxes, they are incapable 
of providing one of the necessary mechanisms for fiscal policy to endogenise the 
growth rate. Policy enters both models in an identical manner, so the differences in 
the results rest not on the behaviour of fiscal policy, but instead, on the treatment of 
capital in the production function. The endogenous growth models we discuss in this 
chapter are therefore, of an `AK' form where endogenous growth is an assumption of 
the model (see Section 1.6.2 for a review). This represents a departure from the 
original Barro (1990) model, but is necessary if expenditures are to be considered 
alone. 
1 This result is robust to changes in the household preference function and the firms' production 
function. 
2 We are forced to make a similar assumption in the next chapter. 
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Although the categorisation of expenditures between those which affect private 
production (which we label productive expenditures) and those which do not (which 
we label non-productive expenditures) is sufficient to determine the effect a 
particular expenditure policy has on growth, productive expenditures display a range 
of other characteristics which we are unlikely to capture through the use of a 
homogeneous productive expenditure term? For example, education is dominated by 
public sector inputs in its production whereas transport infrastructure is often 
produced using private sector inputs/contractors. Additionally, education expenditure 
affects the accumulation of human capital in the economy whereas transport 
infrastructure raises private sector productivity directly. Differences in the 
combination of characteristics of this sort alter the way in which we choose to model 
productive expenditure, and in certain cases can remove the long run relationship 
between policy and the growth rate. We review the characteristics of expenditures in 
Section 2.1.1 and model various combinations of these characteristics in section 2.4. 
In the neoclassical growth model the distinction between productive and non- 
productive types of expenditure is valueless (as is a discussion of their 
characteristics) as no type of expenditure determines the steady state growth rate. 
We can however, show that distinguishing between different types of expenditure 
may be important in determining their effect on income levels. We review the results 
for the neoclassical model in Section 2.2 and demonstrate that changes in 
government expenditure affect only the level of output of the economy. 
Finally, Section 2.5 adds government expenditure to a two-sector endogenous growth 
model where growth is endogenised through the separate accumulation of human 
capital. Unlike the tax models of the next chapter expenditures play exactly the same 
role as in the one-sector model and so very few new results are added. 
' We assume in our modelling of productive expenditures that the marginal social benefit of the fiscal 
instrument is positive (the social benefits to production are greater than the cost of the absorption of 
output). The model could readily be extended to cases where the social benefit is negative. 
'As we demonstrate below we may still wish to distinguish between some of the characteristics of 
expenditure policies even in the neoclassical growth model, as government expenditure is still an 
effective determinant of the level of output. 
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2.1.1 Characteristics of Government Expenditure 
The principal issue concerning public expenditures in endogenous growth models is 
whether the policy fits into either the production or consumption sectors of the 
model. Only those expenditures that are included in the production sector affect the 
growth rate. Non-productive expenditures are assumed to be perfect substitutes for 
private consumption and are therefore modelled as additional inputs to the household 
utility function. Non-productive expenditures have no effect on the 
saving/investment decision because of the assumed nature of the preference function. 
We define all types of non-productive expenditure in this way so their attributes 
require little discussion. 
Productive Government Expenditures 
A large number of public expenditures could be thought of as enhancing (or 
retarding) the production of output in the economy, and it is likely that few of these 
forms of expenditure affect output growth in a homogeneous manner. We use the 
variations of the Barro (1990) model to discuss the scope for public expenditures to 
affect the growth of output. These can broadly be thought of as being of two types; i) 
changes to the characteristics of the productive expenditure term; and iii) changes in 
the manner by which expenditures affect the production of output (expenditures that 
encourage the accumulation of additional reproducible factors). We consider this 
second question first. 
Reproducible Factors of Production 
Barro (1990) assumes that all productive expenditures are complementary to private 
production and can therefore be modelled as additional inputs to the firms' 
production function (they directly affect the marginal product of capital). 
Government expenditures promote growth by correcting the market failure (re- 
allocating the stock of available resources) caused by the public good nature of some 
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types of capital. This assumption clearly limits the role of expenditure policy, and 
ignores expenditures such as those on policing, public sector R&D or health 
expenditures which have an indirect effect on production via investment or human 
capital accumulation (i. e. expenditures which encourage the accumulation of 
additional factors of production). Capolupo (1996) models public goods as inputs in 
the production of human capital (education expenditure) in both one-sector and two- 
sector models. In comparison Levine & Krichel (1996) allow expenditures to 
determine the rate of labour-augmenting technological change. Barro & Sala-i- 
Martin (1995) develop the idea of productive expenditures and model them as 
increasing the likelihood of maintaining ownership of output, as in the protection of 
property rights, and hence the investment decision. The underlying transmission 
mechanism is altered in these models, but it has no consequence for the way public 
goods behave in the steady state (the equations for the steady state all look identical). 
Characteristics of Productive Expenditure 
The second strand of the literature develops the set of characteristics which 
productive expenditure display. Models of economic growth limit the role of 
government to correction for market failure. In addition the model assumes that the 
technology the government has available to produce the goods and services to correct 
for market failure is identical, or at least not less efficient, that of the private sector. 
There is private production but public provision (Barro (1990)). If the government 
exceeds this albeit limited role and intervenes where market failures are not present, 
and/or the productivity of the public sector is below that of the private sector, then 
the growth potential of government expenditures may be unrealised. Government 
intervention acts like a tax and private sector investment is `crowded-out'. Despite 
the ease with which examples may be found which do not satisfy either assumption, 
this is not an issue we choose to explore in any great depth (although we do develop 
a very simple model in Section 2.4.2 as an example). The addition of a separate 
production function for public goods requires the addition of a government objective 
function in order to determine the choice of the level of expenditure. This in turn 
requires a discussion of social welfare, which is well beyond the scope of the thesis. 
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Barro assumes that all government expenditures are productive as flows of goods 
into the production function. Such a characterisation of expenditures is unlikely to be 
true in all cases, as some forms of productive expenditures, transport infrastructure 
for example, may be better thought of as a stock of public capital. The distinction 
between flows (Barro (1990)) or stocks of public goods (Glomm & Ravikumar 
(1994,1997), Futagami et al. (1993)) adds, somewhat surprisingly, very little to the 
model though. The equation for the steady state is identical in both cases and the 
addition to the model comes instead from transitional dynamics not present in the 
Barro model. Given that the interest of the thesis is in the behaviour of the steady 
state rather than transitional dynamics this is not a model we explore in any great 
depth. 
Barro assumes that productive expenditures are homogeneous in their effect on 
production. That is, the marginal benefit of different expenditure categories is 
identical, and therefore they can be aggregated into a single term. In practice it seems 
doubtful that the effect of a unit increase in education expenditure on the rate of 
growth is identical to that of health expenditure and this is supported by empirical 
evidence (Devarajan et al. (1996)). Removing this assumption and allowing multiple 
forms of productive goods within the same production function adds to the set of 
results through the possibility of growth effects from the mix as well as the level of 
expenditure. 
The final characteristic of productive expenditure we consider is the degree to 
which the public good or service is subject to rivalry and excludability (Barro & 
Sala-i-Martin (1992)). Excludability refers to the technical ability to prevent or limit 
the use of the public good or service by private producers (a quantity constraint), 
whereas rivalry impinges the quality of the public good through its use by other 
producers. Three alternative combinations of rivalry and excludability are 
developed by Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992): (i) rival and excludable public goods; 
(ii) non-rival and non-excludable public goods; and (iii) rival but non-excludable 
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(and therefore subject to congestion)' public goods. The first two are generally seen 
as useful extreme representations for capturing certain characteristics of 
expenditures, such as those on health and education (Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980), 
Barro (1990), Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992)). We use these first two definitions of 
public goods interchangeably throughout the text as they have no real impact on the 
results. We cannot do the same for congested public goods as the congestion of 
public expenditures over time renders the results for fiscal policy from the 
endogenous growth model redundant. This has interesting implications as it 
suggests that even if we make endogenous growth an assumption of the model, if 
public goods are subject to congestion then, under certain conditions, productive 
expenditures may not help to determine the steady state growth rate. 
Excludability of public goods suggests that an individual firm has excludable 
ownership over a certain quantity of publicly provided input. The fact that public 
goods are rival is irrelevant in this setting as each individual can prevent other firms 
from trespassing or congesting the quantity or quality of public goods. This form of 
productive expenditure is commonly known as a private public good because of the 
complete property rights that exist for each producer over their proportion of 
government expenditure. For example the production function of firm i is given by: 
Equation 2.1 Y-f (Kj, Gr 
where Y, is output of firm i, K, is the capital input used by firm i, and G,, is 
government expenditure available to the individual firm i (i =1 to n), where n is the 
number of producers 
Aggregating across all producers produces the following production function: 
Equation 2.2 Ymf (K, gy 
s Congestion is the impingement upon the quality of the publicly provided good or service received 
by each individual producer through its use by other producers. 
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Where gy is the equal proportion of productive government expenditure received by 
each producer (gy= G,, /n). 
If productive expenditures can be described as non-rival and non-excludable in 
nature then consideration as to the amount each individual firm receives is 
unwarranted. Each individual producer does not affect the quantity or quality of 
service any other producer receives. This is commonly known as a pure-public good 
(Samuelson (1954)) as there are no enforceable property rights over part of 
government expenditure by individuals. The firms' production function includes 
total productive expenditure as input, Gy, rather than the share per capita. 
Equation 2.3 Y=f (K1, Gy 
which, aggregating across all firms, can be written as: 
Equation 2.4 Y=f (K, Gy) 
. 
Barro & Sala-i-Martin argue that a third alternative specification is the most likely 
description of most government expenditures (transport and communication 
infrastructure being obvious examples). Productive expenditures are included as 
inputs into the production function of firm i as the ratio of total government 
expenditure, Gy, to private output, Y (Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995)). ' As aggregate 
output increases there is a decrease in the ratio GY/Y, and congestion of public 
expenditures. The value to the productive process of government expenditure 
diminishes because of the congestion created by the increase in the output of all 
producers, Y. This negative externality is ignored when the firm decides its output 
and investment decisions as its own effect on congestion is infinitesimally small. 
The production function of the individual firm can be written as: 
6 In Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992) the private production suffers congestion through the aggregate 
capital stock term not aggregate output. Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) note that this change in 
assumption does not change the nature of the results. 
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Equation 2.5 Yf (K,, 1) 
. Y 
Alternative formulations of congestion are available in the literature, and these offer 
a more satisfying description of congestion than the normalisation of public goods 
to the size of the economy described above. For example Fisher & Turnovsky 
(1998) develop a specification of congestion based on the median voter model of 
Edwards (1990). Congested public goods are given by: 
Equation 2.6 Gsy; 
- 
Gy(Kj )I-°' 
K 
where 0stvsl and G1 is the stock of productive expenditures available to firm i. 
K2 represents the capital stock of the individual firm, K the aggregate capital stock, 
G1 aggregate public capital and w the congestion parameter. The congestion of 
public goods increases with increases in the total private capital stock and decreases 
with increases in the public capital stock. If co=1, then public goods are non- 
rivalrous (there is no congestion) and if o--0, congestion increases in direct 
proportion to increases in the capital stock (as in Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992)). If 
O<w<1 then there is a degree of congestion and the results lie between the 
formulation of congested goods in (2.5) and the non-congested public goods case. ' 
By using these extreme descriptions of congestion we are able to capture the limits 
of this more general formulation of congestion. 
Alternatively Glomm & Ravikumar (1994) write their formulation of congested 
goods as: 
7 When public goods are subject to any degree of congestion, 0<ax1, public expenditures have no 
effect on the steady state growth rate. The measure of congestion does, however, affect the speed of 
transition to the steady state growth rate. The lower the rivalrous nature of public goods, the less 
congested it is (w is close to 1) the slower the speed of transition to the steady state from a change in 
public expenditure. 
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Equation 2.7 GS, 
r eG KO)Lý 
where 0s co, 
This can be seen to be a similar formulation to Fisher & Turnovsky in that 
congestion increases with increases in the private capital stock and decreases with 
increases in public expenditures, but it now also depends on the size of the labour 
force. If the growth of the labour force is zero (and hence labour term can be 
suppressed from equation (2.7)) and w=1 then we are back to the Barro & Sala-i- 
Martin (1992) formulation where the congestion of public goods is proportional to 
the size of the aggregate capital stock. Once again we describe the extreme cases to 
provide the limits of this more generalised formulation. 
2.2 The Neoclassical Model 
- 
Policy Ineffectiveness 
Discussion of the defining characteristics of public expenditures in the context of a 
neoclassical growth model is relevant only if there is interest in the relationship 
between the level of expenditures and the level of output. There are no growth effects 
from fiscal policy in the neoclassical model. To demonstrate the differences between 
the neoclassical and endogenous growth models clearly we include fiscal policy in an 
identical manner to the Barro (1990) endogenous growth model. We assume that the 
rate of growth of the labour force and labour-augmenting technological change are 
zero (allowing for either does not alter the results). 
For simplicity we write the production function in a Cobb-Douglas form with 
constant returns to scale in capital and labour. To this we add the term G,, which we 
use to represent productive government expenditures. We describe productive 
expenditures as non-rival, non-excludable public goods that are productive as a flow 
of goods and services. Gy is assumed to be produced under an identical technology to 
that of private goods; to affect production directly; and for all productive goods have 
a homogeneous effect on output. The elasticity of output with respect to government 
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expenditures is given by X6, and we assume that 0<ß<1 so that public goods, like all 
inputs in (2.8) are subject to diminishing marginal returns! 
Equation 2.8 y. AKaLl aGY 
Government expenditures are financed by a lump-sum tax at the rate z: 9 The 
government budget constraint (constrained to balance at every moment in time) is 
given by: '° 
Equation 2.9 G=r. 
where G-G,, + Gc and Gc is government consumption expenditure (see below). 
The resource constraint of the economy is given as: 
Equation 2.10 Y=C+I+G 
where C is consumption, I investment and G total government expenditures. 
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Using I- K+ SK and G=r (2.10) can be re-written as (2.11), the growth equation 
of capital: 
Equation 2.11 K-Y-C-bK-r. 
As in the previous chapter household utility is assumed to be a function of private 
consumption and government consumption expenditure, Gc. We further assume that 
government consumption expenditure and private consumption are perfect 
substitutes. For this reason the provision of consumption by the government has no 
effect on the choice of consumption by households. Equation (1.9) from chapter 1 
now reads: 
8The value of ß has only a small part to play in this model but the assumption we make regarding its 
value when we add distortionary taxation to the model (Chapter 4) is crucial for the results. 
We choose lump-sum taxes because they are non-distortionary and therefore have no effect on any 
part of the models that we consider. 
10 We assume that taxation is time invariant, although as Chamley (1986) demonstrates the optimal 
tax schedule may be time variant. Such issues are outside the scope of this thesis. 
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Equation 2.12 u(c, Gc) 
-f e- (c 0 
ý8t 
1-c 
where 0<ý<1 
The basic set-up of the model is identical to that in Chapter 1 except the felicity 
function, u(c, Gc) replaces u(c). Household utility is maximised subject to the 
economy's resource constraint to yield the growth path for consumption (equation 
(2.13)). The level of government expenditures is taken as given because each firm 
assumes that their increase in output does not affect the available amount of 
productive expenditures. In the context of this model this assumption would appear 
34 
to be obvious, as the steady state level of productive expenditure is constant anyhow. 
This assumption has greater importance when we consider the congested public good 
model in Section 2.3 below and the models of Chapter 4. 
Equation 2.13 1 [a4Ka-1L'G- 
- 
8- p]. rc = 1-(1-o)(1-ý) 
Equations (2.11) and (2.13) combined with the transversality condition in footnote 26 
of Chapter 1 provide the solution to the time paths of consumption and capital, and 
mirror equations (1.8) and (1.10) in Chapter 1. The interest rate is constant, r-0, 
when the growth of the capital stock is equal to the growth of the labour force plus 
technology and when the growth in government expenditures is constant. This can be 
seen in equation (2.13) where the growth rate of consumption is constant when the 
capital-labour ratio is constant and the level of government expenditure is constant. 
By assumption the growth of population and technology is zero, 
Ä=L 
=0. 
Differentiating the government budget constraint in (2.9) with respect to time 
demonstrates that the growth of government expenditure is also zero, 
G==0. If 
G 
we differentiate the production function with respect to time and substitute for the 
growth of technology, population and government expenditures, then we can show 
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YAKLG 
that the growth rate of output is also zero, YQA+aK+ (1- a) L +'8 GY Ll 0. Y 
Adding public goods to aid private production or provide utility to households has no 
affect on the steady state growth rate in this model. " Firms find it optimal to invest 
only to the point at which the capital stock depreciates. Hence, there is no growth in 
the inputs and therefore output. These results are robust to all changes in the 
characteristics of productive expenditures. 
Fiscal policy may not affect the growth rate but it does affect the position of the 
steady state (and hence the level of income). This can be seen through the use of a 
phase diagram of the dynamic equations of the model (Figure 2.1). Increases 
(decreases) in productive expenditures have two effects on the economy; they raise 
(lower) the marginal product of capital by the term (G,, )8 increasing output; but 
reduce (increase) the resources available to the rest of the economy through the 
resource constraint. From equation (2.13) it is clear that the first of these effects 
causes the C=0 line to move unambiguously to the right, while both combine in the 
movement of the line 
k=0. The movement of 
k-0 depends whether the effect on 
the marginal product of capital, (Gy)°, is greater than the effect of a reduction in 
available resources. Figure 2.1 demonstrates this for the phase planes of C and K, 
assuming the total effect on K is positive. The steady state levels of C and K at point 
B are greater than those at point A. Expansionary fiscal policy has increased the level 
of income in the economy. Fiscal policy also affects the transition between these 
equilibria (and hence the growth rate in the transition). 
11 It follows therefore that if we alter the mix of government expenditures between productive and 
non-productive types we have no affect on the steady state growth rate. 
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Ic 
Figure 2.1: Level Effects of Increases in Productive Government Expenditures in the Neoclassical 
Growth Model 
In contrast to an increase in productive expenditures the effect of an increase in 
government consumption expenditure comes only through the reduction in the 
resources available to the rest of the economy. The more goods consumed by the 
government, obviously the fewer can be consumed by the private sector if K is to be 
held constant. The private sector becomes `crowded-out'. In Figure 2.2 this leads to a 
reduction in the k=0 line and the steady state values of C and K move from point 
A to point B'. The equilibrium levels of C and K and therefore income are below 
those in the absence of government intervention. 
Ct 
Is 
Figure 2.2 Level Effects of Increases in Non-productive Government Expenditures in the 
Neoclassical Growth Model 
The role of fiscal policy in the neoclassical model has been well researched despite 
the fact that it is ineffective in determining the growth rate. Examples of fiscal 
policies that affect the position of the steady state (such as those discussed by 
Feldstein (1973)) are provided in Atkinson & Stiglitz (1980); Peacock & Shaw 
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(1971) discuss ways in which fiscal policy may affect the growth of technical 
progress or the labour force; and Cornwall (1963), R. Sato (1963) and K. Sato (1967) 
discuss how fiscal policy helps to determine the speed of adjustment to the steady 
state. 
2.3 Endogenous Growth Models (Barro) 
- 
Effective Fiscal Policy 
The Barro (1990) model represents the first, and perhaps the simplest, example of 
public policy endogenous growth models in the literature. The model uses an 
identical set of assumptions to the neoclassical model bar one. Production is assumed 
to be linearly homogeneous in capital. Fiscal policy is effective in the Barro model 
because of this assumption. The addition of productive government expenditures to a 
growth model is not sufficient in itself to endogenise the growth rate, hence 
endogenise growth is required as an assumption of the model. The difference 
between the results for the neoclassical and endogenous models (in this chapter) are 
therefore based solely on a mathematical restriction on the assumed nature of 
production technology. The importance of this mathematical restriction for the 
results from the models is well understood (Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995)), although 
the economic implications of it are not (see Solow (1994), Romer (1994) and 
Mankiw (1995) for a discussion of the assumptions and implications of `AK' 
endogenous growth models versus neoclassical growth models). 
Production technology is given by the ` AK' functional form described in Chapter 1 
Section 1.2.2, to which we now add government expenditures as an input into this 
process (in non-rival, non-excludable form). 12 There are constant returns to capital 
but increases in public goods are subject to diminishing marginal returns. 
Equation 2.14 Y= AKG" 
where 0</3<1. 
12 It follows naturally from this that the production function for rival, excludable public goods could 
be written as Ya AKgy and as Y= AK( 
GY) 5 for rival, non-excludable public goods. 
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Utility (which includes government consumption expenditure) is maximised in the 
usual way and the steady-state growth rate of consumption is as equation (2.15). 
Equation 2.15 Yc =1 [AGY -8- p] 
The growth rate of consumption is a positive constant because the determinants of 
the steady state are all constant (there is no growth in technology and no growth in 
the level of government expenditures). " In equilibrium productive expenditures 
have a positive effect on the marginal product of capital and hence on the growth 
rate. 
The steady state growth rate is an increasing function at all sizes of government 
(shown in Figure 2.3) but subject to diminishing returns (the slope of the function is 
given by the elasticity parameter fl). 
7 
Gy 
Figure 2.3 Growth Effects of Increases in Productive Government Expenditures in an `AK' 
Endogenous Growth Model 
Government consumption expenditure has a benign effect on the steady state rate of 
consumption, because it does not distort the Euler equation. " This holds because 
"Because there is no growth of government expenditures the economy is always in its steady state, 
that is there are no transitional dynamics in the model. 
14 Cashin (1995) argues that some forms of government consumption expenditure have a positive 
effect on the rate of growth and models them as such without altering the household utility function 
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government consumption expenditure and private consumption are perfect 
substitutes and therefore yield an identical level of utility. " It follows from this 
discussion that if we alter the mix of total government expenditure, G, towards 
productive government expenditure, G,,, and away from non-productive 
expenditure, Gc, there would be an increase in the steady state growth rate. 
Congested Public Goods 
Changing the characteristics of public goods to ones where they now display rivalry 
and excludability adds nothing to the model. The growth rate of consumption would 
then be given by: 
Equation 2.16 yc =1 [AgY -- p] 1-(1-Q)(1-ý) 
The congested public goods case is interesting because it resembles the endogenous 
growth model in that the steady state rate of growth is a positive constant value, but 
the neoclassical model in that at the limit (of time) productive goods are irrelevant 
for determining the steady state growth rate. Equation (2.17) gives the growth rate of 
consumption. 
Equation 2.17 
'VC a1 [A(GY p] Y 
The ratio G/Y declines towards zero as output tends to infinity, 
slim 
y'' 
--ý 0, 
because GY 
- 
0, that is as public goods become congested. The steady state growth 
Y 
rate in this model is equal to the technology parameter, A (the marginal product of 
from the Ramsey (1928) form. Cashin achieves this by instead modelling government consumption 
expenditures as inputs into the production function. Consumption expenditure therefore becomes 
equivalent to productive expenditure. 
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capital). Only if public goods expand at the same rate as output can public goods 
permanently affect the steady state (although public policy will still not have caused 
endogenous growth). There is no such mechanism at present for this to occur in this 
chapter but there is in Chapter 4 when productive expenditures are modelled 
simultaneously with distortionary taxes. 
Public policy affects the transition to the steady state, as in the neoclassical model, 
the speed of this adjustment depending on the value of the parameter /3. The lower 
the value of 8 the slower the adjustment to the steady state. 16 If, as Barro & Sala-i- 
Martin (1992) suggest, a large number of productive expenditures are subject to 
congestion, then even in the presence of sustainable growth public policy may not 
permanently affect the long run growth rate of the economy. 
2.4 Extensions to the Barro Model 
Productive expenditure in the Barro (1990) model are assumed to directly affect the 
production function as a flow of goods and services; to be produced under identical 
technology to private output; and the magnitude of the effect of productive 
expenditures on growth is assumed to be homogeneous. " Many of the extensions to 
the Barro model made in the literature reflect different combinations of 
characteristics discussed in Section 2.1.1. We use this section to assess the impact on 
the model of this work. 
'S We could extend the non-productive expenditure model to consider multiple forms of government 
consumption expenditure but given these results there is little value to this. 
16 Estimates of the elasticity of government expenditures in production function regression equations 
vary considerably. For example Aschauer (1989) estimate the elasticity of public goods as being in 
the range 0.34-0.73 using a Cobb-Douglas approach; Bajo-Rubio & Sosvilla-Rivero (1993) and Otto 
& Vos (1996) estimate a parameter in the range of 0.17-0.19 using a cointegration approach and; 
Merriman (1990) an elasticity in the range 0.43-0.58 using a translog production function. 
17 We choose to omit from the model non-productive government expenditures. There inclusion has 
no substantive change on the results. 
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2.4.1 Indirect Productive Expenditures 
Barro assumes that all productive government expenditures have public good 
characteristics and therefore directly affect private sector production. It is however, 
simple to think of examples of expenditure where this is not the case. Education or 
health expenditure affects the quantity or quality of human capital; whereas policing 
affects the expected returns from investment. We draw upon three models developed 
in the literature to assess the impact of allowing expenditures to encourage the 
accumulation of other reproducible factors. The first is an education model based on 
Capolupo (1996), and the second is labour-augmenting technological change (Levine 
& Krichel (1996)). Both work on a similar basis because of the need to retain the 
one-sector framework and provide the necessary conditions for endogenous growth. 
The third is slightly different from these two although the results are qualitatively 
very similar. This third model increases the probability of retaining ownership over 
capital encouraging further investment (Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992)). 18 
Labour Augmenting Technological Change 
In the model used so far output is a function of the composite capital term `AK' 
which includes both physical capital and human capital. Both the Levine & Krichel 
(1996) and the Capolupo (1996) models disaggregate this composite term and 
assume human capital is produced under an alternative technology to physical 
capital. Government expenditures are then restricted to affect the production of 
human capital only. 
Aggregate output is a function of human and physical capital with constant returns 
to scale at the aggregate level and diminishing marginal returns to each individual 
input. We remove public goods from the production of aggregate output in order to 
concentrate on the indirect effects of fiscal policy. Using a C-D form, the 
production function of firm i is given by, 
18 Technically this model does not encourage the accumulation of additional reproducible factors but 
of capital investment. It could however be argued that this form of expenditure is different from the 
re-allocation of the given stock of capital goods. 
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Equation 2.18 Y- AKr_aH, 
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Levine & Krichel (1996) assume human capital in firm i is produced using a 
combination of raw labour, L;, and an efficiency parameter unique to firm i, E. The 
growth rate of labour is assumed to be constant so that changes in human capital can 
occur only through changes to the efficiency of the use of raw labour. 
Equation 2.19 HJ 
= Eý L, 
The efficiency of labour of firm i is a function of aggregate labour, private capital 
and public expenditure. Efficiency is assumed to accumulate linearly in K. 19 
Equation 2.20 
r 
ei 
-BI 
GY Kt 
Li 
Assuming all firms are identical allows us to substitute the efficiency production 
function (equation (2.20)) into the human capital function (equation (2.19)) and then 
into the production function for output (equation (2.18)). The resulting equation is: 
Equation 2.21 
or 
Equation 2.22 
where J= AB" and ß-ya 
y= ABaK(1-a)+aG ay 
y 
Y= JKGY 
Maximising consumer utility subject to the usual constraints leads to the following 
growth rate of consumption: 
Equation 2.23 yc =1 [JGy 6-8-p] 
19 We require this restriction on the production function in order to produce a constant rate of growth 
in the model. This is a simplification of the Krichel & Levine (1995) model and is required because 
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There is no growth of expenditures and so the steady state rate of growth is 
constant. Government expenditures affect the steady state through the marginal 
product of capital, however, the relationship is indirect through the increasing 
efficiency of labour. Public goods in this model perform exactly the same function 
as labour augmenting technological change in the neoclassical model of Chapter 1. 
Unlike in the original paper there is no growth in the efficiency of human capital in 
this model because we assume only lump-sum taxes are used to finance government 
expenditures. 
Education Expenditure 
A similar model to this is developed by Capolupo (1996) except that the Capolupo 
model works by assuming that human capital production uses only public goods as 
inputs. The absence of physical capital in the human capital production function 
requires aggregate output to be linear in physical capital, K, for endogenous 
growth20 The production of aggregate output is given by: 
Equation 2.24 Y- AKHa 
and the production of human capital by: 
Equation 2.25 H- GY 
Substituting for H in equation (2.24) yields an aggregate production function which 
is of identical form to that used in the Barro model. The effect of public goods on 
the steady state is therefore also identical. 
Returns to Investment 
Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995-Ch. 4) develop a model in which the marginal 
productivity of capital in production is increased indirectly through the perceived 
we do not use distortionary taxation to fund government expenditure. Under such circumstances we 
cannot endogenise the rate of growth and require an `AK' model. 
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returns to investment. Public expenditures, such as national defence, policing or the 
judiciary, influence the likelihood of maintaining ownership, and hence affect the 
decision to invest. The probability of maintaining ownership is assumed to be an 
increasing function of government expenditures subject to diminishing returns: 
Equation 2.26 
where [p'(. )>O 
P=P(GY) 
and p"(. )<O]. 
If output is produced using `AK' technology then the steady state growth rate is 
given by: 
1 
Equation 2.27 ya [Ap(GY) 
-8- p] 1-(1-Q)(1-ý) 
The growth rate is increasing in government expenditures, p'(GY)>O, but is subject to 
diminishing marginal returns, p"(Gy)<O. Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) assume that 
the level of protection (for a given level of government expenditure) is a decreasing 
function with respect to the volume of output it is required to protect (there is 
congestion). If this holds then public goods are no longer determinants of the long 
run growth rate. 
2.4.2 Characteristics of Productive Expenditures 
Relative Technology 
One of the assumptions characterising public goods in the Barro model is that the 
public and private sectors enjoy identical technology. Given that the policy of 
competitive tendering employed in the UK throughout the 1980-90s was based on 
the assumption that the technology of the public sector was less efficient than the 
private sector, then it is perhaps surprising that this issue has so far received so little 
attention in the literature. We develop a very simple model to demonstrate the 
20 We simplify Capolupo by assuming human capital is a flow rather than a stock. 
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possible means by which relative efficiency could be introduced into a one-sector 
model. The results from this model rest crucially on the assumption that capital is 
linear in the production of public goods and that the proportion of the capital stock 
used in the production of public goods is set by some exogenous factor. The 
development of the model would require a description of the government's 
objective function and associated social welfare costs. The choice over the level of 
private capital used in the production of public goods could then become 
endogenous to the model but the results would depend on the form of the objective 
function chosen. Considerations such as these lie well outside the scope of this 
thesis and we choose to simplify the analysis by ignoring them altogether. 
Assuming constant returns to scale in the production of private output and 
diminishing marginal returns to each input results in the following production 
function: 
Equation 2.28 Y=AK''GY 
Relative efficiency is introduced by assuming public goods are produced under an 
alternative technology to private goods (consumption and investment). 21 Public 
goods use `AK' technology in their production given below, where the marginal 
product of capital in the public goods sector by the technological parameter B. 
Equation 2.29 Gy=BK 
A simple substitution of (2.29) into the production function for aggregate output, 
equation (2.28), for G,, yields an alternative aggregate production function, 
Equation 2.30 Y= AKI_' [BK]" 
or 
Equation 2.31 Y= ABaK 
45 
21 The substitution on which the results are based was inspired by a similar one in Capolupo (1996). 
Capolupo overcome the problem as to the choice over the level of private capital used in the 
education sector by assuming human capital is produced only using public goods. 
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This substitution, and hence the results, rely heavily on the assumption that public 
goods production is linear in capital. 
The growth rate is now given by the available technology in both sectors of the 
economy. The relative technology of the public sector is weighted by the term a 
which corresponds to the elasticity of output with respect to public goods. u The 
steady state rate of growth is given by, 
Equation 2.32 yC =1 [AB' -8- p] 
The steady state rate of growth is independent of the size of government but public 
goods still affect the growth rate through the marginal product of capital. If the 
relative efficiency of the public sector is below that of the public sector (A>Ba), 
then the steady state rate of growth will be lower than when both sectors share 
identical technology. In this sense the relative productivity acts like a tax on the 
steady state as private investment is `crowded-out'. 
The Stock of Productive Government Expenditures 
Government expenditures in the Barro (1990) model are flow inputs in the private 
production function. Glomm & Ravikumar (1994,1997) and Futagami et al. (1993) 
alter this assumption to model public goods as stocks of capital (such as transport 
infrastructure). Although the use of public capital has many appealing features it has 
no effect on the behaviour of the steady state equation and the additions from the 
model are in the transitional dynamics not present in Barro (1990). 2' 
22 The efficiency term, B, would appear to be similar to the eternality term which appears in Fuente 
(1997). However, the externality term in Fuente is not derived from an underlying production 
function of public goods, indeed public and private goods are assumed to be produced using identical 
technology. 
' The transitional dynamic described in Glomm & Ravikumar (1994,1997) and Futagami et al. 
(1993) papers would be more complicated than those in this much simpler model. 
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The description of public inputs as; rival and excludable; non-rival and non- 
excludable: and rival, non-excludable goods, is not complicated by changing the 
nature of expenditures from a flow to a stock. The three cases make as much 
intuitive sense as a stock as they do as a flow (in fact for the congestion case 
perhaps more so). The production function is given by: 
Equation 2.33 Y= AKGf 
where Gys is the stock of public capital. 
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The stock of productive government capital is assumed to evolve with investment in 
public capital, 'G, and decreases with depreciation. ' 
Equation 2.34 GYs =IG- 8G 5 
The resource constraint of the economy changes so that it includes government 
investment, IG, rather than the flow of government expenditures G. 
Equation 2.35 Y=C+IK+IG 
The receipts from taxation fund investment in the stock of public goods and the 
government budget constraint must be altered to account for this. 
Equation 2.36 IG 
-T. 
Utility is maximised in the usual manner and the balanced growth rate of 
consumption is given as: 
1 
Equation 2.37 yc 
_ 
[AGYS 
-05-P]. 1-(1-Q)(1-4) 
The steady state growth equation is of an identical form to that when expenditures 
are modelled as a flow into the production function. " Increases in the stock of 
24 We assume for simplicity that the rate of depreciation of the public capital stock is equal to the rate 
of depreciation of private capital. Changing this assumption would have no consequential impact on 
the results. 
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public goods have a positive but diminishing effect on the steady state rate of 
growth as in Figure 2.2. The new element of the model from the stock of public 
capital goods reads in the transitional dynamics. The empirical tests contained 
within this thesis rely on being able to distinguish between the steady state 
predictions of the neoclassical and endogenous growth models rather than the 
transitional dynamics and hence these are felt to lie outside the remit of this thesis 
and are omitted. ' 
Multiple Forms of Productive Government Expenditures 
Devarajan, Swaroop & Zou (1996) develop the Barro (1990) model to allow 
multiple forms of productive goods to enter the aggregate production function. The 
single productive expenditure term used by Barro (1990) assumes that a £1 increase 
in any category of government expenditure has an identical effect on the rate of 
growth. Empirical evidence against such an assumption can be found in Devarajan 
et al. (1996). 
Output is produced using C-D production technology27 and for simplicity there are 
only two differentiated forms of public goods Gy, and Gn (still in non-rival, non- 
excludable form): 
Equation 2.38 Ya AKGYIGY2 
This formulation of productive government expenditure allows for a richer 
description of the relationship between the rate of growth and government 
expenditure as the elasticity parameters on government expenditure are no longer 
constrained to be identical, ßx2. The government is assumed to fully finance 
expenditure on G,, and Gy, through lump-sum taxation, and to be balanced at every 
moment in time. 
' This does not mean that the steady state rate of growth is identical as this depends on the value of 
Gy and Gs, and the value of the elasticity parameter, /1, in each model. 
26 See Glomm & Ravikumar (1994,1997) and Futagami et al. (1993) for details. Z' Devarajan, Swaroop & Zou (1996) use a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
function. 
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Equation 2.39 Z-GaG,., + G,, 2 
Using GY1=qGy and GY2=(1-0)Gy in equation (2.38) (where 0 equals the proportion 
of each expenditure in the budget) and maximising household utility leads to the 
following equation for the steady state growth rate of consumption: 
Equation 2.40 VC 
1 [A[gr]Q[(1-O)GY]' 
-S- p] 1-(1-CM- 0 
Both forms of government expenditure affect the rate of growth through the marginal 
product of capital, but their relative effect depends upon the relative productivity of 
Gyl and Gy2 (given by the elasticity parameters ß8 and y) and their relative budget 
shares, 0 and (1-0). 28 Gyl can be thought of as having a greater relative productivity 
than Gy2 if the change in the rate of growth from a change in Gyp, 8y/8GY1, is 
greater than the change in the rate of growth from a change in Gy2,5y/Wy2 
(holding total government expenditure constant). Given that GY1=cGy and GY2=(1- 
O)Gy, Gyl is said to be relatively more productive than Gy2 if Sy/öq$ > 0. For a 
Cobb-Douglas production function this can be shown to be the case when: 
Equation 2.41 
Y<P. 
1-0 0 
If Gyl has a greater elasticity value than Gy2 (ß> y) then the rate of growth may 
still not be increased if the expenditure share of Gyl to Gy2 is currently too high. 
This suggests that changing the mix of expenditures is as important for the growth 
rate as changes to the level of expenditure. Equation (2.42) gives the condition for 
the mix of productive expenditures to be at its optimum: 29 
28 Devarajan, Swaroop & Zou (1996) describe Gl and G2 as either productive or un-productive 
expenditure depending whether the effect on growth from changing the mix of expenditure (holding 
total expenditure constant) is either positive or negative. This definition contrasts with the distinction 
between productive and non-productive expenditure used here. Under the definition of productive 
expenditures used here both expenditures are described as being productive because they are both 
used as inputs in private production. They therefore differ in terms of their relative productivity only. 
29 Devarajan et al. (1996) provide a general condition from the N productive expenditure good case. 
An increase in expenditure i financed by a decrease in expenditure j is positive if the following 
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Equation 2.42 
. 1-0 y 
If this is not met then the growth rate may be increased by adjusting the components 
of expenditure and without having to increase total expenditure. Figure 2.4 
demonstrates this graphically. The maximum of the line corresponds to the point 
18 where 
0_ 30 
1-0 y 
0 
Figure 2.4 Growth Effects of Changes in the Mix of Productive Government Expenditures in an 
`AK' Endogenous Growth Model 
2.5 Two-sector Models with Government Expenditure 
The inclusion of productive government expenditure in a two-sector endogenous 
growth is no more complex than the equivalent one-sector case 31 The models behave 
condition is met )61 where ß is the elasticity parameter in a C-D production function and ý is 0, Oj 
the budget share. 
30 We note, as in Devarajan et al. (1996), the problem with using the Cobb-Douglas production 
function to describe the case of multiple productive expenditures. The budgetary share of either form 
of expenditure, 4, cannot be allowed to be equal to zero or one because of the effect that this has on 
total output. While this is obviously a restriction on the use of the Cobb-Douglas production function 
we retain its for the purposes of demonstration as it provides useful insights into the workings of the 
model and we suggest the reader consults the original text for a more alternative treatment of multiple 
productive goods. 
" The results for non-productive government expenditures do not change when we develop the 
analysis to the two-sector model and so we omit them for ease. 
Q0 
v 1-0 
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in the steady state in a similar fashion to the one-sector `AK' models. 2 The use of 
lump-sum taxation results in a constant level of government expenditure in the steady 
state and therefore it cannot provide the engine for growth. These models are not 
simply an extension of the one-sector education model described above because the 
accumulation of human capital is now a decision of households rather than 
government policy. 33 The two-sector framework has the appealing feature of enabling 
us to model the accumulation of human capital under an alternative technology to 
private output and therefore to differentiate between expenditures which affect 
human capital accumulation (education and health being obvious examples) from 
those which aid private production (such as transport and communication). The main 
determinant of the behaviour of the steady state is the accumulation of physical and 
human capital changes in government expenditures, which are equivalent to changes 
in the level of technology (a change in the value of the technology parameters A and 
B). 
The two-sector model we describe simply adds government expenditures to the 
model of Chapter 1 (Section 1.2.4) where the production of aggregate output and 
human capital sector are given by the following equations: 
Equation 2.43 Y=C+ K+ bK +G= A(qGý, )°' (VK)a (uH)'-ý 
Equation 2. as x+ air = B[(1- 9)Gy 1'6[(l v)K]? [(i - u)H ]1-n 
A and ß2 are the elasticity parameters of output with respect to public goods and O 
and 1-0 the budget shares allocated to each public good. Both sectors display 
32 The lack of examples of this type of model within the literature have more to do with the problems 
of endogenising the rate of growth in the two-sector sector models if we allow for distortionary taxed 
financed increases in productive expenditure. More of this issue is made in Chapter 4. 
33 The `mathematical tricks' used by Krichel & Levine (1995), or Capolupo (1996) to retain the one- 
sector framework do not work here because the accumulation of human capital is made part of the 
household decision. 
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constant returns to human and physical capital in production, and for this reason K 
and H grow at identical constant rates in the steady state ' 
Utility is maximised in the usual manner (taking government expenditure as given) 
and the time path of consumption does not look unusual in comparison to those 
described above: 
Equation 2.45 yc (A(OGr) UH ] (1_a) 
vK 
If, as happens, H and K grow at identical rates in the steady state then the marginal 
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product of physical capital is constant and the economy exhibits a sustainable rate of 
growth 35 The transmission mechanism by which public goods affect the steady state 
is identical to the one-sector case. An increase in public goods in the production 
sector (a change in Gyj) acts like a once and for all increase in the technology 
parameter in the private goods sector, A; whereas an increase expenditures on public 
goods in the human capital accumulation sector, G, 2, acts like a once and for all 
increase in the technology parameter B. These results can be seen in the equations 
describing the growth of human and physical capital (equations (2.46) and (2.47)). 
Equation 2.46 YK ° A(OG) 6I V(-)' a_C_G 
vK KK 
Equation 2.47 rH= B[(1- O)G]52 (1- V)[ 
(1- u)H1, 
_n 
- (1- v)K 
There are therefore, both direct and indirect effects from changes in expenditure on 
public goods. The optimal provision of public goods to each sector occurs when the 
34 Because productive expenditure acts like a once for all increase in technology productive 
expenditure still to help to determine the steady state growth even when we use extreme forms of the 
production of human capital, such as Lucas (1988). In Lucas (1988) the production of human capital 
depends linearly on H, the rate of growth of human capital (without productive goods) is given by 
H+ b71 a B(1- u)H. The effect of public goods in this model is independent of the technology of 
the human capital sector. 
3s OG is constant because we use lump-sum taxation and do not allow any adjustment to z 
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marginal product of public goods is equated across both sectors of the economy, 
shown by equation (2.48): 
Equation 2.48 
MP, 
- 
MPGy 
- 
ßlA( Y)Q'-l (VK)" (uH)1-t - Q2B[(1- O)Gy ], 82-1 [(1- v)K]'' [(1- u)H] n-1 
Congested Public Goods 
The basic result from the congested good case is the same result as that for the one- 
sector model, namely that the steady state growth rate is independent of public 
goods. The steady state rate of consumption in the economy is given by: 
Equation 2.49 Yc 1- 1- Q1 )(1- ý 
[A(Y ea' [ 
vKý(1-ýý -S- 
pý 
An increase in government expenditure still acts like a one-off gain in technology but 
affects the steady state rate of growth only temporarily. As the level of output grows 
in the economy the congestion of the available stock of public goods (the ratio GY/Y 
falls) and the steady state rate of growth is given by A[ K ](''a) -S-p which 
is 
independent of the congestion of public goods. 
2.6 Conclusions 
The principal difference between the effects of government policy in the neoclassical 
and endogenous growth models is that only in the endogenous growth models do 
government expenditures affect the growth rate. However, not all categories of 
government expenditure are predicted to affect the steady state in endogenous growth 
models. Growth effects occur only if the expenditures affect the supply side of the 
model and are not subject to congestion. 
Figure 2.5 lists the necessary assumptions which need to be made for government 
expenditures to affect the growth rate, the symbol `d' indicating where the 
Chapter 2: Govrrºunrºrl Lx/rrºrclilures in Models of Lcnurnnir Growth 54 
expenditure variable has a significant effect on the growth rate, `x' where the effect is 
insignificant and `-' where the expenditure is not relevant to that part of the model. 
For example, government consumption expenditure is non-effective in both the 
neoclassical and endogenous growth models and as it does not affect private sector 
production it is not relevant to that part of the model. 
Type of Model Neoclassical 
Production 
Public Goods 
Growth Consumptirn 
'ffect from 
_ 
xpenditure Productive 
X 
X 
Figure 2.5: Summary of the Assumptions Necessary for Government Expenditures to Affect the 
Steady State Growth Rate in Models of Economic Growth 
The government's expenditures are constrained to he financed solely by lump-sum 
taxation in this chapter and by implication the level of government expenditure is 
constant in the steady state. Public expenditures arc then not sufficient to provide the 
engine to growth and endogenous growth must he made an assumption through 
constant returns to capital. Lump-sum taxes are used because they do not distort the 
decisions of private agents in the model (this result is robust to changes in the 
household preference function or firms' production functions) which allows the 
growth effects of expenditure to he decoupled from those of taxation. 
At an initial level we can classify expenditures as either affecting the production or 
consumption sectors of the model. In both the neoclassical and endogenous growth 
models changes in the level of productive government expenditure are equivalent 
changes in the level of technology. In the neoclassical model the effect on growth is 
temporary whereas in the endogenous growth model it is permanent. The relationship 
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between the level of' productive expenditures and the rate of growth is positive hut 
non-linear because of diminishing marginal returns. Expenditures which are included 
on the consumption side ofthe model (non-productive expenditure) do not affect the 
form of the equation describing the growth of consumption (the Euler equation) nor 
the steady state rate of interest. 
Barro (1990) assumes that productive goods directly affect production as a flow of 
goods and services; are produced using identical technology to the private sector; and 
that each category of expenditure has an equivalent effect on output. Developments 
of the Barro model in the literature have concentrated on changing the set of 
characteristics of expenditures. 3" However, the requirement of constant returns to 
capital at the aggregate level (to endogenise the growth rate) means that much of this 
work relies on fairly specific assumptions about the nature of public goods or the 
technology used in the production of either public goods or human capital. As Sala-i- 
Martin (1997) writes "a good theorist could make almost any variable affect the level 
of technology.... as a result, he could make almost any variable look like an 
important theoretical determinant of the rate of economic growth. "' The same 
appears to apply here. The behaviour of the steady state growth rate is therefore 
virtually identical under all different combinations of characteristics because of this 
need. 
The one caveat to the result from the endogenous growth model is when productive 
expenditures suffer from congestion. Even in the presence of endogenous growth, 
public expenditures will not affect the steady state if public goods are congested (and 
financed by lump-sum taxes). As time (and therefore output) tends to infinity the 
benefit of public goods to firms' production approaches zero and the steady state 
growth rate is independent of public expenditures. The transition to the steady state 
would still he affected by public expenditures (as in the neoclassical model), the 
speed depending on the elasticity of output parameter with respect to public goods 
"' Thcsc additions concentrate on productive forms ref expenditure. We could perform the same 
exercise for non-productive expenditures hut given that they have no effect on the steady state growth 
rate such a description is valueless. 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) pp. 2-3 
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(in Glomm & Ravikumar (1994,1997) and Turnovsky & Fisher (1997) also on the 
degree of congestion). 
The behaviour of public expenditures in the growth models discussed provide several 
hypothesis with which to test in the empirical section of the thesis. The first is 
whether a significant relationship exists between the long run rate of growth and 
government expenditures. `"" If government expenditures are found to have a 
significant effect on the long run rate of growth of a country then this would provide 
evidence in favour of the endogenous growth models over neoclassical models. "' 
The second would he that the estimated coefficients on forms of expenditure thought 
of as affecting household utility are insignificantly different from zero; whereas those 
expenditures which affect production have statistically significant positive 
coefficients. ") Estimated coefficients displaying these properties would provide 
evidence that the separation of expenditures into consumption and production 
affecting is sufficient to describe their effect on the rate of growth. It' all categories of 
expenditure are estimated as having positive coefficients then it could he argued that 
the endogenous growth model is not a complete representation of the growth process 
and the production and consumption sectors have a greater inter-relationship than 
that described presently. It also follows from these results that for a given level of 
expenditure changing the mix of expenditures will have an effect on the rate of 
growth. Increased (decreased) expenditure on productive government goods and 
services financed through decreased (increased) expenditure on non-productive 
'4 Whether the estimated coefficient on a expenditure variable is statistically significantly different 
from zero. 
We assumed for simplicity that the rate of growth of technological progress and the labour force 
was constant. If government expenditures help to determine either of' these growth rates then the 
predicted insignificant relationship between government expenditures and the rate of' growth in the 
neoclassical model would no longer exist. We overcome this problem in the text by describing this 
case as an endogenous growth model (because public policy is an endogenous variable). In an 
empirical setting we could overcome this problem if we could find evidence of a significant 
relationship between growth and public expenditures in the presence of technological change or the 
growth of the labour force. 
"' Evidence of statistically significant negative coefficients would provide evidence that not all forms 
of government expenditure which affect production have the positive effect assumed in the text. The 
possible negative external effects of gowcrnnients on production have not been discussed in the text. 
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goods and serviccs should lead to an increase (decrease) in the long run rats of 
growth of the economy. 
The final testable hypothesis refers to the model with multiple forms of productive 
expenditure (Devarajan et al. (1996))). An increase (decrease) in the productive 
expenditure which has the greater relative productivity (based on the elasticity 
parameters and the expenditure shares) leads to an increase (decrease) in the long run 
growth rate. A-priori categorising of actual government expenditures into those 
having greater and lesser relative productivity is likely to prove difficult. 
Although the characteristics of public goods have been fairly well described in the 
literature there are areas which perhaps require further development. The one 
highlighted in the text is that of the relative technology of the private and public 
sector. Most models in the literature make the simplifying assumption that the public 
and private sectors share identical technology. We develop one model but the 
technology is described in such a way that a simple substitution allows us to remain 
within the one-sector model. ' Such an analysis should also develop the use of a 
government objective function in the endogenous growth model (see attempts by 
Barro (1990), Davoodi et al. (1995)) and the social welfare considerations which 
follow from this. 
A second possibility would he to endogenise technological progress and for 
government policy to help to determine this growth rate. Endogenous technological 
progress would take the analysis beyond the simple one-sector model of Levine & 
Krichel (1996) described above and would require the use of a imperfectly 
competitive framework (Aghion & Howitt (1998)). One possibility would he for 
governments to provide or help to administer the pool of generally available 
knowledge through university research and hence increase the speed or size of each 
innovation. 
" This result does not rely on public goods being described as it flow oaf gourds as one could extend the 
Capolupo (1996) model to allow for public goods rather than human capital (human capital is a stock 
in the Capolupt) model). 
Chapter 3 
Taxation in Models of Economic Growth 
3.1 Introduction 
Of the I') tax measures that Easterly & Rehelo (1993) calculates only one, the 
marginal rate of taxation calculated from a time series regression on GDP, has a 
consistently significant negative correlation with growth. Similarly Mendoza et at. 
(1997), using measures of taxation which closely match their theoretical 
counterparts, find no direct relationship between growth and taxation. Such 
findings, typical of those found in the empirical literature, suggest that differences 
in tax policy cannot be used to explain differences in output growth across time and 
space; and in turn, imply that the endogenous growth model, in which taxation is a 
determinant of the steady state growth rate, is misspccified. The neoclassical model 
therefore better represents the growth process and government tax policies have a 
neutral long run effect on growth. This Chapter considers the theoretical 
relationship between the incidence of' taxation and the growth rate. 
The techniques, and hence the results, used to introduce taxation into growth 
models are in many ways analogous to those used for government expenditure in 
the previous chapter. Government taxation, like expenditures, is not sufficient to 
endogenise the rate of growth in the model and once again the results for 
government policy rest crucially on the assumptions underlying the production 
function. 
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Once the conditions for endogenous growth have been established ('AK' 
technology) the growth effects of taxes can be separated into those taxes which 
affect the returns from investment and those which do not. ' Investment-distorting 
taxes reduce the returns to capital (the interest rate) and hence the growth rate of 
output., We discuss three different forms of distortionary taxation in an endogenous 
growth model (income, capital and investment taxation) but only use one (income 
taxation) to illustrate policy ineffectiveness in the neoclassical model. Taxes which 
distort the consumption decision of households (consumption taxation) along with 
taxes which create no distortions (lump-sum and human capital taxation in the one- 
sector model) arc discussed only in reference to the endogenous growth models. 
The description of taxation is fairly limited and therefore un-interesting. Once 
beyond the basic results we therefore move to the much richer two-sector models 
very quickly (Section 3.4). The non-distorting effect of human capital taxation in 
the one-sector endogenous growth model can be contrasted with the results for the 
same tax variable in the two-sector model. The two-sector model, by allowing 
human capital to he accumulated, means its taxation affects the interest rate and 
hence the growth rate. The exact effect of human capital taxation depends on the 
relative tax rates on the factors of production in each sector. This offers an 
interesting extension to the results but has led to some considerable debate in the 
literature as to the best way to model the technology of the human capital sector; the 
taxation of the human capital sector and the elasticity of labour supply all impact on 
the results. 
The taxes we use in the Chapter are all proportional (ad-valorem or flat-rate) taxes. 
These taxes have the convenient properties that the marginal and average tax rates 
are constant and equal over the range of taxation. Such taxes create distortions (tax 
wedges) to the decision of economic agents but do so in a linear manner. This 
This classification of taxation is slightly different from that of government expenditures, because the 
inclusion of a tax on the production side of the model is not sufficient for it to have an effect on the 
rate cif growth. 
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enables us to simplify the analysis greatly but implies that the mix as well as the 
leid of taxation must he discussed in relation to the effects of taxation on growth. 
The tax policies discussed in the text are stylised in their description of tax policy 
and ignore many related issues which include: other types of taxation; non-linear 
taxation: or the equity effects of tax policies. ' These issues are not researched 
because we arc interested in the possibility that taxation affects the growth rate of a 
country and the results can simply he extended to capture these more complex 
cases; and secondly this is a review of the literature rather than a development of it, 
hence, the tax policies used merely reflect those already discussed in the literature. 
3.2 The Neoclassical Model 
- 
Policy Ineffectiveness 
The basic model we use remains identical to that of Chapter 1. We have a 
decentralised, competitive, closed economy where all households share identical 
utility functions and all firms identical production functions. Firms maximise their 
profits and households their utility taking the interest rate, r, and the wage rate, w, 
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as given. We allow for no growth of the labour force or of technology in this model. 
Income is taxed at a constant proportional rate, r,, in order to finance government 
expenditures, which are returned to households as non-distortionary, lump-sung 
rebates. Government expenditures are assumed to be of this form because they do 
not affect the utility of households or the production possibilities of the private 
sector. This is a common method of allowing the singular analysis of the effects of 
taxation, and to avoid the complications of productive government expenditure. ' We 
' In the text taxes that affect investment arc labelled 'distortionary taxes' and those that do not are 
Iahelled 'non-distortionarv'. 
In addition to this Ireland (1994) considers the dynamic 'Laffcr curve' effects of changes in tux 
policy: Easterly (1993) the effect tax policy has on the price of investment goods in developing 
countries with large hlack-market sectors, Duvereux & Love (1995) the growth and welfare effects of 
permanent against temporary changes in tax policy. and I lcndricks (I996) use it life-cycle rather than 
it infinite horizon framework. 
We note, as do Futagami ct al. (1993), that the rationale for levying distortionary taxes on the 
economy without any corresponding benefit from expenditures is unclear. 
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assume that the size of* the government is constant and the government's budget 
constraint can he written as: 
Equation 3.1 G=r,. Y 
where G is non-productive government expenditures and r is the rate of taxation 
on income, Y. Unlike in the previous chapter the level of government expenditures 
grows in the steady state at the same rate as output, 
_Y. It should perhaps he 
obvious from this that the addition of distortionary taxation to the model provides 
the mechanisms for fiscal policy to endogenise the growth rate, although this will 
not occur here because expenditures do not affect production. The steady state 
growth rates of capital and consumption are given by the following equations: 
Equation 3.2 K. _ (1 - rý. ýCxfl 
, 
(- 
C- 
1, K 
Equation 3.3 Yu =-- ---[(I - rº. )a4( 
K) 
1-(1-6)(1-5) L 
With no labour force growth or technological change the growth in the capital stock 
is zero, y,. = 0, and therefore if we differentiate the production function with 
respect to time to find the growth path of output it follows that this is zero also, 
y,. = 0. The form of the steady state growth equations for C and K are identical to 
those in Chapters 1&2, as in those models the growth rate is zero in the absence of 
technological change or population growth. Changes in tax policy have no effect on 
the steady state growth rate of output. As with expenditure policy taxation acts like 
a once-and-for-all change in the level of technology. 
01 
5 If taxation affects the growth of technology or labour then the government policy would hemme 
effective in the neoclassical nmodel. We overcome this problem by assuming technology and the size 
of the Iahour force arc constant. 
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3.3 Endogenous Growth Models 
-E fft'cti>>c Fiscal Policy 
. 
3.3.1 Ui. sloriionury 1 uxuiion 
(iý' 
In order to generate endogenous growth in the model we assume that the technology 
used in the production of output is such that there are constant returns to capital. 
This assumption is required because government expenditures are assumed to he 
non-productive and hence do not appear in the equation for the steady state. Under 
such conditions government policy cannot he used to prevent the marginal product 
of capital from declining towards zero over time. " Increases (decreases) in the rate 
of taxation then behave like decreases (increases) in the level of technology. The 
aggregate production function is given by the following equation, 
Equation 3.4 Y= AK. 
Given the production function in (3.4) and the assumption that income is taxed at a 
constant proportional rate (equation (3.1)) then the growth rate of capital is, 
Equation 3.5 Yti 
-15. 
The rate of interest is set equal to the after-tax marginal product of capital, 
i= (1 
- 
r, ) 
A 
which after substitution into the Euler equation gives the following 
growth path for consumption, 
Equation 3.6 v. 
-I 
1-(I-a)(1-ß) 
" Therefore the only way to cndogenise growth is to rcmovc this assumption. 
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It follows from the `AK' production function that the steady state rate of growth is 
constant and therefore increases in the rate of income tax rate have a negative effect 
on the growth rate. The steady state growth rate declines at the linear rate (I-Ty), as 
shown in Figure 3.1. The rate of' growth varies between 
[n 
- 
i) 
- 
f)[ 
, 
when the rate of taxation is zero, r, and zero (l-(r)(I-4) 
when taxation consumes all cat' output, r,. = 1. 
Y 
1-(1-a)(1-ý) 
T ý. 
c,.; 
Figure 3.1: The Effect o1' Income Taxation on the Steady State Growth Rate in a `AK' Endogenous 
Growth Model. 
In both endogenous and the neoclassical models the equilibrium steady state value 
of capital, k*, is lower because of taxation. Taxation lowers the after tax returns to 
investment and with it the equilibrium capital-labour ratio. 
Capital 7axu11o11 
In Capolupo (1996) government expenditures are funded through a tax on capital. 
'l'he form of capital taxation used by Capolupo (1996) is such that it distorts the 
steady state in a slightly different way to income taxation and it behaves like an 
additional depreciation factor of the capital stock, O. Capital taxation lowers the 
growth rate by reducing the net after-tax return on capital, that is, the marginal 
product of capital less the rate of depreciation, r- =f'(K) - o. Capital taxation acts on 
the quantity of available capital rather than on the returns to capital. Changing the 
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government budget constraint so that non-clistorting government expenditures are 
financed by capital taxation can he written as: 
Equation 3.7 G= rk K 
The growth rate of capital can then he given as: 
Equation 3.8 y= fl 
-K- (cS +z ýý , 
and if we maximise in the usual way we get the following growth path for 
consumption, 
Equation 3.9 yý 
_- 
[A 
- 
(ü + rk) 
- 
hý 
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The decline in the growth rate from increases in capital taxation is again linear but is 
slower than that for income taxation. The growth rate now varies between 
1 [A 
- 
cS 
- 
p] when the tax rate is zero, rti = 0, and 1-(I-6)(1-ý) 
[A 
--p-1] when the tax rate is one, z,, = I, as shown in Figure 1-(I-6)(1-; ) 
3.2. 
7 
1 [n-s-p) 
I-(1-o)(I-ý) 
I 
-[A I-(1-Cr)(I-ý; ) 
() TK 
Figure 3.2: The Growth Effects of ('aipital 'taxation in it AK" Endogenous Growth Model 
('Ii ipt " 
. 
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Rchclo (1991) modcls the financing of non-distorting government cash transfers 
through a tax on investment. The government budget constraint is then written as: 
Equation 3.10 C= r, 1. 
Equation (3.10) is substituted into the resource constraint of the economy for G and 
then rewritten as a growth of capital equation using I= K+ AK 
Equation 3.11 K= (- --C) 
- 
AK 
I+r, 
Investment taxation affects the after tax return on capital in much the way that 
income taxation does, except the tax effect is described by Maximising in (I+r, ) 
the usual way leads to the following growth path for consumption, 
Equation 3.12 y( 
- 1-(1-a-)(1- ) (1+r, ) 
An increase in investment taxation lowers the growth rate by reducing the after tax 
return on capital and hence investment. Like the other types of distortionary 
(i 
taxation a tax on investment acts like a once and for all reduction in technology. For 
an identical rate of taxation of income and investment, r, = r,, the effect Of 
investment taxation on the rate of growth is lower than that for income taxation (the 
term (1- r, ) falls towards zero at a faster rate than the term I/( 1+ r, )), as shown in 
Figure 3.3. 
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Investment 
taxation 
Z 
Figure 3.3: A Comparison of the Growth Effects of Income and Investment Taxation in a AK' 
Endogenous Growth Model 
3.3.2 Non-l)istortinnarY Taxation 
Non-distortionary taxes are fairly simplc to introduce in to the endogenous growth 
framework as they have no effect on the steady state growth rate. In each of the 
examples we give the constant growth rate of consumption is therefore, given by: 
Equation 3.13 yý. 
_[ l1 
- 
r) 
- 
I)] 
. 1-(1-a)(1-ý) 
The marginal product of capital is equal to the constant technology parameter A 
from the `AK' production function which is independent of non-distortionary taxes. 
As with any change in government policy private investment is `crowded-out' by 
the change in non-distortionary taxation through the resource constraint of the 
economy, but the steady state rate of growth remains unchanged. 
The limited way in which non-distortionary taxes impact on the economy makes 
them fairly un-interesting to discuss. Therefore, we review only their salient 
characteristics and move quickly on to the much richer two-sector models. Slightly 
longer is spent with the human capital taxes that are non-distortionary in sonic 
versions of the one-sector model but not all. 
00 
hupirr 3: Tu_xaliuºr in MOdrls of Ecotiolnir Growth 
Lrimp-Simi Taxalrnnt 
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As discussed in the previous chapter lump-sum taxes are useful when describing the 
effect on growth of government expenditure because they do not distort the 
investment or the consumption decision of firms and households respectively. The 
results for lump-sum taxes are robust to all changes in the assumptions about 
production technology or household preferences, and are therefore, useful for 
providing a benchmark against which the behaviour of other taxes can be compared. 
Under lump-sum taxation equation (3.10), the government budget constraint, would 
instead he given by (3.14). 
Equation 3.14 G=z 
Cuitsuirtption Taxation 
Consumption taxation behaves like lump-sum taxation in the simple endogenous 
growth models because it does not alter the investment decision of the 
representative firm. Consumption is assumed to he taxed at a constant proportional 
rate, r, so that the government budget constraint would read: 
Equation 3.15 G=r(. C. 
As we shall see later the result that consumption taxation has benign effect on 
growth is non-robust to changes in the model. 
llruiruin Capital Taxation 
It' we decompose the composite capital term in the `AK' production function into 
physical and human capital and then tax human capital, we find results that are the 
same for lump-sum and consumption taxation. This result holds hecause there are no 
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returns to human capital and therefore it would not he accumulated. Its taxation 
would then obviously have no effect on the investment choice of firms. ' If human 
capital were taxed at a constant proportional rate z then the government budget 
constraint would be given by: 
Equation 3.16 (; = z JI. 
r ýýti 
It is possible to make human capital taxation distortionary in the simple model if we 
allow investment to be in either human capital or physical capital (and assume that 
these are produced under identical technology). Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) write 
the production function in the standard C-D form in K and 11, given in equation 
(3.17), and demonstrate that this model collapses to that of a 'AK' production 
function with composite capital. The taxation of human capital would then he the 
same as the taxation of capital already described above. This point is similar to that 
expressed in footnote 5 except that here the separate accumulation of human and 
physical capital is explicitly expressed: 
Equation 3.17 Y= AK"H '-" 
3.4 Two-sector Models of Taxation 
The existing literature modelling the effect of taxation in two-sector endogenous 
growth models is large, and the implications for growth have been researched to a 
much deeper level than the equivalent one-sector models. The manner in which 
taxation affects the steady state is identical to the cane-sector models, but the results 
are less robust to changes in the underlying assumptions of the model. The 
mechanism by which taxes affect the steady state in the two-sector models is still by 
distorting the returns to accumulation of either physical or human capital. The 
re/alive taxation of physical and human capital in each sector of the economy is vital 
for determining the effect on growth. Only if all inputs are taxed at identical rates, 
We have what appears an inconsistency in the results here because if we leave human capital as a 
component of aggregate capital then its taxation has an effect on the steady state yet when we 
disaggregatc human capital out of the composite capital term its taxation has no effect on the steady 
state. 
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which is equivalent to an income tax in the one-sector model, does the growth rate 
unambiguously fall (Rebelo (1991)). Changes in the assumptions regarding the 
production of human capital, the tax treatment of the human capital sector, and the 
underlying structure of the preference function lead to differences in how the 
reproducible factors are affected (Stokey & Rebelo (1995)). 
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The two-sector model we describe can be seen as a direct extension to that described 
in Chapter 1, but allowing for taxation! The analysis uses the same tools as the one- 
sector model except now capital and human capital are produced using non-identical 
technology (which also allows the factors of production to be taxed at different 
rates). 
3.4.1 Distortionary Taxation 
The underlying assumptions of the household utility function and firm's production 
are identical to that described in Chapter 1. The production functions are the most 
important determinants of the growth effects of taxation and are given in equations 
(3.18) and (3.19) below as a reminder. 
Equation 3.18 Y-C+ K+ ASK +G= A(vK)'(uH)l-« 
Equation 3.19 H+ 8H = B[(1- v)K]°[(1- u)H]1'n 
The government can now tax either human or physical capital in either sector of the 
economy and at differing rates. The government budget constraint (again assuming 
non-distorting lump-sum government transfers) can then be written as: 
Equation 3.20 G- rK1rK1vK + zK2rK2 (1- v)K + rW1rµ, luH + rw2rW2 (1- u)H 
8 King & Rebelo (1990), Kim (1992), Stokey & Rebelo (1995) all assume technology and taxation are 
of the form described here. Jones et al. (1993) use an almost identical set-up except they do not allow 
the taxation of the human capital input in the human capital sector, rIn=0. 
Chapter 3: Taxation in Models of Economic Growth 70 
Where rK, is the taxation of physical capital in the production of aggregate output, z, 2 
the taxation of physical capital in the production of human capital, zW, the taxation of 
human capital in the production of aggregate output and, z2 the taxation of human 
capital in the production of human capital. Equation (3.20) allows the tax rates of 
physical and human capital all to differ from each other within sectors and across 
sectors (if the tax rates in an individual sector were equal then the tax could be 
described as sector-specific income tax). 
If we maximise the utility function in the usual way we get a time path of 
consumption that does not look unusual in comparison to those described above, 
Equation 3.21 yc =1 [(1- rKl)aA[uH ](l-a) -8- p] 
vK 
H and K grow at identical rates in the steady state so that the marginal product of 
physical capital is constant and the economy exhibits a sustainable rate of growth. 
The steady state interest rate is set equal to the rate of return to physical capital in the 
output sector, which must also equal the rate of return to physical in the production 
of human capital (expressed in terms of physical capital goods) 
- 
equations (3.22) & 
(3.23). Equation (3.24) states that the return to the factors of production in all sectors 
of the economy must be equated in the steady state. 9 
Equation 3.22 r= (1- rKl) aA(vK) a-1 
-S 
uH 
. 
Equation 3.23 r" (1- ZH2)(1-; 7)B((1- y)K ), ý -s+ (1- u)H q 
Equation 3.24 (1- a)(1-u)(1-r WI) 
- 
(1- 77)(1 V)(W 2) 
aU 1- ZKl 77 v 1- zK2 
The taxation of the factors of production at non-identical rates will lead, through 
equation (3.24), to an adjustment in the factor intensities, v, u, (1-v) and (1-u), so that 
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the rates of return are equated across all sectors. The taxation of any one individual 
factor income has a negative effect on the growth rate, the transmission mechanism 
of which is identical to the one-sector models. That is, factor income taxes affect the 
steady state by reducing the returns to investment. 
Complications to the results are added when the factor inputs are not taxed at 
identical rates and when changes are made to the assumption regarding the 
technology of human capital production and the tax treatment of the human capital 
sector. Such changes lead to different sized relative distortions from physical and 
human capital taxation. 1° If all factor incomes are taxed at identical rates within an 
individual sector then the tax term drops out of equation (3.24) and taxation does not 
alter the factor inputs, but it can be seen to still affect the steady state interest rate, 
equations (3.22) & (3.23). The return to investment in either the output sector and the 
human capital sector is reduced by the factor 1-z,, (i =1,2). 11 There is an 
unambiguous fall in the growth rate because of this change in the interest rate 
(Rebelo (1991)). The results are open to debate in these models when factor incomes 
are not taxed at identical rates and we attempt to alter the mix of these factor income 
taxes. 
The growth paths for capital and human capital are given by equations (3.25) and 
(3.26) below. We include these for completeness but choose not to discuss their 
properties or to produce the full dynamics of the model. For a fuller analysis of the 
dynamic structure of the model the reader is referred to Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995 
Ch. 
-5). 
Equation 3.25 YK= (1- TKI 
- 
ZWi )AvaKa-1(uH)l-a 
-K 
C_ G-8 
Equation 3.26 yH= B[(1- v)K]"(1- u)'-H-' 
-9 
9 See Stokey & Rebelo (1995) for a version of this equation with three different types of reproducible 
inputs all taxed at non-identical rates. 
'0 The reader is referred to Stokey & Rebelo (1995) for an excellent treatment of the important 
parameters of the model. 
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As mentioned above the technology under which human capital is produced and the 
tax treatment of human capital are important determinants of the growth effects of 
factor income taxation. An extreme example of a model illustrating this point is a 
model developed by Lucas (1990). Lucas assumes that the education sector is a non- 
market activity and therefore not subject to taxation, and that human capital is 
accumulated linearly using only human capital as an input, H= B(1- u)H 
. 
The rate 
of return on human capital is equal to the constant technology parameter B. This rate 
of return is independent of the taxation in the other sector of the economy. In the 
steady state all factor income must be equalised (equations (3.22) & (3.23)). In the 
Lucas model the interest rate is therefore equal to the technology parameter B. The 
growth rate of the economy is then independent of taxation (assuming that labour is 
supplied inelastically). We can modify this result slightly if we allow the human 
capital sector to be taxed. The rate of interest is then equal to the after-tax marginal 
product of human capital in the human capital sector r* 
_ 
(1- rH2)B 
-8+q. Only q 
the tax on human capital affects the growth rate, not all taxes (Stokey & Rebelo 
(1995)). Following Tanzi & Zee (1997) we can discern the following policy rule. 
"The lighter the tax burden on the production of human capital relative to the tax 
burden on sectors that are human capital intensive, the smaller will be the adverse 
impact on growth of taxing physical capital. "" Stokey & Rebelo (1995) provide a 
series of simulation exercises to demonstrate the sensitivity of the results to changes 
in the underlying assumptions of the model. 
3.4.2 Non-Distortionary Taxation 
The description of the two-sector model above means the results for the non- 
distortionary taxes of consumption and lump-sum taxation are identical to the 
examples of consumption and lump-sum taxation in the one-sector model. The 
" This is independent of the production technology in each sector as there are no changes to the input 
ratios from the introduction of taxation. 
12 Tanzi & Zee (1997) pp. 184. 
Chapter 3: Taxation in Models of Economic Growth 
household sector of the model has not changed so that there remains no channel by 
which non-distortionary taxation can affect the rate of growth (in the absence of 
productive expenditures that is). Given that the results and the intuition behind the 
results are identical in these two cases we choose not to repeat their results. By 
changing the underlying structure of the model we can change the results for 
consumption taxation quite easily. This is made the subject of the next section. 
3.5 Extensions to the Two-Sector Model 
Labour Leisure Choice 
73 
Households are now assumed to maximise their utility by making choices as to how 
they allocate their time between leisure, education and working (Mendoza et al. 
(1997)). Leisure is therefore included as an additional argument in the utility 
function: 
Equation 3.27 U=f e-l`u(C1, l, )dt 
0 
(where lr is leisure time). The felicity function is still of the CIES13 form but now 
includes leisure as an input, '4 
, 
i) 
= 
rl`0) 
I 
-a 
Equation 3.28 u(C, 
(c 
-1. 1-Q 
ear. 
Assume the remainder of the model is equivalent to that described above. 15 Each 
individual's time is either allocated between leisure, work (the production of output) 
or education (the accumulation of human capital). This is then normalised to one 
13 Constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
14 Stokey & Rebelo (1995) demonstrate that if leisure time is adjusted for quality then these results no 
longer hold. 
is We assume that the rate of taxation on all factor inputs is equal to zero so that all government 
expenditures (of a non-distorting lump-sum type) are financed by taxes on consumption. The 
government budget constraint is then given by, G= rcC. 
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(equation (3.29)). The term z, now replaces (1-u), in the human capital production 
function. 
Equation 3.29 lt + ut + z1 =1 
Maximising in the normal way has little effect on the steady state behaviour of the 
model but it does provide us with a new equation describing the consumption- 
education decision. The ratio of consumption to human capital is given by the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, i'(1-u-z), and the 
real rate of return on human capital: 
C 
Equation 3.30 
H .-1 17_1(1- u- z)(1 - a)A[ UH 
]a 
(1 + zc) 
Consumption taxation affects the leisure, work, and education decision in equation 
(3.30), which in turn indirectly affects the rate of growth. An increase in 
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consumption taxation causes a reduction in household consumption, which results in 
an increase in time spent in work/education. This in turn leads to a fall in the rate of 
return on these activities and therefore a fall in the steady state rate of growth. 16 The 
magnitude of the effect of consumption taxation on the steady state rate of growth 
depends on the elasticity of labour supply parameter q (as identified by Stokey & 
Rebelo (1995)). If the supply of labour is inelastic, r =0 (as assumed by Lucas 
(1990), and King & Rebelo (1990)), then an increase in consumption taxation does 
not lead to an adjustment in time spent in work/education and leisure and hence not 
affect on the rate of growth. If the value of the elasticity of labour supply parameter 
is large (as assumed by Jones et al. (1993)) then the effects of factor income taxation 
are also large. 17 
16 The introduction of a labour-leisure choice in the model creates additional affects from factor 
income taxation on the rate of growth, the details of which can be found in Mendoza et al. (1997). 
These too are dependent upon the assumption regarding the elasticity of the supply of labour and the 
way that this affects the interest rate. 
"Jones et al. (1993) estimate that the removal of all distortionary taxes in the model would increase 
the rate of growth by a massive eight percentage points. 
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The labour-leisure choice extends the results for the factor income taxes. Factor 
income taxation distorts the labour-leisure choice in much the same way as 
consumption taxation. Given that these effects are negative, and therefore augment 
the existing effects of factor income taxation on growth (rather than alter the results) 
we do not report them and refer the reader to the large number of tax studies that 
have included a labour-leisure choice (Jones et al. (1993), Stokey & Rebelo (1995), 
Mendoza et al. (1997)). 
3.6 Conclusions 
Government tax policy is not sufficient in itself to provide the engine for growth, 
hence the conditions for endogenous growth must already be present if taxation is to 
have an affect on the growth rate. The critical assumption which distinguishes 
between the results for the neoclassical and endogenous growth models is that of 
constant returns to capital in the one-sector model, and constant returns to scale 
technology in both capital and human capital production in the two-sector model. " If 
these conditions are satisfied then endogenous growth is an assumption of the model 
and tax policy can have an effect (although not necessarily so) on the growth rate. 
These types of model are commonly used in the literature when considering tax 
policy in isolation and government expenditures are returned to households as non- 
distorting, lump-sum rebates. The use of this type of expenditure has the additional 
advantage in that it allows the expenditure effects of fiscal policy to be decoupled 
from the tax effects. 
As noted above endogenous growth models, are however, only necessary, not 
sufficient, conditions for tax policy to have a permanent effect on the growth rate of a 
country. For tax policy to have a permanent effect it must affect the returns to 
investment and in the case of the two-sector model this requires the education sector 
to be a market sector where human capital production is not linear in human capital. 
In both the one-sector and two-sector models we define distortionary taxation 
through whether it distorts the returns to the factors of production which can be 
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accumulated. This is because the growth effects of taxation are via investment (they 
reduce the returns to investment) although they act on the steady state in an 
equivalent manner to a one-off change in the level of technology. This leads to an 
interesting distinction between the one and two-sector models regarding the growth 
effect of human capital taxation. In the one-sector model unless we explicitly allow 
/o 
the accumulation of human capital then its taxation has a benign cffcct oil the steady 
state growth rate (see Section 3.3.2). 
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Figure 3.4: Summary cif' the Necessary Assumptions for Government Tax Policy to Affect the Steady 
State Growth Rate in One-sector Models of Economic Growth 
Figure 3.4 represents a summary of the necessary assumptions in the neoclassical and 
one-sector endogenous growth model; whereas Figure 3.5 is an attempt to summarise 
the results from the two-sector model. The symbol `V' indicates where the tax has a 
distortionary effect on the steady state; `x' where the tax has no effect on the steady 
state; and '-' where the tax is not relevant for that section of the diagram. For 
example consumption taxation is not effective in either the neoclassical or 
endogenous growth model and does not affect the returns to investment in the 
endogenous growth model. 
'' This is necessary for K and lI to grow at identical rates, see Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) Chapter 5 
for a more general set of conditions. 
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Figure 3.5: Summaiv OI the Nece,, sarv Assumptions for (im, crnmrnt Tax Policy to Affect the Steady 
State Growth Rate in Two-sector Models of [coýnomir Growth 
In addition to the conditions for effective tax policy in the one-sector model the 
growth-retarding effects of tax policy in the two-sector model are dependent as to the 
technology of the human capital sector. Indeed, it is possihlc to completely remove 
all growth effects of taxation in the two-sector model (Lucas (1990)) if it is assumed 
that: the human capital sector is a nom-market sector and is not taxed; that human 
capital production uses only human capital as an input; and that the accumulation of 
human capital is linear in this input. The steady state interest rate in the human 
capital sector will then he equal to the technology parameter in that sector, B, (a 
constant). Standard arhitrage conditions then ensure that this is equal to the interest 
rate in the production goods sector and therefore, the growth rate is endogenously 
No 
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determined by the interest rate in the human capital sector, B. Given the human 
capital sector is independent of government policy then so is the growth rate. This 
result relies in part on the tax treatment of human capital. If the human capital sector 
is assumed to be a market sector (and therefore taxable) then the tax on the human 
capital input in the human capital production sector affects the growth rate in the 
steady state. This highlights the role that the relative taxation of the factor income 
plays in the results. The taxation of factor incomes at different rates leads to an 
adjustment of the factor input shares and the interest rate (equations (3.22)-(3.23)). 
In the basic growth models we discuss (one and two-sector) taxation of households' 
consumption has a non distortionary effect on the equilibrium returns to investment 
and hence growth. This result is non-robust to the introduction of a labour-leisure 
choice to the household preference function. Under the Ramsey-preference function 
with no labour-leisure choice the household labour supply function is assumed to be 
perfectly inelastic. The addition of a labour-leisure choice removes this assumption 
and requires the returns to leisure and education to be equated. Consumption taxation 
decreases the returns to leisure hence encouraging investment in education, which 
lowers their returns, and through the interest rate the steady state growth rate. '9 The 
size of the distortion from the labour-leisure choice depends on the assumptions 
regarding the elasticity of labour supply. Jones et al. (1993) assume labour supply is 
elastic, while Lucas (1990) assumes that labour supply is inelastic. The growth 
effects of the same change in tax policy are therefore, much larger in the Jones et al. 
(1993) model than the Lucas model (Stokey & Rebelo (1995)). 
The conditions under which tax policy affects the steady state growth rate provides 
us with a series of testable hypothese for the empirical section of the thesis. Tax 
policy affects the long run growth rate only if the model displays the properties of 
endogenous growth. We would therefore expect the estimated coefficients on tax 
variables in a growth regression to be statistically significantly different from zero 
19 There are also additional effects to factor income taxation, which we do not develop in the text. 
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only if the growth process was best described by an endogenous growth model. 20 The 
one-sector endogenous growth model further divides taxation into those, which 
distort the returns to investment, and those, which do not. Only those measures of 
taxation that distort investment would be expected to have a statistically significant, 
negative relationship with growth. This result suggests a third potential hypothesis 
relating to the mix of taxes in the one-sector model. An increase (decrease) in non- 
distortionary taxation financed by a decrease (increase) in distortionary taxation so as 
to leave the total size of government constant would be expected to have a significant 
positive (negative) effect on the long run growth rate. 
If the three distortionary taxes which we describe in the one-sector model (income, 
investment and capital taxation) were taxed at an identical rate then we would expect 
that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient would be larger (and negative) for 
income over investment over capital taxation. Figure 3.6 provides a summary of this 
result. If information is not available as to the tax rate, or indeed if taxes are not of 
the linear proportional kind described in the theory (as is likely to be the case), then 
this may be a much more difficult hypothesis to test in practice. 
Y 
apital 
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Figure 3.6: A Comparison of the Growth Effects of Income, Capital and Investment Taxation when 
Taxed at Identical Rates in a `AK' Endogenous Growth Model 
The simplicity of the results from the one-sector model does not carry over to the 
two-sector models and distortionary taxes can no longer be described simply as to 
whether they distort the returns to investment. This is turn affects our ability to 
20 We discuss the problems of the measurement of tax variables elsewhere in the thesis 
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describe testable hypotheses for empirical testing. For example, consumption 
taxation and human capital taxation are examples of non-distortionary taxation in the 
one-sector model but may or may not be distorting in the two-sector model. Human 
capital taxes are distortionary in the two-sector model if human capital can be 
accumulated under a household decision; but non-distortionary if human capital 
sector is non-taxable and human capital technology is linear in human capital. 
Similarly, consumption taxation becomes distortionary if households are allowed to 
make a choice about their consumption based in part on their allocation of time 
between work, leisure and education; in this case consumption taxation has a 
negative distortionary effect on the growth rate. The hypotheses derived from the 
one-sector model about the mix between distortionary and non-distortionary are, 
therefore, not so clear in the two-sector model. Unless there is information about the 
true nature of taxation in each country and accessible information about the rate of 
taxation then it may prove to be very difficult to make a-priori predictions regarding 
the growth effects of changes to the mix of taxes. Empirical testing is required to 
distinguish between these competing hypotheses. 
A final problem from the two-sector model for distinguishing between assumptions 
of the model is if the human capital sector is a non-market sector and human capital 
is accumulated linearly in human capital. Tax policy cannot then be used to 
distinguish between the neoclassical growth model and endogenous growth model as 
they are in this respect observationally equivalent. 
Chapter 4 
Fiscal Policy in Models of Economic Growth 
4.1 Introduction 
According to the public-policy endogenous growth model government expenditures 
affect the long run growth rate of an economy if they affect the supply side of the 
economy and are not subject to congestion; whereas tax policies affect the long run 
growth rate if they distort the returns to the reproducible factors of production or 
labour supply. In reaching these conclusions Chapters 2 and 3 make the simplifying 
assumption that one half of the government budget has benign growth effects (by 
assuming that either taxation is non-distorting 
- 
Chapter 2- or expenditure is non- 
productive 
- 
Chapter 3). Such assumptions are useful in allowing the singular 
analysis of one direction of fiscal policy (the negative effect of taxation or the 
positive effect of expenditure) but are in practice a gross simplification of reality. 
The use of both halves of the budget constraint together modifies the results from 
Chapters 2&3 by highlighting the method of financing changes in expenditure. For 
example distortionary tax financed changes in productive expenditures have quite 
different effects on the growth rate from equivalent non-distortionary tax financed 
changes. The growth effects of certain combinations of fiscal policy now also vary 
with the size of government, being positive when the government is small, but 
negative when the size of the government is too large. 
The inclusion of distortions from both halves of the budget also alters the behaviour 
of fiscal policy in the steady state and in turn modifies the assumptions necessary for 
endogenous growth. The level of productive expenditures now grows at a constant 
rate because of the use of distortionary taxation and therefore the assumption of `AK' 
technology, used in chapters 2&3, can no longer be sustained in the one-sector 
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model. Instead diminishing returns to capital are assumed and the neoclassical and 
endogenous growth models are distinguished through the steady state growth rates of 
productive expenditures and capital. ' The appealing feature of these one-sector 
endogenous growth models is that fiscal policy provides the engine for growth. This 
is robust across a large range of characteristics of expenditures. 2 
The steady state growth of productive expenditures is more problematic in the two- 
sector model. As a consequence only one example of a two-sector model with 
productive government expenditures and distortionary taxation together exists 
currently in the literature. The problems arise when we have three reproducible 
factors of production (physical capital, human capital and public capital) yet require 
constant returns to scale to remain within a perfectly competitive framework. One 
solution is to assume that only two reproducible factors are used in any one 
production function (Capolupo (1996)); and a second yet untried method is to assume 
that productive expenditures are subject to congestion. 
Section 4.2 describes fiscal policy in the one-sector model. The neoclassical and 
endogenous models share a common set up and are described together. The 
differences between the neoclassical and endogenous growth models can then be 
seen to again rest on fairly specific assumptions but this is now the elasticity 
parameter with respect to productive expenditures rather than that on physical 
capital. Section 4.3 describes the equivalent two-sector models highlighting the 
problems of endogenising the growth rate when fiscal policy is added to the model. 
Finally section 4.4 concludes. 
1 In Chapters 2&3 the neoclassical and endogenous growth models were distinguished by the 
assumption on the returns to capital. 
2 These two results perhaps also go a long way to explaining their popularity in the literature. 
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4.2 One-sector Public Policy Growth Models 
4.2.1 The Barro Model 
Examples of one-sector endogenous growth models that include both productive 
expenditures and distortionary taxation are relatively abundant in the literature 
because they have the appealing feature that fiscal policy provides the engine for 
growth. The model developed here therefore displays a close resemblance to much 
that already exists (Barro (1990), Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992,1995), Devarajan et 
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al. (1996)). We add to it solely in our attempt to integrate several different examples 
of fiscal policy into a single model. 
The general form of the model follows that of Romer (1986) (see Chapter 1), but 
where productive expenditures replace aggregate knowledge in the production 
function. The assumption of constant returns to capital ('AK' production) is no 
longer required for endogenous growth3 but constant returns scale in capital and 
public goods are. The endogenous and neoclassical growth models are differentiated 
in their results in part by this second assumption. There are no growth effects from 
fiscal policy in the neoclassical model because fiscal policy is incapable of providing 
the mechanism by which the marginal product of capital declines towards over time 
(the Inada conditions hold in full). The difference between fiscal policy in the 
neoclassical and endogenous growth models rests upon a `knife-edge'. 
The Model 
The representative household maximises a CIES utility function identical to that 
discussed in Section 2.2 and repeated below as a reminder. The utility function 
includes both public and private consumption which are assumed to be perfect 
substitutes. ' 
3 Indeed if it exists then the growth rate explodes towards infinity over time. 
° Then is the steady growth rate of public goods is identical to that of capital. 
5 We do not allow a labour-leisure choice at this juncture. 
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equation 4.1 uaf e-0 (e )St 
Jý 1-Q 
Private production is a function of capital and two forms of productive government 
inputs, all of which are subject to diminishing marginal returns. Productive 
expenditures are assumed to directly affect private production as a flow of non-rival, 
non-excludable goods and to be produced under identical technology to the private 
sector. Barro (1990) describes this as the appropriation of a flow of private sector 
output by the government. The private production function is given by: 
Equation 4.2 y. AKI-aG 6 G" Yl Y2 
The government budget is constrained to balance at every moment in time through 
the sum of taxation on consumption and income. The second crucial assumption is 
that in the steady state productive government expenditures are maintained as a 
constant ratio to output, equation (4.4). This implies that all increased tax revenues 
from a growing economy are used to finance further increases in productive 
expenditures. 
Equation 4.3 GY1 + GY2 + Gc = zCC + r,, Y 
and, 
. 
Equation 4.4 
ýYl 
+ 
ýY2 
Y1 Y2 
Y 
Maximising in the usual way yields a growth path of consumption that bears most of 
the characteristics described in the previous chapters. Productive government 
expenditure have a positive effect on the growth rate through the marginal product of 
capital; while government consumption expenditures have no effect on the steady 
state growth rate. Income taxation reduces the returns to investment and therefore the 
steady state growth rate; whereas consumption taxation has no effect on the steady 
state path of consumption. 
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The steady state interest rate (and therefore the growth rate) is constant in equation 
(4.5) if the ratio of productive expenditures to capital, [Gy,, G, 1/K, is constant6 (that 
is if G and K grow at identical rates) and if the sum of the exponents on the two 
productive government expenditure equals a, that is ß+ y= a. Differentiating the 
production function with respect to time, 
y= (1- a) K+ 
'fl 
G''' 
+y 
GYZ 
, 
and using YK Gy, GY2 
equation (4.4) implies that if 8+ ya a then by simple substitution the steady state 
.. 
growth rate of output is equal to the growth of capital input, 
y@K. Output 
increases proportionally to increases in the capital stock and continual economies of 
scale lead to an ever-growing economy. The economy has no transitional dynamics 
and the growth rate equals that in equation (4.5). 
In the neoclassical model equation (4.4) does not hold and/or ß+ y<a (there are 
decreasing returns to scale) and the growth of capital is faster than the growth of 
public goods. Fiscal policy then has no effect on the long-run growth rate as public 
expenditures cannot prevent diminishing returns to capital. ' Barro (1990) also 
demonstrates the importance of this `knife-edge' assumption. 
The steady state growth path in equation (4.5) and the government budget constraint, 
equation (4.3), generate a series of hypothese concerning government expenditures 
and the method by which they are financed (the results of which are summarised in 
Table 4.1). The rows indicate the fiscal variable that is increased and the column the 
compensating fiscal variable. For example row 3/ column 2 (and row 2/column 3) 
indicates the effect on growth of changes to the tax mix of distortionary taxation and 
non-distortionary taxation; whereas row2 / column 6 (and row 6/column 2) indicates 
6 Barro (1990) implicitly assumes the second by restricting the available policies to an income tax and 
a single form of productive expenditure. 
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the growth effects of distortionary tax financed increases in non-productive 
expenditure. 
Table 4.1: Summary of the Growth Effects from ('omhinations of Fiscal Policy in the Barre 
I nýlýýý cnnuý Glrf)wth Model 
"SO 
l)istnrtionu y Non- Productive Productive Non-productive 
taxation distorlionur. ý expenditure expenditure expenditure 
tuauliun (: ý"i 
Uistorli on ary 
- 
+/0/- +/0/- 
tazalio n 
Non- 
+ + + 
0 
distortionary 
taxation 
expenditure 
+/0/- + +101- 
cxpcnclilurc 
Productive 
+/0/_ 
expenditure 
Non-productive 0 
expenditure 
The most ohvious relationships from Table 4.1 concern those elements of fiscal 
policy which have benign growth effects (non-distortionary taxation and non- 
productive expenditure) as the results are the same when we ignored one half of the 
government budget in Chapter 2&3. For example an increase (decrease) of 
consumption expenditure financed by an increase (decrease) in non-distortionary 
taxation (consumption taxation) has no effect on the steady state growth rate. 
Alternatively, an increase (decrease) in government consumption expenditure 
financed by an increase (decrease) in income taxation then the steady state growth 
rate decreases (increases) relative to the growth rate with no change to fiscal Policy. 
Finally non-distortionary tax financed increases (decreases) in productive 
government expenditures (r-ow 3/ (-olinin 4 or 5) have positive growth effects. 
Holding the revenues from taxation constant we can still affect the rate cif growth in 
the model if we alter the mix of government expenditures. It can he clearly seen from 
equation (4.5) that an increase in either form of productive government expenditure 
compensated by a decrease in non-productive government expenditure (hut leaving 
the size of government constant) has a positive effect on the rate of growth. The 
effect of the mix of productive government expenditure on the rate of growth 
' This is not necessarily the same neoclassical model with public policy discussed by the likes of' 
Peacock & Shaw (1971) and Musgrave (1959) but f'ººIIows t'rum that discussed in Chapter 2&3. 
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depends upon the relative productivity and the relative size of the productive 
expenditures (Devarajan et al. (1996)). 
Changes to the growth rate can also be achieved through changes to the mix of 
taxation. The increased use of consumption taxation and decreased use of 
distortionary taxation (keeping total revenues constant) has a positive effect on the 
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steady state rate of growth. Only income tax reduces the returns to investment in the 
model and therefore any shift away from income tax will increase the of growth. 
Interesting growth effects result from changes to the level of productive government 
expenditures financed by distortionary taxation as the effect on growth now varies 
over the level of expenditure. The positive effects of increases in the level of 
productive expenditures on the growth rate are non-linear because of the assumption 
of diminishing marginal returns to productive expenditures. In contrast the effect of 
increases in the revenues from distortionary taxation are linear in their effect. Figure 
4.1 (based on Barro (1990 
- 
Fig. 1)) demonstrates that at small sizes of government 
the positive effect is greater than the negative effects, but beyond the optimum point, 
at which a= zY= (G/I'), the negative effects of taxation outweigh the positive effects 
of expenditure. 
G/Y 
Figure 4.1: The Growth Effects of Distortionary Tax Financing of Productive Government 
Expenditures in the Barro Growth Model 
4.2.2 Congested Public Goods 
If public goods are subject to congestion then the above results are made redundant 
because equation (4.4) can no longer be made to hold. Instead the steady state 
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behaviour of productive expenditures is given by (4.6). Fiscal policy can no longer be 
used to prevent diminishing marginal returns to capital driving the growth rate to 
zero. The congested public goods model is observationally equivalent to the 
neoclassical model and the steady state is independent of fiscal policy. 
Equation 4.6 
GYl 
+ 
GY2 
=Z=0 
Y1 Y2 
This result is however, sensitive to the assumptions made about technology. The 
congestion of public goods implies expenditures can no longer be used to prevent 
diminishing returns to capital over time. Therefore the only way to endogenise the 
growth rate is to remove the assumption of diminishing marginal returns. That is we 
assume there are constant returns to capital in the production function (Barro & Sala- 
i-Martin (1992)). " The results differ from the congested goods model discussed in 
Chapter 2 because the use of distortionary taxation results in a constant level of 
congestion in the steady state (as shown in equation (4.6)). 
The set of conditions required for endogenous growth in the congested goods model 
changes to: i) there must be constant returns to capital in production and; ii) 
increased tax revenues from a growing economy are used to solely finance 
productive expenditures. " 
Consumption growth in this model is given by: 
Equation 4.7 VC r )A(r )6 
-8- p] 
The dual effect of fiscal policy is well demonstrated in equation (4.7) through the two 
tax terms. Increases in expenditure have a positive but diminishing marginal effect, 
8 If the Barro (1990) model rests on the ` knife-edge' assumption that 83+ y- a then the results for the 
congested goods model (Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992)) rest on the ` knife-edge' that the exponent on 
the capital term equals one, (1-a) 
- 
1. If 1-a <1 then there are no growth effects from fiscal policy, 
while if 1-a> 1 then the growth rate explodes towards infinity over time. The results in the congested 
good case are independent of the exponent on the government expenditure term. That is we no longer 
require constant returns across physical capital and government expenditures. 
9 The parameter value on the expenditure term in the production function has no effect on the results. 
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(r/)Q > 0, and a linear negative effect, (1 
- 
ry) < 0. If the condition of constant returns 
to capital is met then the same set of results for the non-congested public good case 
applies here (Table 4.1). 
Changes to the characteristics of expenditure or the choice of distortionary taxation 
have no substantive impact on the results because the mathematical requirements for 
endogenous growth remain the same. Such modifications of the model are abundant 
in the literature and rather than report the results for various combinations of fiscal 
policy we refer the reader to the relevant sections of Chapters 2&3. 
4.3 Two-sector Public Policy Growth Models 
Only one example of a two-sector endogenous growth model that includes both 
productive government expenditures and distortionary taxation exists in the 
literature. This stems from the problem of constant returns to scale technology when 
three factors of production (physical capital, human capital and public capital) grow 
in the steady state. 1° One solution is to assume that only two of these three factors are 
used within the production function of any one-sector. For example in the Capolupo 
(1996) education model aggregate output is a function of physical and human capital, 
whereas the education sector uses human and public capital as inputs. This has the 
appealing feature that government policies provide the engine for growth but limits 
the types of expenditures that the model can be reasonably thought to reflect. 
Expenditures which affect the production of output, and which empirical work by the 
likes of Aschauer (1989) suggest are important, cannot then be modelled in a two- 
sector model. 
A second possible solution (and one not yet discussed in the literature) is to assume 
that government expenditures are subject to congestion. If the level of congestion 
remains constant in the steady state then the growth rate is endogenised, but public 
lo The problem is how to achieve a constant steady state growth rate i. e. one that does not explode 
away over time. 
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policy does not provide the engine for growth. " This follows a similar approach to 
that adopted when public goods are congested in a one-sector model (Barro & Sala-i- 
Martin (1992)). The congested good model is discussed in Section 4.3.1 followed by 
the Capolupo model in Section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1 Congested Public Goods 
The production technology employed in the two-sectors of the economy is identical 
to that described in Chapter 2 (and repeated as equations (4.8) & (4.9) below). Both 
sectors of the economy exhibit constant returns to scale in physical and human 
capital inputs. For this reason physical and human capital grow at identical rates in 
the steady state. We assume that as q so that physical and human capital are 
produced under different technologies. Expenditures are assumed to be productive as 
a flow of goods in each sector and for all public goods within any one sector to have 
equal marginal productivity. Public goods are subject to congestion and enter the 
production functions as a ratio to output, G; /Y (i = 1,2). 12 
Equation 4.8 Y=C+ K+ 5K 
= 
A(CY') pI (vK)a (uH)1 
Y 
Equation 4.9 H+, H= B( 
y-2)61 [(1- v)K]° [(1- u)H]'-' 
Household utility is of an identical form to that described in equation (4.1) above. 
Productive public goods, Gy, /Y and G, 2/Y, and consumption expenditure, Gc, are 
financed by taxing the output of the capital sector, the human capital sector or 
consumption. 
11 The lack of discussion of public expenditures in two-sector endogenous growth models has much to 
do with this problem of using public goods as the engine for growth. In some ways this is surprising 
given that the two-sector tax models such as Rebelo (1990), Stokey & Rebelo (1995) etc. (discussed 
in Chapter 3) make exactly the same assumption as that used here, production technology is two- 
sector `AK'. 
12 We do not discuss alternative measures of congestion (Glomm & Ravikumar (1994), Fisher & 
Turnovsky (1998)) although given that the measure we discuss is a representation of complete 
congestion the results should hold when the rate of congestion is only partial. The disadvantage of this 
assumption is that both sectors become congested at an identical rate. 
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Equation 4.10 
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G"' 
+ 
GYz 
+ Gc = [TK1rK1vK +r lr lUH] + {zK2rK2 (1- v)K + zw2rwz (1- u)H] + zcC 
We assume for simplicity that the rate of taxation on physical and human capital is 
identical in each sector, that is zKi = THL (i = 1,2) but rK; ;d rKj (i ý j) and ro THI (i ve j). 
This is equivalent to a different income tax rate on each sector of the economy. 
Further to this we assume that in the steady state increases in tax revenues resulting 
from a growing economy fund further increases in productive expenditure. " The 
level of congestion of public goods then remains constant in the steady state. 
Taxation does not affect the optimal input ratios but it does affect the rate of return in 
the physical and human sectors. These conditions (equivalent in forms to equations 
(3.23)-(3.25) of Chapter 3) are given as: 
Equation 4.11 r= (1- ry, )aA(G! L )ß1 ( 
K)«-1 
-45 
. 
Equation 4.12 r+ = (1- r2)(1- t7)B(C'y2 )4 2 
(1 
-n-S+q 
(1 
- 
u)H q 
Equation 4.13 (1- a)(1- u) 
= 
(1- 71)1- y 
au 77 v 
In the steady state the ratio [ vK ] is constant because capital and human capital grow 
at identical rates and by assumption the congestion of public goods is constant. The 
interest rate in equations (4.11)-(4.12), and therefore the growth path of consumption 
(equation (4.14)), is also constant in the steady state. The model therefore behaves in 
much the same way as the two-sector tax models of Chapter 3 but there are now also 
positive effects on growth from public good expenditures as well as the negative 
effects from taxation. Both types of policy are equivalent to one-off shifts in the level 
of technology (parameters A and B). 
13 As in the one-sector model this assumption is crucial for the results. 
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The results from the two-sector model (summarised in Table 4.2) remain much the 
same as those from the one-sector for the reason that government expenditures and 
taxation affect the private production process by identical means. The greater realism 
of the two-sector model comes at the price of a loss of clarity of the results. The 
greater the number of distortionary taxes and productive expenditures the more 
difficult it becomes to predict the effect on growth of changes in the mix of policy 
variables. However a number of the results carry through, if only in general. Most 
noticeable of these is the importance of the method of financing expenditures. The 
effect on growth of increases in non-productive expenditure financed by distortionary 
taxation (of either sector) is negative if distortionary tax financed but zero if non- 
distortionary financed. A change in the level of productive expenditures financed by 
distortionary taxation varies across the size of government, being positive when 
small and negative when large. 
Table 4.2: Summary of the Growth Effects from Combinations of Fiscal Policy in a Two-Sector 
FndOL-, LnO uS Growth Model 
Production Human Non- Productive productive Non- 
sector capital sector distortionary expenditure expenditure productive 
Iaaation taxation taxation Gºý Cº.: expenditure 
production 
rccrýýr 
taxation 
human 
+/O 
. 
ý/O/ý +10ý- " 
capital sector 
taxation 
Non- 
++ + + 
O 
distortionary 
taxation 
Productive 
+/0/- +/0/- + +/0/- + 
expenditure 
Productive 
+0 +/0/- +/0/- 
- expenditure 1ýi, 
Non- 
productive 
expenditure 
The two-sector model provides much scope to extend the rule of fiscal policy in the 
determination of the growth rate but the results are in general non-robust to changes 
in the assumptions. The effects on the results are mostly confined to the tax variables 
(discussed in Chapter 3) although there are spillover effects on expenditures through 
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the budget constraint. Changes to the assumptions regarding the technology of the 
human capital sector and the tax treatment of the human capital sector result in either 
no forms of taxation having an effect on the growth rate (the results o1' the mooclel are 
then identical to the expenditure two-sector model of Chapter 2) or only human 
capital taxation having negative growth effects (see Chapter 3 for the details), 
whereas allowing elastic labour supply (elasticity values greater than zero) will 
introduce distortionary growth effects from consumption taxation. The predictions 
made about the growth effects of changes in the tax mix as well as changes in policy 
across the budget constraint will then he altered. The results from such a model are 
summarised in Table 4.3. The effect on growth of consumption tax financed 
increases in non-productive expenditures would he negative, but increases in 
productive expenditures vary across the range of government size. The growth effects 
of the tax mix will then depend in part on a number of parameters in the model, one 
of which is the rate of taxation. Mendoza et al. (1997) argue that consumption 
taxation is likely to he less distortionary than factor income taxation although this is 
in part based on the empirical results in that paper. On the expenditure side 
alternative measures of congestion (Glomm & Ravikurnar (1994), Fisher & 
Turnovsky (1998)) can be incorporated into the model, as long as the assumption that 
the degree of congestion remains constant in the steady state holds, although this 
change has no real effect on the results. 
'f'ahle 4.3: Summary of the Growth Effects from Conihinations of Fiscal Policy in the Meen(lura ct al. 
(19'), ') Iýýýý 
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ta\: ttion taxation G expenditure 
1'ru rn 
' ' 
+/0/- +/0/- +/0/- +/0/- 
cfol Nc(
n 
c 's +/0/- +/0/- +/0/- 
- tor capital e 
taxation 
Consumption 
+/0/- +10/ý +/ý/ý +/Q/ý 
" taxation 
d +101- +101- +/0/- 
pen ex diture 
G 
ticc Produc 
+/0/- +/0/- +/0/- +/0/- + 
exxpendienditu re 
Non- 
productise 
expenditure 
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4.3.2 Education Model 
Capolupo (1996) limits the role of public policy to the accumulation of human 
capital. The production of private goods uses physical and human capital as inputs, 
whereas human capital production uses human capital and public goods as inputs. 
The production functions are given by: 
Equation 4.15 Y= AKa (uH)l-a 
Equation 4.16 H= BGY2'e [(1-1OH]l-'8 
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We assume government expenditures (of which there is only the one type) are funded 
by a tax on capital (that is on the quantity of capital rather than on the returns to 
capital). This change has no effect on the basic results and is done in order to stay 
true to the original paper. 
Equation 4.17 GY2 = TK 
The household side of the model is equivalent to that in equation (4.1) above, and 
maximising in the usual way yields the following growth path for consumption, 
Equation 4.18 yc =1 [A[ 
K 
Despite the difference between this and the two-sector described above in general the 
results remain the same except for the fact that productive expenditures provide the 
engine for growth in the model. In the steady state the growth rate of human capital 
depends positively on increases in government expenditure (because of the increased 
productivity of the human capital input), 14 whereas the accumulation of physical 
'a Equation (20) is constant in the steady state because the ratio of G/H is constant. Differentiating 
(17) with respect to time yields 
GY2 
=K, demonstrates that equation (4.18) is constant if the ratio 
Y2 
of K/H is constant which it is in the steady state. 
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capital depends negatively on increases in government expenditure because of the 
need to finance expenditures through a distortionary tax on the quantity of capital. 
4.4 Conclusions 
The presence of distortions from both halves of the government budget alters both 
the results and the structure of endogenous growth models. The growth effects of 
expenditure policy depend on the method of financing as well as the direction of 
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expenditure (towards either the consumption or production sectors). Increases in non- 
productive expenditure have a negative effect on growth when distortionary tax 
financed yet no effect when non-distortionary tax financed. In contrast increases in 
productive expenditure have positive effects on growth when non-distortionary tax 
financed but their effect varies with the size of government when distortionary tax 
financed. 
On the modelling side, increases in the steady state level of productive expenditure, 
because of their financing by distortionary taxation, imply that the assumption of 
constant returns to capital, used in Chapters 2&3, is then no longer sustainable. 
Instead diminishing marginal returns to capital (as in the neoclassical model of 
Chapter 1) are assumed. The returns to capital no longer distinguish between the 
results for the endogenous and neoclassical growth models and instead the models 
are characterised by i) a restriction on the substitutability of capital and public goods 
in the production function; and ii) that increases in the revenues from distortionary 
taxation are used to finance increases in productive forms of expenditure in the 
steady state. Public goods provide the engine for growth in these models which helps 
to explain their popularity in the literature. The exception is once again when public 
goods are subject to congestion. If the level of congestion remains constant in the 
steady state then the growth rate can be endogenised if we return to the use of `AK' 
technology. " 
's The growth rate is then endogenised only through the second assumption that increased tax 
revenues finance increases in productive expenditures. 
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The simplicity of the one-sector model does not however carry over to the two-sector 
model. Problems of three reproducible factors in constant returns to scale production 
functions require that either: one factor of production is removed from each 
production function (Capolupo (1996)); or public goods is subject to congestion 
(Section 4.3.1). The second model can be seen to be an extension of the one-sector 
congested public good model and public goods no longer provide the engine for 
growth. The general results for fiscal policy do carry over to both of these models if 
either of the above assumptions hold, but are non-robust to changes in the 
assumptions of the model. 
Figure 4.2 highlights the necessary assumptions for growth effects from fiscal policy 
in the one and two-sector models (indicated by the symbol Figure 4.2 does not 
provide information as to which fiscal variables actually have an effect on growth; a 
summary of these can be found in Figure 2.5 in Chapter 2 and Figures 3.4 and 3.5 in 
Chapter 3. A `x' symbol indicates under what assumptions fiscal policy is 
ineffective. 
By implicitly ignoring the budget constraint from the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 by 
assuming that one half of the budget has a benign effect on growth greatly simplifies 
the way in which the models can be tested. The results from chapter 2 carry across to 
this chapter if funded solely non-distorting (consumption) taxation; and the results 
for taxation from Chapter 3 follow if funded solely by non-productive expenditures. 
Distortionary tax financed increases in productive expenditure are positive when the 
size of government is small, but beyond some optimal point further increases in 
productive expenditure are negative (Barro (1990)). This may prove to be a problem 
when forming hypotheses to test in the empirical section of this thesis. 
The tractability of the results from the one-sector model is lost we allow for multiple 
forms of productive expenditures and taxation in the two-sector model. This is not 
aided by the sensitivity of the results to changes in the assumptions of production 
technology and the elasticity of labour supply. Chapters 2 and 3 provide examples of 
the different results that can be achieved through varying the assumptions of the 
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model but also highlight the difficulty these more detailed models have in providing 
a set of testable hypotheses. 
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Chapter 5 
Review of the Empirical Literature 
5.1 Review of the literature 
Endogenous growth models describe a number of possible channels by which 
government policy affects the long run growth rate of a country; whereas the 
neoclassical models suggests only short run effects. Much of the empirical literature 
examining the relationship between economic growth and fiscal policy pre-dates the 
endogenous growth models and therefore tests are of the general determinants of 
growth rather then with any particular model in mind. These studies vary in terms of 
data set, econometric technique and quality and so we organise them initially 
according to the type of fiscal variables included within the regression equation. This 
is useful in demonstrating how the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients 
alter even on similar variables within similarly specified regressions. 
5.1.1 Tax Variables 
Table 5.1 below displays the findings from previous works that have included tax 
variables within a growth regression. These studies are not strictly comparable in 
terms of measurement of the tax variables (some measures can be thought of as 
reflecting average rather than marginal tax rates) but despite this, one strong 
conclusion which emerges is the consistent estimation of strong negative growth 
effects surrounding income taxation. This result appears to be robust across data set 
and econometric method. Of the other forms of taxation the results are mixed and if 
anything the weight of the evidence appears to suggest that these forms of taxation 
do not have significant effects on the growth rate. 
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Author Countries years econometric length of main results 
method average 
Marsden (1983) 10 pairs of 1970s pair low tax countries grew quicker 
matched GDP comparisons than high tax countries 
Koester, 63 1970-79 cross-section 10-years marginal tax and average tax 
Kormendi (1987) rates have no significant 
negative effect 
Skinner (1987) African cross-section income, corporation and 
countries import taxes are significant and 
negative. Export and sales 
taxes insignificant 
Engen, Skinner 107 1970-85 cross-section 16 years taxes have significant and 
(1992) negative effects in short and long-run 
Dowrick (1993) OECD 1960-85 cross-section 26 years income taxes significant 
negative. Corporation taxes not 
significant 
Easterly, Rebelo 100 1970-88 cross-section 19 years income taxes significant and 
(1993) negative, others types of 
taxation non-robust 
Cashin (1995) 23 OECD 1971-88 panel 5-years total taxation significant 
negative 
Mendoza, Milesi- 18 OECD 1965-91 panel annual, 5- effective capital, consumption 
Ferretti, Asea year and labour tax rates are 
insignificant in 5-year (1997) 
averages, non-robustly 
significant in annual data 
regressions 
Kocherlakota & US, UK US 1891- time-series annual (10 tax measures insignificant 
Yi (1997) 1991, UK lags) individually, significant when 1831-1991 put with public capital term 
Agell, Lindh & 22 OECD 1970-90 cross-section 21 years total tax revenue insignificant 
Ohlsson (1997) 
Folster & 22 OECD 1970-95 panel 5-years total tax revenue significant 
Henrekson (1997) negative 
Fuente (1997) 21 OECD 1965-95 panel 5-years total tax revenue significant 
negative I 
Table 5.1: Review of the Empirical Relationship Between Taxation and Growth 
5.1.2 Government Expenditures 
Consumption Expenditure 
Our review of the literature for expenditure variables proceeds by separating 
expenditures into three different types; total and government consumption 
expenditure; social welfare expenditure; and public investment expenditure (in both 
aggregated and disaggregated forms). Tables summarising the findings of these three 
classifications of expenditure can be found below. 
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The results for government consumption expenditure are symptomatic of the general 
findings from the growth literature. In some studies, Ram (1986) and Romer (1989a, 
b, 1990), positive coefficients are estimated; in others, Kormendi & Meguire (1985), 
no significant growth effects are found; whereas Landau (1983,1986), Grier & 
Tullock (1989), Alexander (1990) and Barro (1991) all find strong negative 
correlation's. 
Author Countries years econometric length of main results 
method 
average 
Landau (1983) 104 1961-76 cross-section 16 years government consumption 
expenditure has a significant 
negative effect 
Kormendi, 47 cross-section 28 years government consumption 
Meguire (1985) expenditure has a no 
significant effect 
Ram (1986) 115 1960-80 cross-section, 10 size of government produces 
time series significant positive coefficients 
Landau (1986) LDCs cross-section government consumption 
expenditure has a significant 
negative effect 
Grier, Tullock 115 1950-81 panel data 5-years government consumption 
(1989) expenditure has a significant 
negative effect 
Romer (1989a) 94 1960-85 cross-section 16 years government consumption 
expenditure has a significant 
positive effect 
Romer (1989b) 112 1960-85 cross-section 16 years government consumption 
expenditure has a significant 
positive effect 
Romer (1990) 90 1960-85 cross-section 16 years government consumption 
expenditure has a significant 
positive effect 
Alexander (1990) 13 OECD 1959-84 panel annual government consumption 
expenditure has a significant 
negative effect 
Barro (1991) 98 1960-85 cross-section 16 years government consumption 
expenditure has a significant 
negative effect 
Devarajan, 21 OECD 1970-90 panel 5-year consumption expenditure 
Swaroop & Zou moving 
(1996) average 
Mendoza, Milesi- 18 OECD 1965-91 panel annual, 5- government consumption 
Ferreti & Asea year expenditure 
insignificant 
(1997) 
Agell, Lindh & 22 OECD 1970-90 cross-section 21 years total expenditures insignificant 
Ohlsson (1997) 
Folster & 22 OECD 1970-95 panel 5-years total expenditures significant 
Henrekson (1997) negative 
Fuente (1997) 21 OECD 1965-95 panel 5-years total expenditures significant 
negative, government 
consumption expenditure 
insignificant 
Table 5.2: Review of the Empirical Relationship Between Government Consumption Expenditure 
and Growth 
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Transfer Payments / Welfare Expenditure 
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This same pattern of inconsistent results is repeated for studies that include transfer 
payments. McCallum & Blais (1987), Castles & Dowrick (1990), Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), Cashin (1995) and Nazimi & Ramirez (1997) estimate a positive relationship; 
Landau (1983,1985) and Hanson & Henrekson (1994) estimate there to be no 
statistically significant relationship; while Korpi (1985), Weede (1986,1991), 
Nordstrum (1992) and Persson & Tabellini (1994) all find significant negative 
growth effects from government welfare programmes. 
Author Countries years econometric length of main results 
method average 
Korpi (1985) OECD 1970-87 panel 18 years transfer payment expenditure 
has a significant positive effect 
Landau (1985) 16 OECD 1952-76 panel/ cross- annual transfer payment expenditure 
section has no significant effect 
Weede (1986) 19 OECD 1960-82 panel/ cross- 7-years transfer payment expenditure 
section has a significant negative 
effect 
McCallum, Blais 17 OECD 1960-83 panel/ cross- 7-years transfer payment expenditure 
(1987) section has a significant positive effect 
Castles, Dowrick 18 OECD 1960-85 panel 6 years transfer payment expenditure 
(1990) has a significant positive effect 
Weede (1991) 19 OECD 1960-85 panel 7-years transfer payment expenditure 
has a significant negative 
effect 
Nordstrum (1992) 14 OECD 1970-89 cross-section 20 years transfer payment expenditure 
has a significant negative 
effect 
Sala-i-Martin 75 cross-section transfer payment expenditure 
(1992) has a significant positive effect 
Persson, Tabellini 14 OECD 1960-85 cross-section 16 years transfer payment expenditure 
(1994) has a significant negative 
effect 
Hanson OECD 1970-87 cross-section 18 years transfer payment expenditure 
, Henrekson (1994) has no significant effect 
Cashin (1995) 23 OECD 1971-88 panel 5-years transfer payment expenditure 
has a significant positive effect 
Fuente (1997) 21 OECD 1965-95 panel 5-years transfers insignificant 
Nazimi, Ramirez Mexico 1950-90 time-series annual transfer payment expenditure 
(1997) has a significant positive effect 
Table 5.3: Review of the Empirical Relationship Between Social Security and Welfare Payments and 
Growth 
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In contrast to the expenditures reviewed above there does seem to be some pattern 
from the studies that have included public investment variables within a growth 
regression. Where significant coefficients have been estimated these are usually 
confined to transport & communication expenditure (see for example Barro (1989, 
1991), Easterly & Rebelo (1993) and Devarajan et al. (1996)). Total public 
investment and disaggregated forms of investment (which have included education, 
health and defence) typically has no significant relationship with growth (see for 
example Bath & Bradley (1987), Barro (1991), Landau (1986) and Easterly & 
Rebelo (1993)) 
Author Countries years econometric length of main results 
method average 
Landau (1986) LDCs education, defence, capital 
expenditure insignificant 
Bath, Bradley 16 OECD 1971-83 cross-section 13 years total public investment 
(1987) insignificant 
Barro (1989) 72 1960-85 cross-section 16 years total investment significant 
Barro (1991) 98 1960-85 cross-section 16 years transport & communication 
significant, total public 
investment insignificant 
Easterly, Rebelo 100 1970-88 cross-section 19 years transport & communication 
(1993) significant, total investment, 
education, health insignificant 
Devarajan, 14 developed 1970-1990 panel 5-year health, transport & 
Swaroop, Zou countries moving communication significant 
average positive, defence, education (1996) significant negative. Total 
capital expenditure significant 
positive 
Kocherlakota & US, UK Us 1891-1991 time-series annual, public investment insignificant 
Yi (1997) UK 1831-1991 (10 lags) when included individually, 
significant when included with 
tax variables 
Fuente (1997) 21 OECD 1965-95 panel 5-years public investment significant 
positive 
Table 5.4: Review of the Empirical Relationship Between Public Investment and Growth 
5.2 Non-robustness 
From this review it appears that only two consistent relationships between fiscal 
policy and growth emerge from the literature; government expenditures on transport 
& communication infrastructure has a positive effect on growth and; income taxation 
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(no matter how measured) has a negative relationship with the growth rate of a 
country. This conclusion can however, be criticised on the grounds that the studies 
reviewed account with varying degrees of success for the statistical problems of 
estimating growth regressions (Folster & Henrekson (1997)). Collinearity and 
simultaneity between the regressors along with omitted variable bias and 
heterogeneity of the parameter estimates can lead to a bias in the parameter estimates 
and a false set of conclusions being drawn. In this section we review these statistical 
problems, the potential biases they introduce along with methods for dealing with 
them. ' We then re-review the empirical literature. 
5.2.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is the approximate linear relationship between combinations of the 
independent variables in the regression equation. This is a problem in growth 
regressions as collinearity amongst the regressors can, from small changes in the set 
of regressors, bring about large variation in the parameter estimates. Variables then 
appear to be inconsistent and of little value in finding the determinants of growth. 
Although not always explicitly tested for, a number of studies provide evidence that 
multicollinearity is a problem in growth regressions. The suggestion of collinearity 
between fiscal variables and the ` other regressors' can be found in the studies by both 
Levine & Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). 2 Levine & Renelt (1992) test the 
robustness of a broad range of variables, some of which are fiscal variables, using 
error bound analysis (EBA). Robustness in this sense is the consistent sign and 
significance of a variable under alternative sets of conditioning variables. The fiscal 
variables included in the study cover a broad range of consumption and investment 
expenditures in both aggregated and disaggregated forms, along with various types 
' We do not review all possible problems with the above studies preferring to concentrate on a small 
number of main issues. From this list we ignore some potentially important reasons such as the poor 
nature of the proxies used, for example those for taxation (Temple (1998)). However we prefer to take 
issue with this sort of issue in the empirical section of the thesis. 
2 Although perversely the Levine & Renelt study has itself been criticised for including collinear 
combinations of regressors in the set of conditioning variables (Temple (1998)). 
3 That is, upper and lower values of the coefficient that cannot be rejected at the 5% level of 
significance. For a more formal description see the original text. 
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of, and methods for measuring, taxes. Using data for a cross-section of 119 countries 
from 1974-89, Levine & Renelt discover that fiscal variables are non-robust to 
changes in the set of conditioning variables, and enter the regression with the 
predicted signs only when investment is included. However, the same fiscal variables 
are not significantly correlated with investment themselves. 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) criticises the EBA approach of Levine & Renelt (1992) for 
being too strong and therefore guaranteed to reject robustness for almost all 
variables. ' Sala-i-Martin (1997) instead tests for robustness by calculating the 
cumulative distribution function of the variable. That is, the number of regressions in 
which the variable is statistically significant. The regression equations are estimated 
for a fixed set of conditioning variables (the same ones as Levine & Renelt) and 
combinations of 3 of the remaining variables. ' The program is run initially with 
private investment not included among the set of conditioning variables, and then for 
a second time with private investment included. Despite the change of approach from 
EBA, of the four fiscal variables studied none can be ` confidently' described as 
affecting growth when private investment is not included, and only public investment 
can be when private investment is included. " From this Sala-i-Martin suggests fiscal 
policies represent `symptoms' of the true determinants of growth (such as social 
structures) rather than having any direct effect themselves. 
Evidence of multicollinearity can also be found between categories of fiscal policy. 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) consider the relationship between a broad range of fiscal 
variables and growth for 100 countries over the period 1970-88'. They find that fiscal 
variables are non-robust to the inclusion of other fiscal variables within the same 
regression equation. They find only investment in transport & communication and 
the budget surplus emerge are robustly correlated with growth. 
4A variable needs to change sign or significance only once for it to become `non-robust' under the 
EBA approach. Durlauf & Quah (1998) provide a more formal explanation for this. 
s Sala-i-Martin estimates combinations of three because the typical regression equation is said to have 
about seven explanatory variables (4 are taken up with the conditioning variables). 
6 Public investment, public consumption expenditure and defence expenditure are not far outside this 
limit of `confidence' in the first set of regressions and this remains so for defence and consumption 
when investment is included. 
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There is no standard method for dealing with suspected collinearity in the literature 
and so often it is dealt with by dropping one of the suspected collinear variables from 
the regression! This is acceptable if the true coefficient on the omitted variable is 
zero, but if the true coefficient is statistically significant then this will lead to a 
different bias because a relevant variable has been omitted. We review the effects of 
the omission of relevant variables below. 
5.2.2 Simultaneity 
The results from Levine & Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) can be used to 
indicate possible simultaneity amongst the regressors as well as multicollinearity. 
OLS estimation assumes that all of the right hand side variables are exogenous (for 
example fiscal policy cause growth but growth does not cause fiscal policy). Yet, 
possible endogeneity between growth and fiscal policy has long been identified in the 
literature. Hsieh & Lai (1994) using a VAR approach on annual data for 7 OECD 
countries from 1885-1987 find in 3 out of the 7 countries under study (Germany, 
Italy and the US) causality runs from growth to government consumption 
expenditure but not back. " While Conte & Darrat (1988) who, using a larger sample 
(22 OECD countries) but over a shorter time period (1960-84), find that in 9i° of the 
22 countries there is evidence that growth Granger causes total government outlays 
(and borders significance for 3 more"). A failure to account for endogeneity leads to 
inconsistent estimates of the parameters as the regressors are not independent of the 
error term. 
The most likely sources of endogeneity between fiscal policy and growth are the 
business cycle and Wagner's law. Certain categories of expenditure, such as welfare 
payments, and most types of taxation are likely to be correlated with the business 
7 In practice the sample size for any particular regression is much smaller because of missing 
information form many countries. 
8 For additional options see Kennedy (1992). 
In Canada, UK and Japan causality is found to run in the opposite direction. 
'o These are Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal Switzerland and the UK. 
" These 3 countries are Denmark, Netherlands and the US. 
Chapter S: Review of the Empirical Literature 106 
cycle. On the expenditure side as growth slows over the cycle welfare expenditures 
increase as an `automatic stabiliser' on aggregate demand. While tax revenues will 
rise and fall with the level of demand in the economy. The usual procedure for 
dealing with the effects of the business cycle is to use a combination of period 
averaging and expressing fiscal variables as a ratio to GDP. If taxes are proportional 
and move pro-cyclically with GDP then expressing fiscal variables as a ratio to GDP 
will eliminate the effects of the business cycle from the data. 12 If taxes are only 
approximately linear then expressing the tax revenues as a ratio will work only 
imperfectly. This method will not work for social security expenditure however, and 
indeed will exacerbate the business cycle effect in the data as social-security 
expenditure is likely to move counter-cyclically with growth. As a consequence some 
form of period averaging is usually also employed on the data to smooth the business 
cycle. Although various lengths of average have been used the consensus appears to 
be for using 5-year periods (although no justification is given for this over 
alternatives). 
Wagner's law is the idea that certain categories of expenditure have an elasticity of 
demand that is greater than one. Therefore, as national income rises so does the 
expenditure on these goods. Evidence for Wagner's law is however, generally weak. 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) find only health and social security expenditures to have 
risen with income whereas expenditures on education, transport & communication 
and general public services have fallen as income increases. Easterly & Rebeln also 
find that this relationship disappears at the highest levels of income in their sample. 
Aschauer (1990) argues against the slowdown in growth as an explanation for 
declining expenditures on investment capital by governments by pointing out that 
these expenditures peaked some 5 to 8 years before the usual dating of the 
productivity decline in 1973. Sundrum (1990) provides a very comprehensive review 
of this literature and concludes that the appearance of a relationship has more to do 
with the changing role of the nation state rather Wagner's law. Instead, Sundrum 
argues that a stronger correlation appears between government tax revenues and 
income because revenues increase with income and the tax structure does not change 
'Z Fiorito (1997) indeed finds tax revenues to vary pro-cyclically with growth over the business cycle 
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greatly over time. Easterly & Rebelo (1993) too find strong correlations between tax 
revenues and GDP. 
The problem of Wagner's law would suggest that only comparing studies which 
include both rich and poor countries will lead to misleading conclusions and instead 
concentration should be made on studies which have used a sample of rich countries. 
In addition Folster & Henrekson (1997) argue against using data averaged over long 
period of time as this is more likely to increase possible simultaneity if not from 
Wagner's law then from demographic variables. " For example, rising incomes have 
been associated with longer life-expectancy. Longer life-expectancy is in turn likely 
to lead to more payments on social welfare for the elderly. Faster income growth then 
is likely to be simultaneously determined with social security expenditure. 14 
The final method for dealing with simultaneity amongst the regressors commonly 
used is estimation by instrumental variables. The variables that are believed to be 
endogenous are regressed on a series of `instrumenting' variables. These instruments 
are (in theory at least) correlated with the regressors of interest but not the error term. 
These yield predicted values, which are then substituted into the first regressions 
hence removing the potential endogeneity. Problems with this technique revolve 
around the choice of instruments and what the resulting regressions mean (Mankiw 
(1995)). 
5.2.3 Omitted Variables 
A further problem with estimating growth regressions is that we have little idea as to 
what the relevant variables to be included in the regression equation are. The 
omission of relevant variables from the regression equation leads to a bias in the 
for a sample of G-7 countries. 
13 This may also form an additional argument against using cross-section estimation techniques in 
which data are typically averaged over fairly long time periods. 
'a Easterly & Rebelo (1993) also find strong correlations between population size and fiscal variables. 
Capital spending, transport & communication, agriculture and general public services all fall as 
population size increases whereas defence expenditure rises. However, when they try to instrument 
for fiscal variables using the measures of scale they find to be correlated with fiscal variables they 
found the significant coefficients they estimated in previous regressions now become insignificant. 
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estimation of the remaining parameters; whereas the inclusion of irrelevant variables 
reduces the efficiency of the estimates. If we follow the empirical literature as a 
whole we might conclude that ` everything matters' for growth, whereas if we follow 
Levine & Renelt (1992) and include only `robust' regressors we would conclude that 
only initial GDP and the investment ratio should be included. In turn economic 
theory adds little to our ability to limit the number of proposed regressors. The 
neoclassical model concludes only unobservable technological change and some 
structural parameters such as the rate of time preference matter for growth, whereas 
in endogenous growth models `everything matters' 's 
. 
As means of limiting the number regressors estimation has typically been through a 
Barro-type regression equation. In the Barro regression growth is regressed on a 
matrix of conditioning variables, which includes the robust determinants of growth, 
and a set of `other variables', which are the variables under test. The set of 
conditioning variables is suggested by both theory and previous empirical evidence 
as important determinants of growth and is generally fairly consistent across 
studies. "' 
Evidence of statistical bias introduced by the omission of relevant fiscal variables is 
identified by Miller & Russek (1993) through the inclusion of the entire government 
budget constraint in the regression equation. They develop a methodology first 
proposed by Helms (1985) and Mofidi & Stone (1990) and show that the sign and 
significance of fiscal variables depends upon which fiscal variables are included in 
the regression and, as importantly, which variables are left out. " Interestingly, in 
unrelated studies Kocherlakota & Yi (1996) and Kocherlakota & Yi (1997) note the 
importance of including both tax and expenditure terms in the regression equation. 
's This description of the endogenous growth models is not strictly true but there is scope in the 
models for a theorist to make `anything matter'. 
'6 These regressions have the disadvantage that they can be criticised as not being derived from a 
theoretical framework (i. e. Mankiw, Romer & Weil (1992)) and therefore cannot be used to test 
between models. Given the previous empirical literature has demonstrated no consistent relationships 
from which to build formal models we suggest at this point in time that the lack of restrictions placed 
on the model may be an advantage. 
"Miller & Russek (1993) use a constraint with 15 categories of fiscal variable. Within that, 
significant effects from changing the specification of the constraint changes the sign and/or 
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The omission of country and time specific effects from the regression equation can 
also be dealt with by estimating using panel data techniques. Panel data estimators 
allow us to account for unobservable variables such as the level of technology that 
may be correlated with other explanatory variables. Country and time specific effects 
can be assumed to be either fixed or random. We review the advantages and 
disadvantages of these two approaches in Appendix B. 
5.2.4 Parameter Heterogeneity 
The final statistical problem we review arises from the heterogeneity in the parameter 
estimates across countries. Estimation by OLS assumes that each country in the 
sample can be described as coming from a `common surface'. That is, the true 
parameters of the model should be homogeneous across the countries contained 
within the sample. Evidence of heterogeneity can be found within the empirical 
literature, but more pointedly also within growth theory itself. The Barro (1990) 
model suggests that the relationship between growth and productive forms of 
expenditure is quadratic over the range of government size when financed by 
distortionary taxation (see Chapter 4 Section 4.2 for an explanation). The estimated 
parameter may then vary between positive and negative amongst the countries within 
the sample. Further evidence of heterogeneity can be found from the empirical 
literature. Levine & Renelt (1991), Durlauf & Johnson (1995) and Durlauf & Quah 
(1998) all conclude that parameter heterogeneity is a problem in growth regressions. 
None of the tests they propose have been used in the studies reviewed here but some 
general evidence can be found. Atkinson (1995), in a review of the empirical 
relationship between social welfare payments and growth, notes the sensitivity of the 
estimated parameters to the in(ex)clusion of Japan from the sample. When Japan is 
included in the sample of countries there is an increased chance that the estimated 
relationship between welfare payments and growth will be negative. Many of the 
suggestions to account for heterogeneity, such as stochastic parameter estimation, 
regression trees and robust estimation (Temple (1998)), require a length of data set 
coefficient on all variables except income, profit and capital gains taxation, social security tax, 
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greater than that available at present. Instead possible heterogeneity is reduced by 
restricting the sample to a single country or more commonly to a small number of 
similar countries, such as the OECD. 
5.3 Re-review of the literature 
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The statistical problems involved in the estimation of growth regressions suggest that 
when attempting to determine the strength of the empirical relationship between 
growth and fiscal policy we should concentrate only on those studies that adequately 
account for them (Folster & Henrekson (1997)). Concentrating on studies that use a 
sample of developed nations should reduce problems of collinearity along with 
parameter heterogeneity and simultaneity and estimate by panel data to reduce bias 
from omitted variable and heterogeneity across the intercept terms may also improve 
the consistency of the results. In addition we further restrict the sample of studies to 
those in which the data has been averaged across time to remove possible 
simultaneity from business cycle effects (but not too long in case of simultaneity 
from Wagner's law). Finally the study must be aware of collinearity with other fiscal 
variables and have used instrumental variable estimation to at least check the stability 
of the results. Once this is done we are left with five studies, Miller & Russek (1993), 
Cashin (1995), Devarajan et al. (1996), Mendoza et al. (1997) and Fuente (1997). 
From these we choose to ignore the Miller & Russek (1993) study because of 
potential endogeneity bias from the use of annual data, along with the Devarajan et 
al. (1996) study because of the likely collinearity between total expenditures and the 
sub-categories of expenditure included in the same regression. There is little 
acknowledgement of possible collinearity between types of fiscal variables in either 
the Mendoza et al. (1997) study or the Cashin (1995) study, but as the results appear 
reasonably robust we choose to include them. 
Differences in the set of conditioning variables may account for some of the variation 
in the results between studies if fiscal policies have indirect effects on growth, such 
as on the decision to invest in physical capital. Cashin (1995) and Mendoza et al. 
taxation of international trade and expenditure on transport & communication. 
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(1997) include a measure of human capital but not physical capital investment 
amongst their set of conditioning variables; while Fuente (1997) omits and then 
includes both human capital and private capital investment together in the regression. 
Mendoza et al. only include investment in human capital in the regression when 
instrumenting for investment. All studies include a measure of initial GDP to capture 
conditional convergence to which Mendoza et al. (1997) add a measure of terms of 
trade, whereas Fuente (1997) adds demographic variables (such as the labour force 
participation rate, unemployment and the growth of population). 
Taxation in the Mendoza et al. (1996) study is effective taxation and calculated18 as 
the ratio of total tax revenue from each element, (e. g. total consumption taxation), to 
the value of the taxed element, (e. g. pre-tax value of consumption) for 18 OECD 
countries and for the time span 1965-91. They argue that these measures more 
accurately reflect the ad valorem taxes used in the growth literature. Of the three 
types of tax ratio they calculate (consumption taxation, capital income tax and labour 
income tax) none enters the regression with a significant effect on growth. 
In contrast, Cashin (1995), for a sample of 23 OECD countries from 1971-88, using 
total tax revenues as a ratio to GDP estimates this measure of the tax burden to have 
a significant negative effect on growth. This result from Cashin matches similar ones 
in Fuente (1997) for a sample of 19 OECD when government consumption 
expenditure is excluded from the regression but not when it is included. The 
difference in the estimated effect of taxation between the Mendoza et al. study and 
the other two is surprising given that it could be argued that the effective tax rates 
they estimate more accurately reflect the marginal rate of tax. One would expect, if 
accurately measured, marginal tax rates to produce stronger correlations with growth 
than the tax burden. At first appearances this difference may be thought to be due to 
the inclusion of investment in the Fuente study, for as Levine & Renelt (1992) 
conclude the inclusion of private investment is crucial for estimating sensible fiscal 
parameters in studies of growth. However, an additional explanation offers itself. 
Comparing Mendoza et al. and Fuente when both private capital investment and 
18 These estimates follow a methodology designed by Mendoza, Razin & Tesar (1994). 
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human capital are included in the same regression shows that taxation remains 
statistically insignificant in the Mendoza et al. study but, significant in Fuente only 
when government consumption expenditure is excluded from the regression. 
Government consumption expenditure is included in the set of conditioning variables 
by Mendoza et al. This suggests that it is not the inclusion of investment but 
collinearity of taxation with government consumption expenditure that drives the 
differences between the results. 
Comparing the results for the other fiscal variables one finds government 
consumption expenditure is consistently estimated as having an insignificant effect 
on growth in the Mendoza et al. regressions but, insignificant in the Fuente 
regressions only if either total government expenditures or total tax revenues are 
included in the same regression. 
Cashin estimates that social security expenditure and public investment have positive 
effects on growth. This is repeated in the Fuente study but again, only if particular 
combinations of taxation and expenditure terms are included in the same regression. 
We can conclude from this improved review that once many of the statistical issues 
are accounted for there are no consistent relationships between fiscal policy and 
growth in the literature. Even when studies are matched as closely as possible in 
terms of data set, specification of the regression equation and econometric technique 
inconsistencies still arise. Nor does this appear to be due to differences in the 
measurement of the fiscal variables (notably those for taxation). When the 
regressions are specified in a similar way, results generally match, but where 
specification differs so do the results. 
The lack of consistent relationship between fiscal policy and growth can then, only 
be explained through a failure to account for additional factors from the statistical 
issues reviewed above. One possible source of additional factors is economic theory. 
We identify four conclusions from the review made of the theoretical literature in 
Chapter 2 to 4 that might help explain non-robustness and in turn be used to shape 
Chapter 5: Review of the Empirical Literature 113 
the empirical analysis. These four conclusions constitute the four empirical chapters 
of this thesis and we review them very briefly here as way of an introduction. 
5.4 Theoretical Issues 
Within the review of the empirical literature we noted the non-robustness of taxation 
variables to the inclusion or exclusion of government consumption expenditure from 
the regression. However, variation of the parameter estimates can also be thought to 
be consistent with the predictions from models of economic growth. For example the 
effect on growth of an increase in productive expenditures depends on the method of 
financing. If financed by non-distortionary taxation then the effect is unambiguously 
positive; whereas if financed by distortionary taxation the effect may vary between 
positive (at small sizes of government) to negative (when the size of government is 
large). Thus far the empirical literature has failed to tie these two branches of the 
literature together. We build on the work of Miller & Russek (1993) who 
demonstrate that parameter estimates on fiscal variables depend on specification of 
the government budget constraint. That is, the direction of the omitted variable bias 
depends upon which fiscal variables are included and excluded from the regression. 
A second issue is the distinction between the short run and long run information 
contained within the data. Growth models are distinguished by their implications for 
long run growth. The predictions do not hold if the economy is in transition from one 
steady state to another because of changes to one or more parameters (Kocherlakota 
& Yi (1997)). Standard practice in the literature has been to use five, ten or even 
longer period-averages to remove business cycle effects from the data, yet the 
relative benefits and costs of doing so have not been established. " 
A third issue is the level of aggregation of the data. Growth theory suggests fiscal 
variables should be categorised into productive and non-productive types according 
19 Hsieh & Lai (1994) find exactly this when investigating the impulse response functions of their 
estimated VAR equations. They find that in the first few time periods in some countries the effect on 
growth of a change in government consumption expenditure is negative, but this becomes positive 
after longer time periods. They do not equate the long run effect on the growth rate of this change. 
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to their inclusion in the demand or the supply side of the model. Even at this simple 
level the theory does not predict anything about the likely coefficients on total 
expenditures or total tax revenues sometimes included within regressions. Further to 
this it can be demonstrated that there are possible significant growth effects from 
changes in the mix of productive expenditures within the model (Devarajan et al. 
(1996)). The merits of assuming homogeneity across parameter estimates in the 
theoretical model has not been satisfactorily demonstrated and requires empirical 
testing. Too much aggregation risks widening the confidence intervals of different 
coefficients when they should be characterised by different coefficients. While too 
much disaggregation risks losing the signal in the noise as individual fiscal categories 
constitute a smaller percentage of GDP. 
A final explanation for non-robustness is the direct versus the indirect effects of 
fiscal policy. In growth models fiscal policy simultaneously determines both growth 
and investment. For example distortionary taxes reduce the returns to investment and 
hence the steady state rate of growth. The empirical relationship between fiscal 
policy and growth is weak. Levine & Renelt (1992) note the importance of the 
inclusion of investment in the regression equation but can find no evidence of a 
correlation between fiscal policy and investment. A better understanding of the 
relationship between fiscal policy and investment may therefore aid our 
understanding of the statistical relationship between fiscal policy and growth. 
Chapter 6 
Growth and the Government Budget Constraint 
6.1 Introduction 
As we have seen in earlier chapters, endogenous growth theory predicts that some 
elements of government expenditures and taxation affect the steady-state growth rate 
whereas others do not. Forms of taxation that lower the returns to investment, (such 
as income taxation), reduce the steady-state growth rate; whereas increases to forms 
of expenditure that aid the private productive process, (such as investment in 
transport and communication), increase the growth rate. There are also forms of 
taxation, (such as lump-sum and consumption taxation), and forms of expenditure, 
(such as transfer payments and welfare expenditure) which have no affect on the 
steady-state rate of growth. These predictions have not generally been supported by 
empirical research to date. We provide evidence however that, once implicit 
financing of an element of the government budget constraint is taken into account, 
there is consistent empirical support for the Barro model. 
The implication of research by Levine & Renelt (1992) and Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) and the varied results obtained by other researchers is that fiscal variables are 
not statistically robust determinants of long-run growth rates. This conclusion is 
premature, because it ignores the role of the government budget constraint. The 
government budget constraint implies that we cannot interpret the coefficients on 
fiscal variables within growth regressions without reference to the other fiscal 
variables in the model. 
Once the effect of the government budget constraint is allowed for in the regression, 
the apparent lack of statistical robustness is in fact consistent with the theory rather 
than a genuine lack of robustness. The empirical results produced here are highly 
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consistent with the simple public policy endogenous growth model of Barro (1990). 
The results and the model both imply that an alteration in the revenue stance away 
from distortionary forms of taxation and towards the use of non-distortionary forms 
of taxation has a growth-enhancing effect. Whereas an alteration in the expenditure 
stance away from productive forms of expenditure and towards non-productive forms 
of expenditure is growth-retarding. Non-distortionary tax-financed increases in 
productive expenditures have a significant positive impact upon the growth rate, 
whereas with distortionary-tax financing the growth effect is insignificant. Finally, 
distortionary tax-financed increases in non-productive expenditures have a 
significant negative growth effect, whereas the effect is insignificant if financed 
through increases to non-distortionary taxation. These results are found to be robust 
to some, but not all, changes in the specification of the data and regression. 
The next section provides a brief review of the existing empirical literature. This 
summarises the empirical findings from Chapter 5 and then discusses the 
implications of the government budget constraint (Helms (1985), Mofidi & Stone 
(1990) and Miller & Russek (1993)). A brief review of the theoretical literature is 
made in Section 6.2.2 and the empirical results are discussed in Section 6.3. A series 
of tests for the robustness of the results is reported in Section 6.4. Finally, the 
empirical results are compared to the theoretical literature in Section 6.5 and 6.6 
concludes. 
6.2 Literature Review 
6.2.1 Existing Empirical Evidence 
As shown in Chapter 5 the results for similar fiscal variables can vary across studies 
irrespective of the data set or econometric technique employed. Part of this failing 
can be explained through the statistical problems of estimating growth regressions. 
Levine & Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) provide evidence of non- 
robustness with respect to the set of conditioning variables and initial conditions. 
While Easterly & Rebelo (1993) and Miller & Russek (1993) demonstrate how the 
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results are sensitive to the inclusion and exclusion of other fiscal variables. Miller & 
Russek (1993) find that the results change systematically by varying the specification 
of the budget constraint. However, even if one accounts for these statistical problems 
still no consistent picture as to the relationship between fiscal policy and growth 
emerges. 
6.2.2 The Government Budget Constraint 
The issue of how a change in a given tax or expenditure variable is financed was first 
addressed by Helms (1985) and Mofidi & Stone (1990) in an analysis of growth in 
different states of the US. Miller & Russek (1993) developed this idea and applied it 
in a panel study of annual data to 39 countries from 1975-84. Miller & Russek found 
that the growth effects of expenditures depend crucially upon the way in which they 
are financed. In general their results suggest that changes in expenditure financed by 
taxation produce insignificant growth effects (except for education expenditure). 
Negative growth effects, where they occurred, tended to be associated with changes 
in the mix of expenditures, or reductions in taxation, financed by an increase in the 
budget surplus. 
The theory of the government budget constraint is relatively straightforward. The 
principal underlying assumption is that growth is a function of fiscal variables from 
both sides of the government budget. In equation (6.1) growth, g, in country i at time 
t is a function of conditioning (non-fiscal) variables found to be robustly correlated 
with growth from previous studies, ß; Y;,, and a vector of fiscal variables, y; X;,. 
km 
Equation 6.1 g; t =a+1,31Y, + 
lyjxjt + Uft 
i-I J. 1 
Assuming that all elements of the budget (including the surplus/deficit) are included, 
m 
so that X jt = 0, then because the government budget constraint is a linear 
,. 1 
constraint one element of X must be omitted from the regression to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity. The omitted variable is effectively the assumed compensating 
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element within the constraint. Thus the coefficient on each individual category must 
be interpreted as the effect of a unit change in that variable offset by a unit change in 
the omitted category. Changing the omitted category alters the estimated coefficients 
of the individual categories. For example, assume for simplicity that the government 
budget constraint is made up of the two expenditure variables defence expenditure 
(edj) and non-defence (end) and the two tax variables' income taxation (tin) and 
consumption taxation (tco) and that these are included in our generally specified 
growth regression. 
Equation 6.2 giy a....., ledf, +, tend, +, 3än1 +, 4tco, +......... 
Since edf + end = tin + tco, we may write edf as [tin + tco 
- 
end]. 
Equation 6.3 g; t ....... I[tin + tco - end], +Y2end, +Y3tin, +Y4tco, +......... 
Collecting terms and simplifying leads to, 
gu a...... O1end1 + 02tint + O3tco, +.......... 
Equation 6.4 
01 
° Y2 -Y1 
02 
° Y1 +Y3 
03 
° Y1 +74 
If however, we chose to use end, as the compensating fiscal variable, the regression 
equation in (6.1) would be altered to read, 
Equation 6.5 
äu 
........ 1edf, + U21 in, + /t3tco1 +.......... 
J 
UI m YI -Y2 
P2 ° Yz +Y3 
u3 ° Y2 +74 
The estimated coefficients on the tin, and tco, variables therefore depend crucially on 
the compensating expenditure variable chosen. We cannot make the prior assumption 
that ý2 = µZ or c3 = µ3 without formally applying the correct hypothesis tests to the 
1 We assume for simplicity here that the government is constrained to fully finance its budget at every 
moment in time and as such there is no budget surplus/deficit term. 
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estimated coefficients. Previous interpretations of fiscal parameters have typically 
been based on inappropriate tests (although often implicitly so in the sense that fewer 
than (m-1) elements of the budget constraint appear in the regression). In economic 
terms this implies an assumption that all tax revenues are returned to households as 
non-productive forms of expenditure (i. e. any form of expenditure does not have an 
effect on the rate of growth), and all forms of expenditure are financed by non- 
distorting forms of taxation (or indeed any form of taxation that does not affect the 
rate of growth). Within the above examples this would be assuming that the 
coefficients on the two expenditure terms, edf, and end from equation (6.4) and (6.5) 
equal zero (y1 = 72 = 0), then y3 = ý2 ° µ2, and y4 - ý3 ° µ3. That is the growth effects 
of income tax financed increases in defence expenditure has an identical growth 
effect to an income tax financed increase in non-defence expenditure; and a 
consumption tax financed increase in non-defence expenditure is identical in its 
effect on the rate of growth to a consumption tax financed increase in defence 
expenditure. This is clearly a strong assumption and one that requires formal testing. 
It is also clear from the above that the coefficients on fiscal variables in the previous 
empirical literature cannot be interpreted as estimating the direct effects of a single 
fiscal variable on the rate of growth (i. e. they are estimating µ's and ý's rather then 
y's). This in turn implies that the interpretation of the coefficients depends on the 
precise specification of the government budget constraint used. The range of the 
results noted in the review of the empirical literature above might therefore be 
explained through the omission of different compensating fiscal variables from the 
regressions. 
A further part of the dispersion of the results could be explained from omitted 
variable bias caused by the inappropriate exclusion of relevant explanatory fiscal 
variables. With m elements of the government budget constraint, we have seen that 
only (m-1) elements can be included in the regression to avoid multicollinearity. If, 
as has been frequently the case in practice, fewer than (m-1) elements are included, 
then the estimated coefficients will reflect some kind of weighted average of 
financing by each of the omitted elements. 
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To avoid this problem, we estimate a complete matrix of results which maps 
coefficient estimates of each element of the government budget constraint against 
each method of financing? The matrix indicates the estimated growth impact of the 
tax mix, the expenditure mix and the size of government. Table 6.1 shows an 
example of the type of fiscal matrix produced from each set of regressions. Each 
column of the matrix indicates the fiscal variable excluded from the regression and 
each row the fiscal variables that remained within the regression. The tables are split 
into four quadrants. ' Working first from top left (the first quadrant), this shows the 
effects of changes to the government revenue mix, that is increases (decreases) to one 
type of revenue whilst leaving the government budget in balance through decreasing 
(increasing) an alternative source of government revenue. Quadrant 3 shows the 
growth effects of the expenditure mix, that is increases (decreases) to one form of 
expenditure whilst leaving the government budget in balance through changes to an 
alternative expenditure. Quadrants 2 and 4 show changes across the government 
budget, that is changes to the size of government. ' When the estimated coefficients 
are significantly different from zero (at a minimum of the 10% level of significance) 
the coefficients are indicated as bold symbols (the significance level is indicated by 
asterisks), insignificant variables are represented as fainter symbols. It is also 
possible to use the government budget constraint methodology to exclude irrelevant 
fiscal variables from the regression equation. We include an example of this amongst 
the regression results but choose not to follow the results up any further. 
'This is essentially the development made by Miller & Russek (1993) on the work of Helms (1985) 
and Mofidi & Stone (1990). Helms (1985) and Mofidi & Stone (1990) exclude only transfer payments 
from the regression (without formally testing that it has a zero coefficient). 
3 The budget surplus is not included in the table because we use it to balance the budget after period 
averaging. More of this is made below. 
The consistency of the regression matrix can be tested for by comparing the results from each 
quadrant along the central diagonal. For the tax and expenditure mixes to be considered consistent a 
negative (positive) coefficient of the left-hand triangle of either quadrant 1 or 3 must be matched by a 
positive (negative) coefficient in the corresponding position in the right-hand triangle of the quadrant. 
For example an increase in consumption financed by a decrease in income taxation has a significant 
positive effect upon the rate of growth then in order to be considered consistent an increase in income 
taxation financed by a decrease in consumption taxation must have a significant negative coefficient. 
Coefficients in quadrant 2 must have identical signs to the corresponding position in quadrant 4 in 
order to be considered consistent. That is in both quadrants an income tax financed increase in 
defence expenditure must have identical signs. 
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Table 6.1: Examplc Fiscal Matrix 
1.11 
Omitted Fiscal Variable 
Tax Variable Expenditure Variable 
Included 
1 4iscal 
Tax 
Variable 
Tax 
Mix 
Size of 
Government 
Variable Expenditure 
Variable 
Size of 
Government 
Expenditure 
Mix 
This chapter uses a sample of 22 developed countries for the period 1970-94 in order 
to examine the sensitivity of the coefficients on fiscal variables to the specification of 
the government budget constraint. The data come from two sources. The governnient 
budget data come from the GFSY, the standard source for these sorts 0f studies, 
while the remaining data comes from the World Bank 'Fahles. Data sources and 
characteristics are discussed in Appendix A. 
6.2.3 The Theoretical Predictions 
One of the aims of this study is to demonstrate how the sign and significance 
switching of fiscal variables can he consistent with much of the existing theoretical 
literature. In order to do this we briefly review the results from the theoretical models 
concentrating on the new public policy cndogcnous growth models. 
As we saw in Chapters 2 to 4 the public-policy neoclassical growth models, such its 
those by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), consign the role of fiscal policy to one Of 
determining the level of output rather than the long-run growth rate. The steady-state 
growth rate is driven by the exogenous factors of population growth and 
technological progress, while fiscal policy can affect only the transition lath toi this 
steady-state. In contrast to these neoclassical mOdcls the huhlic-poolicy' endogenous 
growth models of Barro (1990) and Barra & Sala-i-Martin (1992,1995) provide a 
mechanism for fiscal policy to determine both the level of output and the steady-state 
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growth rate. The existence of public goods within the private consumption function 
produces constant returns to the accumulation of capital and hence constant growth 
rates 5A constant growth rate allows the temporary growth effects of fiscal policy 
within the neoclassical model to become permanent in the endogenous growth 
model. 
Predictions from the one-sector public-policy endogenous growth model are derived 
by classifying taxes and expenditures into one of four categories: distortionary or 
non-distortionary taxation and productive or non-productive expenditures. 
Distortionary taxes affect the investment decisions of agents creating tax wedges and 
hence distorting the steady-state rate of growth. Non-distortionary taxation does not 
affect the saving/investment decisions of agents because of the assumed nature of the 
preference function and hence has no effect on the rate of growth. Government 
expenditures are differentiated according to whether they are included as arguments 
into the private production function or not. If they are, then they are classified as 
productive and hence have a direct effect upon the rate of growth. If they are not then 
they are classified as unproductive expenditures and do not affect the steady-state 
rate of growth. 
Several papers have extended the Barro (1990) and Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992, 
1995) analysis. Glomm & Ravikumar (1994,1997) assume that government- 
provided goods are productive in stock rather than flow form, 6 which introduces 
transitional dynamics into the model. Mendoza et al. (1996) consider different types 
of taxation, while Devarajan et al. (1996) consider multiple forms of productive 
expenditure in the same model. ' The models have also been extended to a second 
sector by assuming that human capital is produced under an alternative technology. 
These models have predominantly concentrated on the tax side of the government 
budget (Rebelo (1991), Stokey & Rebelo (1995)) rather than the expenditure side of 
the model (Capolupo (1996)). The results from these models are less robust to 
' Public goods are accumulated within the model as the economy grows preventing diminishing 
marginal returns to capital returning the growth rate to that of the exogenous factors. 
6 We attempt to account for this difference in the Sensitivity tests of Section 6.4 
We consider the effect of relaxing the assumption of homogeneity of productive expenditures in 
Chapter 8. 
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changes in the underlying assumptions! Despite this the results are still essentially 
driven according to whether expenditures are included within the production function 
or whether taxation affects the reproducible inputs in the production function. 
6.3 Empirical Investigation 
The regression equation we estimate in this study follows a similar form to that in 
equation (6.1) above. The constant set of conditioning variables, the method of 
averaging the data to remove the effects of the business cycle, and the estimation 
procedure are taken from standard practice within the literature in order to ensure that 
our results do not derive from deviations from normal procedure. The conditioning 
variables we use are typical of those found in the usual of the Barro-type regression. 
In order to avoid the inclusion of irrelevant variables and possible collinearity with 
the fiscal variables we restrict their number compared to previous studies. Given the 
sample of countries, it is unlikely that the political instability measures usually 
included in the ` Barro' conditioning matrix are relevant, and are therefore omitted. In 
addition the possible correlation between measures of human capital and education 
expenditures, (which will be present in some form in the X matrix), along with that 
between measures of macroeconomic instability and fiscal policy recommends us to 
exclude these measures also from the regression. ' The set of conditioning variables 
was thus reduced to the investment ratio, (inv)i°, the labour force growth rate, (Ibfg), 
and initial GDP, (GDP70). 11 Data for growth rates are taken from the World Bank 
8 For example through the introduction of a labour-leisure choice consumption taxation, which is non- 
distortionary in the one-sector models, becomes distortionary through its effect on the accumulation 
of human capital. We may then only be able to distinguish between taxes which are less distortionary 
using the methodology of the budget constraint 
The exclusion of the human capital variable is the more troublesome omission given several of the 
theories we review on Chapters 1-4 suggest a relationship between human capital and growth. An 
attempt was made to include human capital measures from the Nehru et al. (1995) data set. In the 
resulting regression human capital (measured as secondary or a combination of all levels of 
education) entered with an in-significant coefficient (and also negative), the initial GDP variable was 
rendered insignificant and the investment ratio negative (but insignificant). Of the fiscal variables the 
main relationships do not appear to alter, although there does seem to be some evidence that non- 
productive expenditures has a positive effect on the growth rate. This issue clearly requires further 
investigation with alternative measures of human capital. 
'o The private investment ratio, from Chapter 9, was also used but the results did not differ from those 
for the aggregate investment ratio. 
11 Initial GDP refers to the initial value of GDP for each sub-period. 
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CD ROM and measured as the log difference of GDP per capita across yearly periods 
(for further details see Appendix A). 
The results from the Barro (1990) model are dependent upon by the classification of 
fiscal variables as one of four types. In accordance with this we aggregate the GFSY 
functional classifications of the fiscal variables into these four categories. This 
process is described in Table 6.2 below. We classify consumption taxation as a form 
of non-distortionary taxation. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the 
one-sector model but not all of the versions of the two-sector model reviewed in 
Chapter 3. Under such circumstances this form of taxation would be better thought of 
as reflecting less-distortionary forms of taxation. 
Several of the functional classifications in the GFSY have no theoretical counterpart 
and are relegated to the ` other expenditure' and `other revenue' terms12. The final 
fiscal variable is the government budget surplus. We test for the sensitivity of the 
results to this classification of the data in section 6.4. These aggregated fiscal 
variables were then expressed as percentage ratios of GDP in order to minimise the 
effect of the business cycle on tax revenues. 
Data is available for 22 OECD countries13 for the period 1970 to 1994. The sample is 
limited to OECD countries partly by data availability and partly as an attempt to 
minimise statistical problems such as heterogeneity across the estimated parameters. 
In order to remove the effects of the business cycle from the data and Wagner's law 
we follow standard practice and average the data across time. The common standard 
12 The GFSY includes an expenditure category entitled `lending minus repayments' which can take 
either negative or positive values. In order to overcome problems of how to classify this variable it 
was decided to include this item as a separate variable within the regressions but not to discuss it. It 
appears under the variable name elmr in the results. 
"These are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, UK and US. 
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is 5-year averages, and this is the length we chose here'' (the first tinic period 
beginning in 1970). 15 
Table 6.2: Functional[Ifieorctical Classifications 
i", 
New Classification Functional Classification 
distortionary taxation (rdis) taxation rin income and profit 
social security contributions 
taxation on payroll and manpower 
taxation on property 
non-distortionary taxation (rndis) taxation on domestic goods and services 
other revenues (rotte) taxation on international trade 
non-tax revenues 
other tax revenues 
productive expenditures (eprd) general public services expenditure 
defence expenditure 
educational expenditure 
health expenditure 
housing expenditure 
transport and communication expenditure 
unproductive expenditures (enprd) social security and welfare expenditure 
expenditure on recreation 
expenditure on economic services 
other expenditure (coth) other expenditure 
'a The issue of how to hest to capture long-run growth rate under different ectuitnuctric techniques is 
discussed within the next chapter. 
'` At least three years of data for a country were required within a specific time period hefore the 
period was used. 
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In order to maintain equality across the government budget constraint after period 
averaging, it was necessary to classify one of the 7 available fiscal variables as the 
balancing item. Two methods were used for this: the first was to balance the budget 
through the surplus term and the second through the ` other expenditure' and `other 
revenue' terms. 16 The empirical results suggest there was no difference between the 
two methods and only those where the surplus term is the balancing item are 
discussed. Although the surplus variable itself is reported, it is omitted from the 
discussion of the results because it is likely to contain a certain amount of statistical 
error. 
Estimation is by panel data rather than the cross-section approach more commonly 
used in the literature. Panel data has the advantage of accounting for unobserved 
country and time specific effects, such as the level of technology and its growth over 
time, and therefore correct for omitted variable bias. For further information on the 
techniques used we refer the reader to Appendix B. The estimation package LIMDEP 
calculates 5 different forms of panel data estimator for each regression. These are 
pooled OLS regression, one-way (country dummies) fixed (by OLS) and random (by 
GLS) and two-way (country and time effects) fixed and random effects models. It is 
clearly not feasible to discuss individually the results from all of these models, nor to 
present them all within an appendix. We discuss briefly the relevant diagnostics that 
lead to the choice of model but these diagnostics are not presented within the text. 
LIMDEP provides information regarding the log-likelihood and the adjusted R2 for 
the pooled OLS and the fixed effects models (both one-way and two-way error 
models). We prefer the model with the higher log-likelihood (absolute) value and 
higher adjusted RZ"1' 
The two-way form of the regression equation receives greatest support from the 
diagnostics and this is the one on which we focus. In both cases it has the highest 
adjusted R2 and highest log-likelihood value. The Hausman test accepts the 
16 The new surplus variable was calculated as the sum of the averaged revenue terms minus the 
averaged expenditure terms. The new 
`other 
revenue' variable was calculated as the sum of the 
averaged total revenues minus the sum of the averaged sub categories of revenue excluding other 
revenues. The ` other expenditure' variable was calculated in a similar manner. 
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alternative hypothesis of correlation amongst the individual effects and the regressors 
and so the random effects models are not reported (details of this test can hu hniii l in 
Appendix B). We estimate the regression equation initially, including only the 
conditioning variables and: then including fiscal variables either singularly or in 
pairs. These regressions represent those commonly found within previous studies. 
The results are displayed in Table 6.3. '' 
'fahle 6.3: Estimation with an Incon pletc Budget Constraint 
Estimation Technique 5-year av-cs. 2 w; tY IT 
Depcndcnt variahie pcI capit; l grov. -(h 11= 0 (2 04111trAc. l) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
initial (: DP 
-0.467' -0.501' - ). 576' -0.389' 
x 10.3 (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) 
inv 0.069 
-0.027 O. (. R(7 IL(((4 -0. )L I ). 02) 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
I bIg 
-0.535 -0.522 -0.342 -0.363 -0.522 0.379 
(0.34) (0.31) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31) (0.30) 
eImr - 0.150 0.280 - (0.18) (0.18) 
roth - - -0.055 - - (0.10) 
eoth - 0.025 (0.09) (0. nx) 
Sul* - 0.165" 0.269' - - (0.09) (0.07) 
rdis - - -0.260' -0.245' -0.133 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
rndis - - 0.222 - - 0.303' (0.14) (0.14) 
eprd - -0.009 - - - (0.09) 
enprd - -0.229' - - -0.301' -0.286' (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
I 
ad, j R2 0.453 0.572 0.591 0.512 0.571 0.598 
I ), i t, iWud riiur, in I); uLIIIlh 
2) * denotes signifir, incr at the J'/? level, ; il Ihr I(1', ýr level. 
When the list of regressors is limited to just the conditioning variables only the initial 
GDP term enters with a significant coefficient. Such a finding is consistent with the 
idea of conditional convergence of income levels amongst the sample countries over 
the period. Neither of the other two conditioning variables, the investment ratio'" and 
Only the value of the adjusted R' is presented in the results tables. 
" Within the results tables throughout this text the large hold figures represent significant vvariahles, 
the small faint figures non-significance. 
"' The finding of a negative coefficient on the investment ratio in the static regression is troublesome. 
I lowcvcr, Mendoza ct al. (19r)(ß) estimate a similar coefficient also using a static panel approach with 
s-yearly averaged data. We tested further the robustness ref this result for the use of the private 
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the labour force growth rate, are statistically significant, whereas both the time and 
country dummies are collectively significant. This suggests that the set of 
conditioning variables is not complete, and that the complete variation of growth 
rates across time and space is not being fully captured by the regression equation. 
One obvious missing conditioning variable is the accumulation of human capital over 
time (or indeed the fiscal variables). We do not account for this here because the 
available proxies for human capital are likely to be highly correlated with 
government expenditures on education. 
By including different combinations of fiscal variables on a fairly ad hoc basis we are 
able to recreate many of the typical findings of growth regressions. This would also 
suggest that our variables reflect reasonably well the fiscal variables used in previous 
studies, despite the new classifications of the data. For example, distortionary 
taxation (rdis) and non-productive expenditure (enprd) are consistently estimated as 
having a significant negative effect on growth. These represent two of the most 
common findings in the literature (for example Barro (1991) or Fuente (1997)). 
This result is robust in all except regressions (6), where the addition of the non- 
productive expenditure term to the regression renders the distortionary tax term in- 
significant. This supports a conjecture made in Chapter 5 that the different results for 
taxation found in the Fuente (1997) and the Mendoza et al. (1997) studies are 
conditional upon the inclusion or exclusion of non-productive expenditure in the 
regression. This we believe provides strong evidence that the omission of relevant 
fiscal variables leads to a bias in the remaining fiscal variables through the budget 
constraint. 
The results from Table 6.3 can be contrasted with those found in Table 6.4 where the 
government budget constraint has been accounted for in estimation. The specification 
of the government budget constraint does appear to be important for the estimated 
effect of fiscal variables on growth as expected. The sign and the significance on the 
investment variable calculated in Chapter 9 and found no change. Drawing upon work presented 
further below leads us to believe that this is a result is a consequence of the econometric methodology 
used. 
('hapler 6: Growlh and I/rr Gon'c'i-nmrnt Budget Constraint 
theoretical classifications of the data can he seen to depend crucially upon which 
compensating fiscal variable is omitted from the regression. For example the 
significance of the distortionary tax term is lost when productive forms of' 
expenditure are removed from the regression; whereas non-distortionary taxation 
ýý, 
term is insignificant only when non-productive expenditure is the compensating item. 
This variation in sign and significance has interesting implications i, rrr pOlic y. I rar 
example, our results suggest that raising productive expenditures (q d) as a ratio to 
GDP by one percentage point raises the growth rate by 0.29 of a percentage point if 
financed by non-distortionary taxation (rndis), by 0.25 of a pcrccnta, c point if 
financed by reductions in non-productive expenditure and lowers growth by O. 1 6 of a 
percentage point if financed by distortionary taxation. Although possibly large in 
magnitude these estimates are consistent with those found in Miller & Russek 
(1993), Wang & Yip (1992) and Folster & Henrekson (I N7). 
Table 6.4: Estimation with Complete Specification of the Budoct Constraint 
Estimation Technique 5-vcr eves. 2 \vay, Fl, 
Dependent variable per capita growth r, = t)S ( ct, (((, I(; cs) 
Omitted Fiscal \'; (ri. (hlr 
rdis rndis eprd enprd enp)rd/rndis 
initial GUI(' 
-0.1'10" -0.490' -0.490" -0.440' 0.48Y 
l0' (0.2) (1.2) 111.21 (0.2) (11.17( 
-- 
inv 
-0.02(( -0.020 -(.... 
_'.. 
H. H_'. O 11.020 -- 
(n 
. 
u(, ) (0.06) (0.0 0) ((1.01) (((. 06) 
I ht ; -0.327 -0.327 -0.327 -(027 77 A1 .1,16 (((. 30) (0.30) (((. 3))) (11.3(1) (11. "N ( 
elmr -0.03(1 0.417'" 0.127 0.380" 0.384" 
(((. it)) (0.23) (((. 20) ((). Ix( 10.181 
- 
roth 0.293" -0.154 ((. 136 ((. 1I7 .. II A131 ((1. I )) ((). 15) (11.111) , II-III) 
Goth 
- (i. 131 0.315 00025 11.279" 11.289' 
(((. 10) (0.16) ((). 1I) 0. []( 10.11) 
stir u u, 0.446" ((. I S(, 1). 410" 0.416" 
((1.16) (((. fin) II. u4i ýII. l) 
rdis -0.446" -1). 156 -11.4 I0 ... 41 
A 17ý (0. ý(1) 10.1111 .... r,. 
rndis 0. -1-16 
, ((. 17( 10.141 
eprd U 
enprd -0.4110" 0. (I;; _ll. 2 _1- (0.10) ((LIA, ) l(I. I-1i 
0.6112 0.602 0.602 41.602 11.621 
Nutcti: I) stancl, rI(I rn()F in parrnthý'n. 
?)" denotes signilicancc at the 5`( level, at the I(Y) level. 
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When we exclude both enprd and rndis together from the regression we find that the 
standard errors of the remaining fiscal variables improve (become smaller in size), 
which is consistent with the removal of irrelevant variables from the regression. In 
addition the null that the coefficients on the rndis and enprd variables are jointly 
equal to zero is accepted. This matches a prediction from the Barro (1990) model that 
non-distortionary taxation and non-productive expenditure have no effect on the 
steady state growth rate. From this we suggest that regression when interpreting the 
results greater weight should be given to the regressions where rndis and enprd are 
excluded as these regressions do not contain an omitted variable bias from the 
exclusion of eprd or rdis from the regression. Kocherlakota & Yi (1997) estimate 
significant growth effects from fiscal variables only when public investment and the 
marginal tax rate are included in the same regression and therefore make similar 
conclusions. Kocherlakota & Yi do not however explicitly set up the budget 
constraint. 
The results from Table 6.4 take no account of differences in the relative size of 
expenditures and revenues. An increase in eprd/GDP of one per-cent may involve a 
far greater relative change than a one per cent change in enprd/GDP due to 
differences in the relative size of expenditures on eprd and enprd. The coefficient 
from the tax mix quadrant suggests that a 1% reduction in non-distortionary taxation 
and its replacement by distortionary forms of taxation leads to a 0.084 of a 
percentage point reduction in the long run rate of growth (e. g. from 2% per annum to 
1.916% per annum). These are obviously greater in size compared to the estimated 
effect of a 10% reduction in capital and labour taxes found from the simulation 
studies in Mendoza et al. (1996) who predict that the growth effects are in the range 
0.1 to 0.2 of a percentage point. Comparisons with the empirical results from their 
study are more problematic because of differences in measurement of the taxation 
variables. 
Compared to the tax mix quadrant, the growth effects of a change in the expenditure 
mix are relatively modest. A 10% reduction in non-productive expenditure and a 
compensating increase in productive expenditure leads to a 0.37 percentage point 
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increase in the rate of growth in the rate of growth. This is substantially greater than 
the magnitude of the coefficients in the expenditure mix study be Devarajan et al. 
(1996) for defence, health, education and transport and communication expenditure, 
but again is similar to the estimated coefficients of the expenditure mix found in 
Miller & Russek (1993). 
Within the other two quadrants the size of the coefficients are highly variable 
according to which is the compensating fiscal variable. The effects of increases in 
non-productive expenditure financed by distortionary forms of taxation are very large 
relative to non-distortionary tax-financed increases, at -0.410 and 0.037 respectively. 
The estimated coefficients of increases in productive expenditure differ greatly in 
magnitude, being 
-0.156 when distortionary tax financed but 0.290 when non- 
distortionary tax financed. 
6.4 Robustness Testing 
In this section we test the robustness of the above results to changes in the 
specification of the data and the regression equation (6.1). The first is to estimate the 
regression without the initial GDP term (Easterly & Rebelo (1993)) while the next 
two changes in specification examine whether the above results are robust to the 
classifications of the data 2° A fourth test is for parameter heterogeneity from the 
financing of productive expenditures by distortionary taxation across countries. The 
fifth change tests for sensitivity to the number of years used in period-averaging" 
Finally we attempt the use of instrumental variables within the regression to correct 
for possible bias between fiscal variables and growth. This section discusses the 
results only in terms of their consistency with those discussed above. 
20 The sensitivity of the results to different level of aggregation of the data are studied in depth within 
Chapter 8 
21 Alternative methods of estimating the long-run and the sensitivity of the results to these different 
measures are studied in greater depth with Chapter 5. 
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6.4.1 Initial GI)P 
Easterly & Rehelo (1993) show that the estimated coefficients on fiscal variables arc 
sensitive to the inclusion of initial GDP term in the regression. 'h'hcy explain this as 
due to the likely simultaneity between fiscal policy and the level oo1' develoohnment 
through Wagner's law. If the elasticity of demand for some types ofexpenditure is 
greater than one then as incomes rise so do expenditures. The rcnicival o1' the iinitial 
GDP term collapses equation (6.1) to a simple form of growth accounting equation. 
The results for this regression arc displayed in Table 6.5 helow. 
Takle 6.5: Estimation with Initial Income Omitted 
Estimation Technique s-vcar ayes. 2 wa' FF 
Dependent variable pcr capita grWtl, L n= 98 (22 ctn11t1Ics) 
Oniittcd I ikral 
rdis rndis eprd cnprd 
inv 0.020' 0.020' 0.020' 0.020' 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
lhfg 
-0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
elrnr -0.113 0.314 0.041 0.353- (0.19) (0.24) (0.21) (0.19) 
rotte 0.326' -0.101 0.172 -0.140 (0.14) (0.20) (0.16) (0.1 1) 
Both -0.127 0.301- 0.028 0.340' (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.12) 
Sur 0.071 0.357' 0.084 0.400' (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.09) 
rdis 
0 
-0.427' 0.155 -0.467' (0.18) (0.1 1) 10.10) 
rndis 0.427' 0.273 -0.039 (0.18) (0.15) (0 17) 
epr. d -0.155 0.273 0.312' (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) 
enprd -0.467* -0.0: + 0 -0.312- 
(0.10) (0.17) (0.13) 
ad, j 1(2 0.574 0.574 0.574 0.574 
II ýCURI, LiJ , liol, to Iý: urI1II1 Iý. 
2) ` drat lcs 
. 
signiliranrc at the 5'i Ioc'1, '' ; it the IU'; i Irvrl. 
The results for the growth accounting regression are virtually identical to those 
produced above. The only change in the fiscal matrix is On the eiijnd/rncli. s variable 
where the sign remains insignificantly different from zero but is negative instead Of 
positive. It appears therefore that the sensitivity of the growth cfk'cts of' fiscal 
variables to the level of development is not apparent in this data set. 
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6.4.2 Level of Classification 
133 
The second change we make to the regression equation is to change the nature of the 
variables included within the fiscal matrix. The allocations of the data from the 
GFSY in creating the theoretically based classifications are obviously imprecise. We 
attempt two alternative classifications of the data in order to demonstrate that the 
results are robust to this. The first simply aggregates upwards until we have three 
fiscal variables: total revenue, total expenditure and the government budget surplus. 
The surplus term is again used as the constraining item to ensure the budget identity 
is satisfied across each data point. 
Our second sensitivity exercise invokes further disaggregation in order to focus on 
some variables that are either commonly used in previous studies; produce some of 
the consistently strong results; or constitute such large proportions of total revenues 
or expenditures as to possibly swamp the other results. The additional sub- 
classifications of the data drawn out are: income taxation, health expenditures and 
social security expenditures. It should also be possible to use these variables in order 
to determine how much of the results from the theoretical aggregations above are 
driven by these categories. The distortionary taxation variable has been sub-divided 
into revenues from income taxation, given that this is a commonly used measure in 
applied studies, and the remaining distortionary tax revenues that we label as factor 
income taxation. There is no longer a non-productive expenditure category as 
expenditures on recreation and economic services have instead been included within 
the other expenditure category and ignored. The other difference from the previous 
aggregation is the separation out of those expenditures which are perceived to be 
productive as a flow of goods and services, such as defence, and those arguably 
productive as a stock of goods, such as transport and communication infrastructure. 
The theory suggests that there is a difference between the nature of public goods as 
either stocks or flows such as its subjection to the forces of congestion and that this 
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may have bearing upon the significance of the results. "Fahle 6.6 helow explains how 
the data from the GFSY has been re-classified to generate this new data set. 
'f'ahle 6.6: Rr-classified Fiscal Data 
New Fiscal Variable Category from GFSY 
Surplus/ deficit (. tiur) Surplus/ delis it 
income taxation (rinc) taxation and income and profit 
factor income taxation (ifac) social security contrihutions 
taxation on payroll and manpower 
taxation on property 
consumption taxation (rndis) taxation on domestic goods and services 
other revenues (rolh) taxation on international trade 
non-tax revenues 
other tax revenues 
productive flows (epf) general public services expenditure 
defence expenditure 
productive stocks (eps) educational expenditure 
housing expenditure 
transport and communication expenditure 
health expenditure (ehltfº) health expenditure 
social security and welfare expenditure (c. c. c) social security and welfare expenditure 
other expenditure (cot/i) expenditure on reciealioin 
exlpLenditurrLe o, n economic 
., 
rr\ icy s 
other expenditure 
The results for the two adjusted data sets are displayed as tables 6.7 and 6.8 below. 
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Table 6.7: Estimation with Aggregated Fiscal Data 
Estimation l echniquc 5-ycar avcs. 2 ktia FF 
Dcpcndent variahic per capit; i growlh n '1ti ( rýýuntrirý) 
Oniittrcl Eisrad 
trev texp sur 
initial GDP x 10.1 -0.545' (0.19) -0.545' (0.19) -0.545' (0.19) 
Iily 0.024 
(0.06) 
0.024 
(0.06) 
0 024 
(0.06) 
lbfg 
-0.498 (0.32) 
49R 0498- 
iO J: 1) 
0.498 
(0 32) 
texp -- 
-0.098" 
(0.05) 
- 
-0.214* 
(0.06) 
treu 
-0.098" O1; 
sur 0.117 
(0.09) 
(0.05) 
0.214" 
(0.06) 
(00()) 
adj. RZ 0.545 0.545 0.545 
iNotes: t) stanwuu Irrurs in parcmnriý. 
2) * denotes significance at the 5'1 level, at the I(), leevi. 
TUI)IE 6.8: Estimation with Re-classified Data 
Estimation Technique 5-Vcar ave", -, vý; i. \ IT, 
Ucpcndent variahlc pacapita groýwth n=') i (22 cmiliIric ) 
()mined Fiscal Variable 
rinc rfac rndis epf eps ehlth ess 
initial 
-u. 529* -0.529 -0.52i 
-1). 529 -0.529* -11.520' -0.520' GUl' a IU1 10.1x1 (0. IRI (. IR) 11). 151 1((. 151 11). 181 (0.151 
Inv -(1.058 -(1.11.58 
-0.115 
-0.05k Il. llýti ((((58 (Hot (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) ((). 07) (11.117) (0.117) 111.07) 
Ibfg 
-0.210 -0210 -0.210 
-0.210 
-0.210 
-11'01 
-0. 
_'1() (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (II. 33) (II. 31) 
elmr 0.022 0.188 0.546 0.178 0.175 0.2170 I). S09 
(0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) 1(). 2201 
Toth 0.199 0.032 -0.325 0.042 0.046 
-0.041) 11.2}89 - (0.14) (0.20) (11.211) (0.21) (It 'll) (0.25) 11.141 
Goth -II. I? 7 (1. (129 0.387 (1.1) 1') (). 0 I6 (). III (L(50 
(0.11) (0.15) (((. 16) (0.18) (1.17) (0'I) (0.131 
sur 
ýý 11'02 0.559Y 11. l')_1 1811-11 0.81 0.523' 
10.11, ) (((. 17) (11.10) (n. It, ) (II ' I) (11.121 
ring r -0.524" 
-((. 157 
-). 1 I I. 2.18 
-0.45X' (u lrýl (11.191 (11.10) (0.11, ) (11 ") II1.1 ýI 
rtac 0.355 0.010 (1.111) u. ur l u. 21r - 
(u. llý) ((I'1) (u-'tl (11.1')) (11 3) IILIJI 
rndis 0.524 II. 57 (((. 19) ((1'11 ý'I ILI')I (H. 1) (II 18) 
ep f -II, 157 ll. l 111 ý ! I I, I14I 11.331 
(11.19) (11.2 )) (li-. ' i II 111 
. 
'')) (01 22') 
cps -0.153 0.014 u. l 0.35 
(0.16) (0.19) 111.911 (ý-. 'II ý (u. ýl) 
ehlth -0.248 -0.081 0.276 (I. I r)) 1H 
(0.22) (11.23) (0.24) fly. ")) ' 
ess -0.488* -0.321' 0.036 
. 
71 
(0.13) (((. I4) (0.18) ((). 22) ((1'1) (ýý ýý, 
add jt 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 
Nolcs: I) st; inthiru errors in parcnincsi.. 
2) * dc"molrs significance at the 5`ii. 1 cveI, *` at the IU'; ICA CI. 
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Increasing the level of aggregation of the data obviously increases the number of 
opposing forces at work within each quadrant; however, under both data sets there is 
still strong evidence that the choice of the compensating variable matters for the sign 
and significance of the fiscal variable. A failure to account for the budget constraint 
will lead to incorrect interpretations of the results whatever level of aggregation is 
used. The variability of the sign and significance on any one variable can also be 
seen to increase the greater the level of disaggregation. 
According to the results from the very aggregated form of the data tax-financed 
increases to expenditure reduce the long-run growth rate significantly. When we 
disaggregate the data we find that this negative effect applies only to the social- 
security and welfare expenditure variable and only if financed by income or factor 
taxation. Under both specifications, within the set of conditioning variables, the 
investment ratio and the labour force growth rate remain individually insignificant 
whereas the initial GDP term remains significant (and negative). 
6.4.3 Parameter Heterogeneity 
In using data from a cross-section of countries we have assumed that the true 
parameter estimates for each variable are identical across these countries. Economic 
growth models however, show that the coefficient of distortionary tax financed 
increases in productive expenditure can depend on the current level of expenditure. If 
below some optimal point then an increase in productive expenditures raises growth; 
whereas if already above the optimum level then an increase in productive 
expenditures lowers the growth rate. This is clearly an assumption that requires 
formal testing. 
Testing for heterogeneity is through the use of slope dummies for each country on 
the productive expenditure variable. As in equation (6.6) below a dummy variable is 
added for each country when rdis is the compensating variable. An F-test on the joint 
significance of these slope dummies then test whether homogeneity is a valid 
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assumption. The results from the regression equation are presented in "fahle (c). '1'hc 
slope dummies are omitted to conserve space but the value of' the F-test is included. 
There is a clear acceptance of the assumption of homogeneity in this sample of 
countries (the 5% critical value is 1.92 against a test statistic of 0.97). This result can 
he interpreted as indicating that the countries within the sample provide productive 
expenditure through distortionary taxation at an optimum level. 
Equation 6.6 gi, = CX L ýfl i ýl +/ j'I ýrl fL1 ill f l/rr 
where ß,, is a slope dummy for each country. /32, = I for each i=I and zero (otherwise. 
The F-test is on the null hypothesis ý3 Y, = 0. 
Table 6.9: Robustness Tcst for Paramctcr I lctcrogcncitv 
Estimation Technique 5-ycar uvc 
.2wvF. 
Dcpendcnt variable per capll n= 98 (22 counºrics 
initial (1)P x III` -Iº. 4x2' 
(0.22 
inv (1.0 33 (u. u7) 
Ibfg 0.44I 
einir 0.172 W. 11) 
roth 0.372' 
Both 
sur 
rdis 
rndis 
eprd 
enprd 
adj R2 0.603 
F-test 0.9708 
\ulrý: I 11, t, indtlld crn rý III I>; iIcnlhr 
dcrwtes signiIicancr al Ihr 5`r Ircrl, at the IU'; Icvd. 
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6.4.4 The Long Run 
In this sensitivity exercise we use different length of average through which to 
remove the business cycle effect. Period averaging is used toi help remove the 
business, and therefore possible simultaneity, from the data. Although 5-year period 
averages are the most common length of period average chosen within the data no 
rationale exists behind this choice. To test the sensitivity of the results to this choice 
we average the data across ten-year periods. Table 6.1 O displays the results. Folster 
& Henrekson (1997) warn that caution is needed when choosing: the length of period 
average and argue that a choice too long in length may aggravate simultaneity 
between fiscal policy and growth through Wagner's law. Under such conditions we 
may find some elements of expenditure to be positively correlated with growth. 
Table 6.10: Estimation using 10-year Averages 
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The change in the method of averaging the data does have a significant impact upon 
the results. A comparison of the results between the 10-year averages and the 5-year 
averages show them to be identical in terms of the signs on the estimated coefficients 
but different in terms of the significance. The significance of both the enprd/eprd and 
enprd/rdis variables is lost with 10-year averages, whereas the enprd/rndis variable 
gains significance under the 10-year averages. In creating 10-year averages we move 
from 98 available observations down to 36. This reduction in degrees of freedom is 
likely to increase the size of the standard errors and therefore to a greater probability 
of finding insignificant coefficients. Such an increase in the standard errors is evident 
in the results, which could also help to explain the loss of the significance of the 
enprd/eprd and enprd/rdis variables. A reduction in the degrees of freedom does not 
however explain why the enprd/rndis variable gains significance when we use 10- 
year period averages. We suggest this result reflects simultaneity between growth 
and non-productive expenditure as predicted by Folster & Henrekson (1997). The 
sensitivity of the significance of the estimated coefficients to changes in the method 
of estimating the long-run is investigated in depth within the next chapter and so we 
chose not follow the results up here. Instead we simply note that the use of the 
budget constraint remains an important determinant of the coefficients on fiscal 
variables even in these regressions. 
The other change in the results from the change in the measurement of the long-run is 
in the conditioning variable matrix. The initial'GDP term is no longer significant 
under the 10-year averages while the investment ratio is significant. Both of these 
results again suggest that the results are sensitive to the measurement of the long-run. 
6.4.5 Instrumental Variables 
The estimation of regression (equation (6.1)) assumes that all of the right hand side 
variables are exogenously determined. Easterly & Rebelo (1993) and Hsieh & Lai 
(1994) both discuss the simultaneity problem between fiscal variables and the level 
of GDP and the rate of growth and find it to be a problem. The most likely sources of 
simultaneity in the regression are the business cycle and Wagner's law (the positive 
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income effect of some categories of government expenditure). Period averaging was 
used as an attempt to control for simultaneity but it is possible that some noise still 
remains within the data (especially where the period averages do not coincide with 
the business cycle). 
There is some general evidence against simultaneity being a problem in these 
regressions. The variable enprd, which contains social security and welfare 
payments, is the most likely expenditure variable to be correlated with the growth 
rate both from the business cycle (as unemployment increases over the cycle) and 
from Wagner's law (increased payments on pensions). On no occasion is this 
variable found to have any effect on the growth rate in the results above. 22 Indeed if 
one employs a general to specific approach in determining the variables from the 
government budget constraint to be excluded from the regression then along with 
non-distortionary taxes the null for its removal is accepted. In addition the results 
appear reasonably robust to the exclusion of initial GDP and alternative period- 
averages. 
The choice of instruments is a problem in these sort of regressions and we chose the 
most common form found in the literature which is the first lag of the fiscal 
variables. However, lagged values cannot be used as instruments in fixed effects 
models due to potential biases from the presence of fixed effects. We therefore 
follow Folster & Henrekson (1997) and estimate the regression in first differences. 
The first differences of the fiscal variables are instrumented by lagged levels of the 
respective fiscal variable, the level and first difference of the population and initial 
GDP variables and country specific effects (Folster & Henrekson (1997)). The 
growth equation is also run in first difference form and the variables in Table 6.11 
should be interpreted as such. In order to ensure that the government budget remains 
an identity the surplus term is generated as a balancing item between revenues and 
expenditures. The surplus term is not therefore, an instrumented variable. The results 
when instrumenting for of all the remaining fiscal variables are displayed in Table 
6.11 below. 
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Table 6.11: Estimation by Instrumental Variables 
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The results for these instrumental variable regressions display only a weak 
resemblance in terms of significance of the variables. however, this appears to he 
due to inflation of the standard errors rather than through any large changr in the 
value of the coefficients. The results for the instrumental variable regressions appear 
to he dependent upon which of the set of fiscal variables are include(] or left out of 
the regression equation. For example when i-dis is the excluded fiscal variable the fit 
of the regression is 50.6% yet when mndlix is the excluded fiscal variable the fit of the 
regression is only 33.9%. This also appears to affect the magnitude 01' the standard 
errors in the regressions. For example, when rdis is the excluded fiscal variable the 
standard errors of the fiscal variables are around 1.5 times those found in 'fahle 6.4, 
whereas when midis is the compensating variable then the standard errors are around 
22 Additional evidence against simultaneity causal by Wagner's law is the rl, huStness ut the results to 
the exclusion of initial GDP fron the regression equation. 
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three times as large. We suggest that this is due to a loss of efficiency from using IV 
for a large number of variables rather than a loss of robustness. 
Some support for this conclusion can be found when we include fiscal variables 
singularly within the regression (i. e. do not take account of the budget constraint) 
and; when we instrument individually for fiscal variables taking account of the 
budget constraint. In all of these regressions the general findings from Table 6.4 are 
supported. Evidence can also be found against the choice of instrumenting variables 
by referring to results found in the next chapter. Within that chapter we find that the 
addition of lagged explanatory variables to the regression cannot be rejected. That is, 
fiscal policy within the previous period adds significantly to the ability to explain 
growth within this period. The choice of lagged variables as instruments will 
therefore potentially bias the results because the instruments will themselves be 
correlated with growth. This may also help to explain why the results change little 
when instrumenting for one fiscal variable at a time, as within previous studies, but 
are less robust when we instrument for the entire budget constraint. 
6.5 Interpreting the Results 
Table 6.12 below presents a summary of the expected coefficients from the Barro 
endogenous growth model along with the regression results in the fiscal matrix in 
Table 6.4 above. The theoretical prediction is displayed in the left hand side of the 
cell and the empirical result on the right hand side. The bold and large signs on the 
coefficients represent variables that are significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level or above, and the fainter coefficients those that are not significantly different 
from zero. 
The degree of matching of the Barro model and empirical literature once the 
government budget constraint has been accounted for is quite remarkable. In all cells, 
(excluding those where no prior predictions were possible), the expected coefficient 
from the theoretical literature is reproduced by the empirics. 
('hapk'r" 6: Growth and Ihc (; cwernlnerrl liudli'rl Constraint 
"fahle 6.12: A ('comparison of'the ]'hcorctical 1'miictiuns and I ml)irical Results 
distortionary non- productive nOn-ptl (Iii ti%t 
taxation distortionary, expenditures expend ilures 
taxation 
distortionary 
taxation 
non- ff ff 0 
distortionar_y 
taxation 
productive 7 ff f+ 
expenditure 
non-productive 
expenditure 
Note: (theorctiraI preclirtiun empirical result) 
Quadrant I provides evidence on the growth effects of'the tax mix. "I'hc' distinction 
within the model as to whether one type of taxation has a significant direct ctIcct 
upon the steady state rate of growth or not concerns whether it fits into the 
consumption or the production side of the model. Distortionary taxes reduce the 
returns to investment the rate of accumulation of capital and hence the steady state 
growth rate. Non-distortionary taxes are introduced into the model within the 
consumption function and (because of the assumption of infinitely lived households) 
have no effect upon the steady state rate of growth. The tax measures within the 
Barra (1990) model are progressive taxes and hence the average and marginal tax 
rates are identical. In reality taxes are in general not progressive and the tax revenue 
categories we use more accurately reflect ui'c'rup' rather than marginal tax measures. 
Nonetheless evidence of significant coefficients within the tax mix quadrant exists. 
This suggests average tax measures arc reasonably well correlated with marginal tax 
rates in this data set possibly because of high compliance ratios in thL. s, rnlpft art" 
countrics. 
lt does not necessarily follow from this result that consumption taxation is nun- 
distortionary. The coefficients estimate the net rather than direct effect of fiscal 
policy on growth. Mendoza et al. (1996) in a two-sector endogenous growth model 
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allow for the possibility that consumption taxation is distortionary but predict 
(partially based on their empirical findings) that consumption taxation is less 
distortionary than human capital and physical capital taxation. Such a conclusion 
would be consistent with the findings from this study also. When we attempt a 
general to specific test of the government budget constraint we find that we can 
144 
simultaneously exclude rndis and enprd from the regression. This would suggest that 
non-distortionary taxes have no effect on the growth rate in our sample and therefore 
we favour the first of our conclusions. 
Information regarding the effect of changes to the mix of expenditures is contained 
within quadrant 3. Again it appears that the empirics support the notion that it is the 
supply side of the model that drives the growth effects of fiscal policy. Productive 
expenditures raise the marginal product of capital encouraging more investment and 
increase the growth rate. Non-productive expenditures are perfect substitutes for 
private consumption and have no effect upon the investment decision and hence on 
the steady state rate of growth. Any change in policy that leads to an increase in 
expenditures on productive goods financed from reduction in non-productive 
expenditures will increase the long-run rate of growth. This conjecture appears to 
receive strong empirical support from this study. 
The results from quadrants 2 and 4 are also highly consistent with the theory and 
with those from the tax mix and expenditure mix quadrants. The effect on growth of 
distortionary tax financed increases in productive expenditures is not possible to 
predict because the relationship is quadratic (Barro (1990)). Increases in productive 
goods are positive for all sizes of governmentl3but subject to diminishing marginal 
returns; whereas the marginal effect of an increase in distortionary taxation is a 
negative constant at all rates of taxation. The net marginal benefit of these two is 
positive when the size of government is small but negative when the size of 
government is large. The insignificant coefficient on the eprd/rdis variable suggests 
the results estimated here are consistent with Barro (1991) that the provision of 
'Devarajan et al (1996) find some evidence of non-linearity of changes in the government 
expenditure mix but the budget constraint used here makes this difficult to investigate further. 
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productive goods financed by distortionary taxation is at an optimal level. Additional 
support can be found from the test for parameter heterogeneity in Section 6.4.3. 
No optimal provision of productive expenditure funded by non-distortionary taxation 
exists because there are no negative growth effects from this form of taxation. The 
marginal growth effect of an increase in productive expenditure financed by non- 
distortionary taxation should be positive at all sizes of government. The coefficient 
estimated on the eprdlrdis variable suggests that there is scope for further increases 
in productive expenditure financed by non-distortionary taxes. 
The optimal provision of unproductive expenditure from distortionary tax revenues is 
zero within the theory. Any deviation from this position will lead to a reduction in 
the rate of growth. The empirical evidence here supports this theoretical prediction. 
Finally non-distortionary tax financed increases to non-productive expenditures will 
have no significant growth effects because both fiscal variables affect the 
consumption side of the model. The growth effect of a non-distortionary tax financed 
increase in non-productive expenditures is positive but insignificant as expected. 
The results are also consistent with many of the extensions of the Barro model that 
have appeared in the literature. For example when public goods are subject to 
congestion unless the level of congestion is maintained at a constant level (and 
technology is `AK') then fiscal policy has no effect on the growth rate. If the level of 
congestion is constant then fiscal policy becomes a structural characteristic of the 
steady state rather than its engine. In such a model the effect of fiscal policy on the 
growth rate are the same as in the Barro model 24 
The results could also be used to argue against the Cashin (1995) model in which 
non-productive expenditures become `productive' (this is achieved by including 
`non-productive' expenditures in the production function). Perhaps more 
interestingly though we find no evidence that non-productive expenditure (of which 
Z' This result might be considered interesting in a second sense as constant returns to capital models 
allow no convergence of growth rates across countries. Yet we find evidence of conditional 
convergence through the initial GDP term. 
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social-security and welfare payments are the largest part) have negative effects on the 
growth rate of a country 
. 
2' 
The data set is perhaps in far too aggregated a form to argue convincingly for or 
against any particular form of two-sector model. For example the estimated positive 
effect on growth from changes in the tax mix away from distortionary taxes and 
towards non-distortionary taxes would also be consistent with a two-sector model 
which includes a labour-leisure choice in which consumption taxation is 
distortionary. It could then be argued that this result reflects the situation in which 
consumption taxation is simply less distortionary than other distortionary taxes 
(Mendoza et al. (1996) argue this). However, the insignificant effect estimated from 
non-distortionary financed increases in non-productive expenditures is evidence 
against this kind of model. 26 
The results could be used as evidence against extreme forms of the two-sector model 
such as Lucas (1990) in which the human capital sector is a non-market sector and 
has linear production with human capital as the only input. In this model the growth 
rate is given by the technology parameter in the human capital sector and is therefore 
independent of taxation (productive expenditures in the human capital sector would 
have an effect on the growth rate in this model). 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter argues that the specification of the government budget constraint is an 
important determinant of the coefficients on fiscal variables within growth 
regressions. We demonstrate that the failure to take this constraint into account helps 
explain for the dispersion of results found in previous studies. In other words, the 
apparent non-robustness of fiscal variables in other studies is in fact consistent with 
the theory rather than true statistical non-robustness. 
u There are negative effects on growth if they are financed by distortionary taxes, but if they are 
financed by non-distortionary taxes they do not appear to significantly change the growth rate. 
2' Or at least is only consistent with one in elasticity of labour supply is low. 
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Data for 22 developed countries averaged over 5-year periods from 1970-94 was 
analysed using the empirical methodology developed by Helms (1985), Mofidi & 
Stone (1990) and Miller & Russek (1993). It was found that the principal results 
from the Barro (1990) model namely that altering the tax mix from distortionary 
towards non-distortionary taxes, and the expenditure mix from non-productive 
towards productive forms of expenditure are growth-enhancing do in fact receive 
strong empirical support. 
The results are found to be robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the initial GDP 
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term, to the level of aggregation and to a test of parameter heterogeneity. The results 
are however sensitive to whether five-year or ten-year averages are used estimation 
by instrumental variables. 
The results from this chapter could be used to conclude in favour of all growth 
models that separate expenditures and taxes into the four basic types used here. 
However, the level of aggregation of the tax and expenditure variables suggests that 
this conclusion may be too strong. We may be safer in concluding that we find 
evidence in favour of the general class of endogenous growth models, and that we 
find no evidence for the more extreme assumptions made in some endogenous 
growth models such as Lucas (1990) or where public goods are subject to congestion 
(Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992)). 
Chapter 7 
Growth and the Steady State 
7.1 Introduction 
Growth models (both new and old) typically contain strong predictions about the 
long run steady state. As Kocherlakota & Yi (1997) show, new and old theories have 
different steady state predictions with respect to the impact of fiscal variables in a 
growth regression. No fiscal policy variables feature in the steady state of the 
neoclassical model whereas certain types of fiscal policy do feature in the 
endogenous growth models. These predictions often do not hold if the economy is in 
transition from one steady state to another as a result of a change in one or more 
parameters. In both models fiscal policy helps to determine the rate of transition to 
the steady state but the transition depends very much on the initial state, so few 
general predictions can be made. 
Within the most simple public policy endogenous growth model, (Barro (1990)), 
fiscal variables which are included in the supply side of the model, (public goods, 
which appear in private production functions, and the taxation of output or returns to 
factor inputs), affect the steady state; whereas those fiscal variables which are 
included on the demand side of the model (expenditures on welfare payments to 
households or the taxation of consumption or lump-sum taxation) have no influence 
on the steady state. The statistical non-robustness of the relationship between fiscal 
policy and growth may therefore be due to differences in the ability of the various 
econometric techniques and data transformations used in the literature to distinguish 
between the business cycle, the transition and the steady state. 
A major empirical issue concerns the appropriate use of the available data in order to 
test theoretical hypothese. In practice we have a finite time-span of annual data on 
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fiscal variables for a limited number of countries. We could use each year as a 
separate observation, in order to maximise degrees of freedom, but even if we allow 
for lagged effects there is a high risk of being unable to distinguish the steady state 
from transitional and business cycle effects. The business cycle would be expected to 
influence the short-run behaviour of the dependent and many of the independent 
variables. Alternatively, we can aggregate the data into averages of 5,7 or even 10- 
years, hoping to smooth out many of the short-run effects and isolate the long run 
relationships, but at the expense of a loss of a great deal of potentially useful 
information. 
Kocherlakota & Yi (1997) use data from the UK and US for 150 and 100 years 
respectively in a time series framework with long lag structures in order to assess the 
impact of a limited number of fiscal variables on the rate of growth. We address 
similar issues using data on a panel of 22 developed countries over 24 years with a 
complete government budget. Our initial approach is to estimate a standard static 
panel regression with the data organised as 5-year period averages. To this we add a 
dynamic element to the regression through a single lag of the explanatory variables. 
If the static regression with 5-year period averages fully captures the long run 
component of the data the addition of this lagged term will have no explanatory 
power and can be legitimately removed from the regression equation. On the contrary 
we find that the null hypothesis of no explanatory power from the lagged variables 
cannot be accepted. That is, the standard approach with regard to the measurement of 
the long run within the literature is misspecified. 
We test the sensitivity of the results to a number of alternative estimators and means 
of treating the data. This in turn throws up some interesting results. Our results 
suggest that the treatment of the data have no real effect when testing between the 
neoclassical and endogenous growth models as all favour the endogenous growth 
model. However, the choice of methodologies is found to be important when testing 
between variants of the endogenous growth model. That is, we consistently find a 
statistically significant relationship between fiscal policy and growth but not always 
for the same combinations of fiscal variables. 
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Section 7.2 summarises the existing literature (both empirical and theoretical) and 
reviews the available panel data econometric methodologies (Section 7.2.2). Section 
7.3 considers the empirical methodology along with the design of the data set and 
section 7.4 the results. Section 7.5 performs some sensitivity analysis and finally 
section 7.6 concludes. 
7.2 Existing Literature 
The non-robustness of fiscal variables estimated by Levine & Renelt (1992) and 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) and reviewed in Chapter 5 would appear to hold, 
irrespective of the choice of period averaging and econometric methodology 
employed. Chapter 6 demonstrates that at least part of the explanation is due to an 
incomplete specification of the government budget constraint but this was only 
investigated for static panels using five-year period averages. The robustness tests 
included in Section 6.4 indicate that these results may be sensitive to the choice of 
period average to remove the short run effects from the data. 
In the public policy neoclassical growth models fiscal policy affects the level of 
output but not the long run growth rate. In contrast, public policy in the endogenous 
growth models of Barro (1990) and Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992,1995) fiscal policy 
determines both the level of output and the steady state growth rate (for the details 
see Chapters 2 to 4). 1 We can use this difference in the determinants of the long run 
growth rate to distinguish between the new and old growth theories. Within the 
endogenous growth models not all elements of fiscal policy are expected to help 
determine the steady state growth rate. The growth effects of fiscal variables can be 
easily summarised depending on whether they influence the production or the 
household side of the model. As explained in Chapter 4 those policies that affect the 
production side, (distortionary taxation and productive expenditure), help to 
determine the rate of growth; whereas those that are included on the household side, 
(non-distortionary taxation and non-productive expenditure), do not. 
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This distinction between types of policy is sufficient to characterise the effect on 
growth in many of the extensions that have been made to the basic model, but not all. 
In certain forms of the model it is possible to have either no expenditure, or no tax, or 
neither taxation nor expenditure affecting the steady state, even when the growth rate 
is endogenously determined. For example if public goods are subject to congestion 
and capital (either physical or human) is subject to diminishing returns then the 
steady state growth rate is independent of fiscal policy. Fiscal policy can be 
reintroduced as a determinant of the steady state if constant returns to capital are 
assumed and the level of congestion (the expenditure/GDP ratio) remains constant in 
the steady state. 2 
The results may also be used to distinguish between some of the more extreme forms 
of two-sector model. For example Lucas (1990) in a two-sector model of taxation 
demonstrates that under certain assumptions taxation policy has no effect on the 
steady state growth rate. Clearly evidence of significant relationship between taxation 
and growth would provide evidence against a model in which the human capital 
sector is a non-market sector and linear in its production of human capital. 
7.3 Econometric Methodology 
Neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature provides us with much insight into 
how to manipulate the data in order to accurately capture the determinants of the long 
run growth rate. One thing we are clear about however, is that if we are searching for 
the determinants of the steady state then we must distinguish it from the business 
cycle and the transition which are also contained within the data. The business cycle 
is clearly going to contaminate annual observations of the data; while the transitional 
I Public goods are accumulated within the model as the economy grows, in so doing this prevents 
diminishing returns to capital and hence declining growth rates. 
2 Given the limits of the data set available (around 20 years in length) to be able to distinguish 
between these two sets of assumptions requires that the degree of congestion is relatively large such 
that congestion occurs quickly. If however the degree of congestion is small (as can occur under 
Glomm & Ravikumar (1994), Fisher & Turnovsky (1998)) then we may incorrectly conclude in 
favour of fiscal policy as a determinant of the growth rate. From a policy perspective this distinction 
may appear uninteresting but from a modelling perspective it is crucial for the structure of the model. 
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dynamics appear because of the dynamic nature of the theory, but no clear 
information exists as to its length. Both of these are likely to affect the short-run 
behaviour of the dependent and possibly the independent variables within the 
regression. Further complications are added because the transition is dependent upon 
initial conditions making any a prior theoretical prediction about the path to the 
steady state difficult. 
Of the panel data studies that exist within the literature the most common form uses a 
non-dynamic panel regressions with period averages around 5-years in length. 
Alternative techniques, such as those of dynamic panel data, are available but are less 
used. In this chapter we demonstrate the sensitivity of the results to differences in the 
econometric methodology used to model the long run relationship between fiscal 
variables and the rate of growth. More specifically we compare the results from non- 
dynamic and dynamic panel data regressions. 
Panel data estimators are used to investigate the relationship between fiscal policy 
and long run growth because they offer several advantages over the use of cross- 
section3 or time series models alone given the shape of the available data set in this 
thesis. A time dimension of only around 20 observation per country prevents the use 
of time series techniques, while using cross-section estimation would leave us with 
only 22 observations. Data availability prevents us from collecting additional data in 
order to use time series techniques, while collecting data on more countries is likely 
to aggravate simultaneity and parameter heterogeneity problems identified in Section 
5.2.2 and 5.2.4. Panel data estimators therefore have the advantage in increasing the 
available degrees of freedom, but more importantly, because it exploits the time 
dimension of the data set, allow us to use more of the information contained within 
the data to improve the efficiency of the parameter estimates. A final advantage of 
using panel data estimation is that we can account for country and time specific 
omitted variables. 
3 See Temple (1998) and Durlauf & Quah (1998) for a comprehensive review of the problems of 
cross-country growth regressions. 
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Two different types of panel data technique are applied to the data set, these are the 
static panel techniques (no lagged values) and dynamic panel techniques (includes 
lagged values). The properties of these two estimators are quite different and we 
compare only their general specification here, leaving the details of the estimation 
procedures to Appendix B. 
7.3.1 Static Panel Data Estimators 
The basic static panel data regression runs over the equation, ' 
Equation 7.1 ytl =a+X, ß+u,, 
where yi, is the dependent variable and X; t is a matrix of explanatory variables. ' The 
error term is assumed to be a random disturbance, but contain the effects of the 
omitted variables. The error term, u; t, can then be decomposed into parts that are 
country specific and those that are time specific effects. 
Equation 7.2 u; t _ uj + 
where µ; are country varying time invariant effects; ? are time-varying, country- 
invariant effects; and s; t is a classical error term with the properties that it is IID(O, 
oE2) and E(c1, X; t)=0. The estimators of the parameters contained within the ß matrix 
are unbiased and consistent as both N and T tend to infinity. The properties of µ; and 
l,; depend upon the asymptotic properties of T-ºoo and although consistent are not 
reported at any point below. Instead concentration is made solely upon the 0 matrix. 
The estimation program used within this chapter is LIMDEP (Green (1992)). 
LIMDEP automatically estimates standard OLS, least squares dummy variable fixed 
effects models (with both one way and two way error terms) and two-step feasible 
GLS random effects models. The principal features of the fixed and random effects 
We simplify this equation from equation (6.1) for ease. 
s We combine the conditioning variable matrix with the fiscal variable matrix from equation (1) in the 
previous chapter into a single term for ease 
Chapter 7: Growth and the Steady State 154 
models are discussed here and the reader is referred to Hsiao (1986) or Baltagi (1995) 
for the details. The Hausman specification test is used to test between the random 
effects models (see Appendix B for the details) and we continually find evidence in 
favour of the fixed effects model. As in the previous chapter we find the fixed effects 
model is consistently estimated as having a higher log-likelihood (absolute) value 
2 
and higher adjusted R. 
7.3.2 Dynamic Panel Data Estimators 
Pesaran (1997) argues that in order to estimate empirically the long run or steady 
state from economic growth models then "the steady state solutions can be embedded 
within a suitable multivariate dynamic model. "6One possible econometric procedure 
for studying the steady state of the type of growth models reviewed in Chapters 1-4 
is through dynamic panel data models. Dynamic panel data regression equations are, 
essentially, identical to static panel data techniques except the dynamic regressions 
add lagged values of the explanatory variables. However, the addition of these terms 
complicates the estimation procedure and the choice between the different estimation 
techniques must be made partially on the nature of the data set and the properties of 
the different estimation procedures. 
The dynamic panel data regression simply extends equation (7.1) to include a series 
of lagged terms, 
00 
Equation 7.3 Yu = arr + 
lAiYO-j 
+ Qrxr, 
r-k + ei: 
J-1 
Ignoring the exact nature of the unobserved coefficients for the moment, (whether 
fixed or random effects) in order to estimate an equation for the steady state a 
dynamic equation of the following form is required: 
P 
Equation 7.4 DYtr 
° ail +I MAYO-I + 
XAAXII-k 
+ Zi2i, t m+ sit 
J-1 
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If y represents output then the regression for the growth of output is estimated on 
lagged growth and two vectors of explanatory variables, the first containing 
explanatory variables in levels (for example government expenditures) and the 
second variables in first difference form. This is an unusual dynamic panel data 
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equation but follows from a basic ECM equation in which the long run component is 
zero 
- 
see Appendix B. 
Long Run Parameter Estimates 
In order to employ the econometric techniques discussed above requires the ability to 
translate the steady state equations from the theoretical models into a form of 
regression equation. Kocherlakota & Yi (1996) do this by nesting the exogenous 
growth model within the endogenous growth model and we choose not to repeat the 
analysis here. Put simple they show that the steady state growth rate can be expressed 
as distributed lags of the variables of interest. Within the regression equation and the 
theoretical model the growth effects of fiscal policy are determined by the joint 
significance of the distributed lags. Within the exogenous growth model the sum of 
the lags is zero whereas in the endogenous growth model the sum of the lags is non- 
zero. As Yi & Kocherlakota write "the different coefficient sum capture the idea that 
permanent changes in policy variables can have long run effects of growth rates in 
endogenous growth models, but do not have long run effects in exogenous growth 
models. "7 We assume the same process here but for a wider range of fiscal variables. 
Estimation of equation 7.4 yields a series of short run parameter estimates. These can 
be converted to long run estimates under a simple transform the details of which we 
save to Appendix B (Section B3). 
6 Pesaran, M. H. (1997) "The role of economic theory in modelling the long run" Economic Journal, 
vol. 107, no. 440, January, pp. 178-9 
' Yi K., Kocherlakota N. 'Is there endogenous long run growth? Evidence from the US and the UK' 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York December 17p. (1996) 
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7.4 Empirical Methodology 
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As demonstrated in the previous chapter correctly testing that the rate of growth is a 
function of fiscal variables implies the use of the government budget constraint 
within the regression. We therefore, continue its use within this chapter and refer the 
reader to Section 6.2.2 for an explanation of the approach. 
7.5 Empirical Results 
7.5.1 Results 
The dynamic regression using 5-yearly averaged data includes the current value of 
the explanatory variables, as in the non-dynamic regression, and one lagged value of 
the explanatory variables, as its dynamic component. Longer lag structures were 
precluded by the limitations of the time series element of the data set. The two way 
fixed effects model is favoured by the diagnostics for the static panel regression, but 
the period effects in the dynamic regression were only marginally significant at the 
10% level and hence we made the decision to exclude them from the regression. The 
results of the other variables are not changed by their omission. Thus, the dynamic 
regression is a one way fixed effects model that includes country effects but not 
period effects. The dynamic regression explains some 67.9% of the variation of 
growth, whereas the static regression explains 61.5%. A Wald test on the joint 
significance of the lagged dependent variables leads to a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients on these terms are jointly zero. This suggests that the 
static panel regression estimated in Chapter 6 is misspecified as the model does not 
fully capture the dynamics present in the data. ' 
Of the conditioning variables the investment ratio is statistically insignificant in both 
the static or the dynamic regression; while the labour force growth rate is significant 
8A similar process was attempted for with the inclusion of period effects leading to the same result. 
Chapter 7: Growth and the Steady State 157 
(and negative) in the dynamic regression. The inclusion of the initial GDP9 term with 
a negative coefficient in the regressions implies convergence of GDP levels, with, 
ceteris paribus, faster growth at lower starting values of GDP. The lagged growth 
term from the dynamic regression is also significant and negative, suggesting 
persistence in short-run dynamics. 
Consider next the fiscal parameter estimates. The signs and significance on the 
estimated coefficients from the static and dynamic panel regressions are displayed in 
Table 7.1 below. 10 Comparing the first two elements from Table 7.1 suggests that 
there is some sensitivity of the estimated long run" effects of fiscal policy to the 
choice of how we model the long run. Concentrating on the long run coefficients 
from the table; two variables, enprd/eprd and eprd/rdis, have different significance 
across the two types of regression. The significance of the enprd/eprd variable in the 
static regression set is lost in the dynamic regression whereas, the coefficient on the 
eprd/rdis variable gains significance in the dynamic regression. This latter case leads 
us to believe that it is not simply a reduction in degrees of freedom (caused by the 
inclusion of lagged explanatory variables) in the dynamic regression that causes the 
results to alter. 12 
9 Initial GDP refers to the level of GDP at the start of each averaged period. For example the GDP for 
1970 is used as initial GDP for the data span 1970-74. 
'o The table displays the results from only the bottom half of the fiscal matrix in order to conserve 
space. If at any point in the empirical results the matching cell of the matrix does not have the correct 
matching sign or significance this is indicated by colouring the cell grey and the result is explained as 
a footnote. The figures in parenthesis under the parameter values are the t-statistic of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient of the variable is insignificantly different from zero. The t-statistics 
under the long run coefficients of the dynamic regression refer to test of the null hypothesis that the 
sum of the short-run parameters is equal to zero. This switch from the previous chapter is made for 
ease of comparison between the static and dynamic panel regressions and is used consistently 
throughout the chapter. 
" An explanation how the long run coefficients of the fiscal variables from the dynamic regression set 
were calculated can be found in the appendix. 
12 This may also have implications for which variables can be excluded from the regression if we 
adopt a general to specific approach. We choose not to follow up this result here. 
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Table 7.1: Comparing Static and Dynamic Panel Data Estimators 
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panel Static Dynamic 
length of average 5-year 
long run current 1st lag 
increase rndis 0.446* 0 602* 0.450 0.474 
decrease rdis (2.60) . (3.05) 
(1.56) (1. ss) 
increase enprd 
-0.253** -0.114 
-0 454* 
0.279 
decrease eprd (1.95) (0.80) . (2.48) 
(1.34) 
increase eprd -0.156 
-0 289* -0 299 0 decrease rdis . (2.04) . (1.75) 91) 
increase enprd 
-0.410* 
-0.403* -0 754* 0.135 decrease rdis (4.21) (3.44) . (4.09) (0.99) 
increase eprd 0,290` 0 313 0.150 0.330 
decrease rndis (1.98) . (1.91) 
(0'57) (1'31) 
increase enprd 0.037 (0.23) 
0.199 
(1.30) -0.304 (0.99) 0.609"` decrease rndis (1.93) 
Notes: 1) t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2)' denotes significance at the 5% level, at the 10% level. 
It is also worth noting the importance of the dynamic specification of the regression 
equation for the magnitude of the coefficients. This has important consequences for 
government policy. For example, using the results from the dynamic regression an 
increase of productive expenditures as a ratio to GDP of one percentage point raises 
growth by 0.114 of a percentage point when financed by reduction in enprd; whereas, 
the growth rate increases by 0.253 of a percentage point when we use the results from 
the static regression. 
The results from Table 7.1 take no account of differences in the relative size of 
expenditures and revenues. An increase in eprd/GDP of one per cent may involve a 
far greater relative change than a one per cent change in enprd/GDP due to 
differences in the relative size of expenditures on eprd and enprd. To demonstrate 
these differences in relative size consider the growth effect of a increase of one 
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percent of non-productive expenditurel3 financed by distortionary taxation. Taking 
the average rate of growth per annum across all countries and all time periods, this 
would decrease the rate of growth from 2.30% to 2.237% under the static regression 
results. Now if we instead increase revenues of distortionary taxation by 1 per cent 
and chose to spend this increase in revenues on non-productive expenditure the rate 
of growth falls by a greater amount to 2.223% (under the static regression results). 
The fall in the average rate of growth is different in the two cases because of the 
difference in the relative size of rdis and enprd and what it means to increase the 
revenues/expenditures by 1 percent; we display the outcome for this and all other 
possible changes in fiscal policy in Table 7.2 below. 
The largest changes to the rate of growth are from when we increase revenues from 
distortionary taxation and decrease revenues from non-distortionary taxation, (the 
rate of growth drops to 2.216% using the static regression results and to 2.187% in 
the dynamic regression), and finance increases in non-productive expenditures 
through distortionary taxation, (2.237% or 2.223% in the static regression or 2.238% 
or 2.224% in the dynamic regression). 
Table 7.2 also provides us with information about the preferred method, in terms of 
the rate of growth of the economy, of financing a change of fiscal policy. For 
example if the government wishes to finance increases in non-productive 
expenditures (of which payments on transfers and welfare constitute the largest 
amount) then they have the choice to finance this through increases in distortionary 
or non-distortionary taxation, or a reduction in productive forms of expenditures. The 
preferred (growth-maximising) method of financing this increase would be through 
non-distortionary taxation. Taking the results from the dynamic regression the 
growth rate would increase to 2.330% under this method; whereas if financed by 
distortionary taxation the growth rate would be reduced to 2.238% and; to 2.283% if 
financed by reducing expenditures on productive goods and services. 
13 In the above example this increases the ratio of non-productive expenditures to GDP from 5.29 to 
5.44. 
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Table 7.2: Rate of Growth from Changes in Fiscal Policy 
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panel Static Dynamic panel Static Dynamic 
growth rate growth rate growth rate growth rate 
increase rndis 2.341 2.355 increase rdis 2.216 2.187 
decrease rdis decrease rndis 
increase enprd 2.261 2.283 increase eprd 2.337 2.317 
decrease eprd decrease enprd 
increase eprd 2.277 2.258 increase rdis 2.271 2.246 
decrease rdis decrease eprd 
increase enprd 2.237 2.238 increase rdis 2.223 2.224 
decrease rdis decrease enprd 
increase eprd 2.342 2.346 increase rndis 2.326 2.329 
decrease rndis decrease eprd 
increase enprd 2.306 2.330 increase rndis 2.303 2.318 
decrease rndis decrease enprd 
Nr. +P. nPr Tanita nrnwth rate under no chance in fisca l nolicv is 2.3%. G 
Differences in measurement of the variable makes comparisons to previous works 
difficult. The results from previous works using cross-section estimators, (such as 
Mendoza et al. (1996), Easterly & Rebelo (1993) and Koester & Kormendi (1987)), 
are in general smaller in magnitude than the estimates of the long run parameter from 
the dynamic regressions here. For the Mendoza et al. study the estimated effect of a 
1% increase in taxation is around 0.02 of a percentage point but this does reach 0.06 
when a fixed effects estimator is used. However, as argued in Chapter 6 the 
coefficients estimated by Mendoza et al. are biased towards zero by incomplete 
specification of the government budget constraint. 
The estimated growth effects of fiscal tax policy, displayed in Table 7.2, are also 
significantly larger than the estimates of a 10% change in taxation from studies 
which have used simulation techniques (such as Lucas (1990), Stokey & Rebeln 
(1995), Mendoza et al. (1996)). These studies find that decreasing distortionary 
taxation by 10% and replacing them with non-distortionary taxes raises the growth 
rate by around 0.1 to 0.2 of a percentage point. The equivalent estimate in this study 
of a 10% increase in distortionary taxation (increase in non-distortionary taxation) is 
0.84 of a percentage point reduction in the growth rate (a 0.41 of a percentage point 
increase) from the static panel results and even larger 1.13 of a percentage point 
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reduction (0.55 of a percentage point increase) from the dynamic panel regression 
estimates. 
The long run parameter estimates from the expenditure mix quadrant are very close 
to those estimated for the public capital stock measures by Kocherlakota & Yi (1997) 
for the UK and US for over 100 years of data. The parameter estimates are also 
reasonably in line with those from the cross-section studies of Barro (1991), Easterly 
& Rebelo (1993) and Miller & Russek (1993). They are however, larger than the 
estimates for developed countries in Devarajan et al. (1996), but their data is in a 
more disaggregated form and expressed as a ratio to total expenditure hindering 
comparisons. 
7.5.2 Application to the Theory 
Table 7.3 lists the coefficients we expect on the long run fiscal parameters under four 
different forms of model; the neoclassical model (in which there are no long run 
effects from fiscal policy); and the three different endogenous growth models (in 
which there are long run effects from fiscal policy). " These are the Barro (1990) one- 
sector model, the Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992,1995) congested public goods 
model, 15 and a two-sector model which includes a labour-leisure choice (hence 
consumption taxation is distortionary - Mendoza et al. (1996)), congested public 
goods, assumes the education sector is taxable and is not linear in its production 
technology. " It is clear from Table 7.3 that developing the model from the simple 
form used by Barro (1990) leads to problems of interpreting the estimated 
coefficients. 
'a For a more complete summary of the results for particular fiscal policies along with the necessary 
assumptions see the conclusions to Chapters 2,3 & 4. 
is We assume that physical capital does not display constant returns. The results are sensitive to this 
assumption and its employment returns the results to those of the Barro (1990) model. 
16 The results from the two-sector model are highly stylised and assumption dependant. For example, 
we ignore from here the growth effects from the changes in the mix of expenditures between sectors, 
and the taxation between sectors. 
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Table 7.3: Summary of the Steady State Effects of Fiscal Policy in Economic Growth Models 
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Theory 
Exogenous Endogenous 
Barro Barro & Sala- Two-sector 
i-Martin Model 
(congestion) 
increase rndis 0 + 0 +/0/_ 
decrease rdis 
increase enprd 0 
_ 
o 
_ decrease eprd 
increase eprd 0 o 
decrease rdis 
increase enprd 0 
_ 
o 
_ decrease rdis 
increase eprd o + 0 
decrease rndis 
increase enprd 0 0 0 
_ decrease rndis 
The key difference between the neoclassical and endogenous growth models is the 
prediction of significant coefficients on the long run parameters within the fiscal 
matrix. Since our empirical results include significant long run coefficients within the 
fiscal matrices in both the dynamic panel regression and static panel regression sets, 
our evidence favours the endogenous over the neoclassical model. 
Evidence also favours the versions of the endogenous growth model, which allow 
growth effects from fiscal policy. We therefore, do not find evidence of the 
congestion of public goods. '' Nor do we find evidence of the extreme results from 
the two-sector tax model in which the accumulation of capital is linear and the 
human capital sector is non-taxable (Lucas (1990)). 
The coefficients estimated from the static regressions accord very closely to the 
Barro public policy endogenous growth model (i. e. Chapter 6). The sign and the 
17 According to these models by our findings we provide indirect evidence of constant returns to scale 
across all reproducible factors in production. We note however that under alternative specifications of 
congestion (Glomm & Ravikumar (1994) and Fisher & Turnovsky (1998)) if the rate of congestion is 
sufficiently low then it could be that the congestion of public goods is not being captured in the 
regression (but then this would imply we are not accurately measuring the long run). 
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significance matches for all pairs of coefficients where it was possible to make a 
prior prediction of the expected coefficient. The results therefore, appear to give 
strong support to the separation of fiscal variables into four basic types, productive 
and un-productive expenditure and distortionary and non-distortionary taxes. That is, 
the results are consistent with the idea that the inclusion into the demand or supply 
sides of the model is enough to fully describe the growth effects of a particular 
policy. 
The use of the dynamic panel data techniques slightly reduces the support for the 
Barro (1990) model. The model correctly predicts the sign and the significance on 
the rdis/rndis, enprd/rdis, eprd/rndis and enprd/rndis variables but only the sign on 
the enprd/eprd variable. 
The predictions of the Barro model in terms of taxation appear to be well captured 
and the strongest departures appear on the expenditure side. The estimated 
insignificant effect of changes in the mix of expenditures contrasts with the Barro 
model, which predicts a significant positive relationship. In the Barro model 
productive expenditures increase the returns to private investment whereas non- 
productive expenditures have no effect. Therefore any change in the expenditure mix 
in the direction of non-productive forms of expenditure should, in theory, decrease 
the rate of growth. 
The insignificant coefficient on the enprdleprd variable could be used as evidence of 
any one of three conclusions: either both forms of expenditure are in fact productive 
(as in the Cashin (1995) model)"; that productive expenditures are subject to 
congestion (as in the Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992) model); or neither form of 
expenditure is productive. We choose not to follow a general to specific approach to 
determine which fiscal variables may be excluded from the regression, which in turn 
may help to distinguish between these three hypotheses. it is however an issue we 
18 The results from the Cashin (1995) model hold because non-productive expenditures are modelled 
identically to productive expenditures i. e. they are included as inputs into the production function. 
This might be a reasonable assumption if the non-productive expenditure variable contains elements 
of public investment as may be the case in this data set. 
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return to in the next chapter when we disaggregate the expenditure categories from 
their present form. 
7.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
The standard approach to separating the long and short run information contained 
within the data has been to use some form of period averaging. This has settled on 
the use of 5-year period averages with the beginning of the data period chosen as the 
first available observation to begin this process (usually 1960 or 1970). The basis for 
organising the data as 5-year periods over possible alternatives is in order to remove 
as much of the short run effects as possible but to maximise the time series element 
of the data set. We perform four tests for the sensitivity of the results to these 
choices. The first test considers the length of period average through which to 
remove the short run information contained within the data; the second considers the 
sensitivity to the start date for period averages; and the third test considers alternative 
estimators for the dynamic panel regressions we have run. 19 Finally we use some 
alternative lag structures within a dynamic regression. 
7.6.1 Length of Average 
Averaging the data over long time periods has the advantage of smoothing out more 
of the short-run effects from the data but at the cost that potentially useful 
information is being removed from the data. Further problems may be encountered if, 
as Folster & Henrekson (1997) argue, too long a length of period average is used. 
This being likely to lead to simultaneity between certain types of expenditure and 
growth through Wagner's law. In order to consider the robustness to the use of 
alternative period averages we estimate the regression using 10-year period 
averages. 20 A degrees of freedom problem prevented the analysis of the same 
problem for dynamic panels and sensitivity tests through instrumental variable 
i9 We also tried sensitivity to the level of classification. The results were broadly similar and since the 
issue of aggregation is taken up in the next chapter we do not report the results here. 
20 The 10-year averages run across the years 1973-82 and 1983-92 producing 36 data points. The 
average was only taken for the 10-yearly averaged data when 8 or more data points were present 
which meant both Italy and Portugal were excluded from the data set. 
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techniques. The results for this regression are displayed in Table 7.4 along with those 
from the static panel regression from Table 7.1. 
Table 7.4: A Comparison of Static Panel Estimation with 5 and 10-year Averages 
panel Static 
length of average 5-year 10-year 
increase rndis 0.446* 0.953* 
decrease rdis (2.60) (2.43) 
increase enprd 
-0.253** -0.163 
decrease eprd (1.95) (0.61) 
increase eprd -0.156 -0.208 
decrease rdis 
(1-514) (0.70) 
increase enprd 
-0.410* -0.371 
decrease rdis (4.21) 
(1.49) 
increase eprd 0.290** 0.745* 
decrease rndis (1.98) (2.78) 
increase enprd 0.037 582* 0 
decrease rndis 
(0.23) 
. (1.15) 
Notes: 1) t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2) * denotes significance at the 5% level, "" at the 10% level. 
The results for the two static regressions are in places quite similar, and the use of 
10-year as opposed to 5-year averages does not remove much of the explanatory 
power of the regression. The adjusted R2 for the regressions using 5-year averages is 
61.5% while the adjusted R2 for the regression using 10-year averages is 59.5%. The 
coefficients on the rndislrdis, eprd/rdis and eprd/rndis are identical across the two 
sets of regressions but the significance of the coefficient on the enprd/eprd and 
enprd/rdis variables is lost when we use 10-year averages. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients on the enprd/eprd and enprd/rdis variables are not greatly different 
between the two static regressions whereas the standard errors on these variables are 
inflated in the regressions using 10-year averages. It is therefore likely that the loss of 
significance of these variables reflects the loss of degrees of freedom from averaging 
the data over longer time periods. Once this possibility is accounted for the results 
for the two static regressions then appear to take on a stronger degree of similarity 
and the results appear to be relatively insensitive to the choice of period average. 
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Such an explanation is however, not consistent with the variable enprd/rndis gaining 
significance. Given it was simultaneity between enprd and the growth rate which 
Folster & Henrekson (1997) argued would be aggravated by increasing the length of 
the period average this result would appear to support their conjecture. A lack of 
computing power prevents further analysis of this potential relationship using 2-stage 
least squares regressions. 
A comparison of the magnitudes of the coefficients between the two estimators 
shows large changes. For example, on the rndis/rdis variable the point estimate is 
0.45 using 5-year averages and 0.95 using 10-year averages; while the point estimate 
on the eprdlrndis variable is 0.29 using 5-year averages but 0.75 using 10-year 
averages. Such large changes as these have dramatic implications for policy. For 
example, according to the results from the 10-year period averaged data the point 
estimate of an increase in non-distortionary taxation financed by distortionary taxes 
is almost +1.00 percentage points. Such a figure seems unrealistically large. Curious 
of this result we reviewed other studies that have report results using alternative 
period averages. Although they`do not highlight this feature, Oulton & Young (1996) 
find similar effects for the social returns to investment. Period averaging clearly has 
affects on the magnitude of the coefficients in ways in that are hard to explain. 
7.6.2 Period Averaging 
As is typical in empirical studies the start date for the period averages here is taken 
from the first available observation. So for this study 5-year period averages run from 
1970-74,1975-79 and so on. If the period average encompasses the length of the 
business cycle then this sort of period averaging is an acceptable means of smoothing 
the short run component from the data and is so doing reducing possible simultaneity 
between fiscal policy and growth. However, if the choice of period average does not 
capture fully the business cycle these results may be biased (and the results from the 
dynamic regressions presented in Section 7.4 already suggest this). One simple way 
of testing this is to alter the start year of the period average. If 5-years fully captures 
the effects of the business cycle then such a change will have no effect on the long 
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run relationship between fiscal policy and growth. We construct three alternative sets 
of period averages all 5-years in length but with start dates in 1971,1972 and 1973 
instead of 1970. Only 5-year period averages are calculated and the regressions are 
only run for static panels 21 The results are displayed in Table 7.5 (the results for 
1970 as the start years are included as a reminder). 
Table 7.5: Robustness to Alternative Start Years for Period Averaging. 
Start Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 
increase rndis 0.446* 0.332""` 0.511 0.457* 
decrease rdis (0.17) (0.20) (0.26) (0.22) 
increase enprd 
-0.253* 
-0 293* -0.085 0.006 decrease eprd (0,13) . (0.13) (0.18) (0.16) 
increase eprd -0.156 0.031 -0.180 -0.154 
decrease rdis (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) 
increase enprd 
-0.410* -0.325* -0.266* -0.148 decrease rdis (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) 
increase eprd 0.290** 0.301 0.331 0.304* 
decrease rndis (0.14) (0.18) (0.22) (0.18) 
increase enprd 0.037 0.007 0.245 0.310 
decrease rndis (0.16) (0.18) (0.22) (0.20) 
adj. R 0.602 0.587 0.339 0.441 
Notes: 1) t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2) * denotes significance at the 5% level, '' at the 10% level. 
The choice over the start year for period averaging clearly has an impact on the 
results for some of the pairs of fiscal variables but not for others. This can be seen 
most clearly for the regressions using 1972 as the base year. The significance of the 
regression falls significantly and the standard errors on the variables increase in 
size u 
21 The size of the data set falls to 86 observations for each of these alternative start years such that a 
degrees of freedom problem is soon reached when the regressions are run for dynamic panels. It is 
possible to aggregate some of the expenditure and taxation terms to reduce the degrees of freedom 
problem. When we estimate regressions of this kind we find similar results to those from the static 
regressions. We draw upon some of these results in the next chapter. 
22This regression also favours one-way rather than two-way fixed effects models. We report the 
results for the preferred model but we note that the inclusion of time dummies means the results are 
even less consistent with those using 1971 or 1973 as the base year. 
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The results would appear to be non-robust for all variables except rdis/rndis and 
eprd/rndis (if we treat 1972 as a rogue regression). For the remaining pairs of 
variables the greater variation appears on the estimated coefficients rather than in the 
standard errors. For example, the estimated coefficients on enprd/eprd varies 
between 
-0.293 to +0.006; while for eprd/rdis the coefficient varies between +0.156 
to 
-0.154; and for enprdlrndis between 0.007 to 0.310. As a consequence the 
recommended policy prescriptions also vary between models. For example, the point 
estimate of an increase in non-productive expenditure as a ratio to GDP by 1 
percentage point financed by distortionary taxation lowers the growth rate by 0.410 
of a percentage point when 1970 is used as the base year and by 0.148 of a 
percentage point when 1973 is used as the base year. For enprd/eprd and enprd/rndis 
such movements are within the upper and lower extreme bounds23 one might 
statistically expect the estimated coefficient to vary between given the change in the 
sample size. In contrast, although the erpd/rdis variable remains insignificant, the 
variation here is well outside what one might reasonably expect. 
The results from this section suggest at the very least that caution should be 
employed when using static panel data techniques and some sensitivity testing to the 
base year chosen for period averaging should be made. Alternatively, it could be 
argued that given 5-year period averages do not fully encompass the business cycle 
they are not capable of distinguishing between short and long run movements within 
the data. They should not therefore be used to test between models of long run 
growth. 
This result also warns against using lagged periods as instruments when testing for 
simultaneity in the regressions as the instruments may themselves be correlated with 
growth. A similar conclusion is reached by Lopez, Fabrizio & Ubide (1997) for the 
Spanish economy where they estimate the effects of the business cycle may still be 
present in the data some 15 years later (this compares with typical estimate for the 
US business cycle of around 6 to 8 years in length). 
23 Taken as +/- twice the standard error of the estimated coefficient. 
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7.6.3 Alternative Estimators 
The parameter estimates from dynamic panel data regressions are by their very 
construction biased because of the correlation of the lagged dependent variable, Ay,, 
_,, 
with the error term. Most solutions to this problem have suggested the use of 
instrumental variable (IV) techniques as reviewed in appendix B. The consistency of 
the IV techniques in panel data regression rely heavily on the assumption of a fixed 
time dimension and a large number of cross-sectional units. Unfortunately the data 
set used in this study does not have these properties. The use of IV techniques as a 
solution to this problem therefore becomes questionable. Judson & Owen (1997) run 
Monte Carlo experiments to estimate the bias of the parameters in typical 
macroeconomic data sets (small N and small to large T) for 6 types of estimator 
(OLS, LSDV, corrected LSDV (LSDVc), Anderson-Hsiao (AH), and two forms of 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators. On the principal parameters of 
interest to us in this study, those on the fiscal variables, Judson & Owen conclude 
that "the bias of the estimates.... are relatively small for all techniques except OLS, 
and, thus, cannot be used to distinguish between estimators. "24 Judson & Owen 
demonstrate that the different estimators do not bias the sign on the estimated 
coefficient, but do bias the magnitude of the parameter. The bias on the AH and 
LSDVc estimators is smaller than the LSDV and GMM estimators but at the cost 
over the LSDV estimator of a lower efficiency of the parameter estimates. The 
LSDVc estimator requires a balanced panel and is computationally complex, 
therefore, it was decided to test the robustness of the results found above using the 
AH estimator. 
The AH estimator uses the lagged level to instrument for the lagged difference term, 
in equation (7.4) above 
. 
25 Lagged growth is therefore replaced by 
24judson & Owen (1997) `Estimating dynamic panel data models: A practical guide for 
macroeconomists' Federal Reserve Bank of Washington Working Paper 
2' Arellano & Bond (1991) and Kiviet (1995) confirm the superiority of using the lagged level as an 
instrument over the lagged difference in simulation results. 
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lagged GDP in equation (7.4). Despite reservations that the estimated regression has 
the appearance of a growth accounting regression with the assumption that the 
coefficient on the lagged GDP term is equal to one, the results are displayed in Table 
7.6 below. 26 
Table 7.6: Robustness to the use of AH Estimators 
length of average 5-year 
instrument lagged GDP 
increase 
decrease 
rndis 
rdis 
1.107** 
(1,95) 
increase 
decrease 
enprd 
eprd 
. 
0.872* 
(3.94) 
increase 
decrease 
eprd 
rdis 
-0.501 * 
(2.24) 
increase 
decrease 
enprd 
rdis 
-1.373* 
(6.84) 
increase 
decrease 
eprd 
rndis 
0.606 
(1.27) 
increase 
decrease 
enprd 
rndis 
-0.267 (0.47) 
adj. R 87.8 
Notes: 1) t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2) " denotes significance at the 5% level, ** at the 10% level. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
Comparing the results in Table 7.6 to those in Table 7.1 shows there to be two 
changes from the use of AH instrumental variable estimators over the LSDV 
estimator. The coefficient on the enprd/eprd variable still has a negative coefficient 
but this is now significantly different from zero, while the enprd/rndis variable is 
now negative but remains statistically insignificant. There is therefore, some slight 
sensitivity of the significance of the parameter estimates to the use of the AH 
estimators but, a greater amount of sensitivity of the magnitude of the long run 
coefficients. A comparison of the magnitude of the estimated coefficients from Table 
7.6 and Table 7.1 demonstrates that the long run parameter estimates from the AH 
estimator are consistently larger than those from the LSDV estimator. This result is 
26 The regression includes country and time dummies as instruments but not as regressors. 
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perhaps unsurprising given that most of the bias from the calculation of dynamic 
panel data models appear on the estimation of the lagged dependent variable. The 
lagged dependent variable is used in the calculation of the long run parameter and 
therefore affects the magnitude of the long run coefficients. Judson & Owen (1997) 
estimate that the LSDV estimator biases the estimate of the lagged dependent 
parameter downwards towards zero, whereas the AH estimator leads to an upward 
bias away from zero. It is probable that the true long run parameters lie somewhere 
between our two calculations. 
7.6.4 Lag Structure 
A degrees of freedom problem prevents the use of 5-year averages in comparing 
different lag structures and so instead we turn to the use of annual data. Not 
averaging the data provides us with many more degrees of freedom and captures 
additional information that may be contained within the past history of the dependent 
variable. Estimates of the long run effects of policy using annual observations may 
be misleading if the data period is too short and does not contain enough variation 
over the cycle. This is unlikely to be a problem in the data set used here but the 
decision was made to exclude countries with a short time-series element so that long 
lag structures could be estimated to overcome these problems 27 We anticipate that 
some of the differences in the results between the annual data observations and those 
using 5-yearly averaged data may be because of the reduction in the number of 
countries. In order to make meaningful comparisons with the annual data regressions 
we re-run the regressions using 5-year averages of the data over the smaller sample 
of countries. It is the results from these regressions that are reported in Table 7.7 as 
the dynamic regressions using 5-year period averages. 
The reduction in the country dimension of the sample has little impact on the results 
for the regression set using 5-year averaged data. The difference in the results is on 
the enprd/rndis variable, which has a significant coefficient in Table 7.7 where 
before the estimated coefficient was insignificant. The results from the restricted 
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sample finds evidence in favour of the Cashin (1995) version of the Barro model in 
which transfers have a positive effect on the rate of growth. 
Table 7.7: Comparison of Dynamic Panel Estimation with Annual Observations and 5-year 
Averages 
length of average 5-year annual annual annual 
number of lags 1 6 7 8 
increase rndis 0.766 0.663 0.479 0.263 
decrease rdis (3.55) (4.60) (4.28) (1.73) 
increase enprd -0.175 
-0.270 -0.279 -0.348 decrease eprd (1.31) (4.27) (6.05) (5.49) 
increase eprd 
-0.262 -0.192 -0.103 0.017 decrease rdis (1.84) (2.33) (1.62) (0.18) 
increase enprd 
-0.437 -0.462 -0.382 -0.331 decrease rdis (3.74) (6.60) (7.12) (4.55) 
increase eprd 0.504 0.471 0.377 0.279 
decrease rndis (2.97) (4.60) (4.88) (2.88) 
increase enprd 0.329 0.201 0.097 
-0.068 
decrease rndis (2,05) (2.10) (1.35) (0.73) 
adj. R 71.2 64.1 72.5 73.9 
Wald test 4.32 17.27 28.91 19.99 
Notes: 1) t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2) "denotes significance at the 5% level, ** at the 10% level. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
Table 7.7 displays only the estimated long run coefficients from three of the dynamic 
regressions using annual data we estimated. A comparison between them shows them 
to be fairly consistent in terms of estimated sign and significance across several of 
the variables. The choice of lag structures was made using a general to specific 
approach. The maximum number of lags it was felt that could be reasonably be used 
given the time series element of the data and still maintain a sensible number of 
degrees of freedom was nine. Testing between lag structures was made on the null of 
the joint significance of the last lag of the explanatory variables within the 
regression. The exclusion of these lagged values is accepted up until the inclusion of 
27 Greece (10-years), Ireland (11 years), Italy (11 years), Portugal (11 years), and Switzerland (15- 
years) were removed from the data set for the regressions. 
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an 8th lagged term. The Wald value for the null of the joint significance of the 9`h lag 
is 6.90 against a critical value with 9 degrees of freedom of 14.68 at the 10% level of 
significance and 16.92 for the 5% level of significance. A separate test on the joint 
significance of the main fiscal variables (sur, rdis, rndis, eprd, enprd - not reported), 
also rejected the inclusion of the 9th lagged value of the explanatory variables. ' The 
Wald test statistics for the other lags are recorded in the results table. The adjusted R2 
rises significantly between the three different types of regression with annual 
observations. The adjusted RZ rises from 64.1% when 6 lags are used to 72.5% when 
7 lags are used to 73.9% when 8 lags are used, (these compare to 71.2% for the set of 
dynamic regressions using 5-year averages). 
Of the variables contained in the conditioning matrix for the dynamic panels with 
annual observations, the investment ratio is estimated as having a significant effect 
on the long run growth rate of a country in irrespective of alternative lag structures. 
The labour force growth rate is statistically insignificant. Significant long run effects 
from certain combinations of fiscal policy can also be found in Table 7.7 although 
this varies over choice of lag structure. For example, the significance of cprdlydis and 
enprdlrndis variables is lost the longer the lag structure of the regression. It appears 
the results display a greater consistency with the Barro (1990) model the longer the 
estimate of the `long run'. Care is, therefore, required when specifying the regression 
equation so that `short run' and `long run' effects of fiscal policy are not confused. 
Comparing the dynamic regressions using annual data and 8 lagged explanatory 
variables with the dynamic regressions using 5-yearly averaged data shows there to 
be some sensitivity to the differences in the organisation of the data. Where the 
dynamic regression using 8 lagged terms provides evidence in favour of the Barro 
endogenous growth model, the regression using 5-yearly favours the Cashin (1995) 
version of the same model. Several of the parameters are consistently estimated as 
having the same sign and significance but the enprd/eprd variable gains significance 
in the regressions using the annual data, whereas the eprd/rdis and enprd/rndis 
variables lose significance. Evidence of strong positive effects on growth from non- 
28 The Wald statistic for this test was 0.80 
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distortionary tax financed increases in non-productive expenditure in the dynamic 
regression with 5-year period averages is consistent with a model such as Cashin 
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where the expenditures we describe as `non-productive' are better thought of as being 
productive. The fact that the regression with annual observations of the data and 
eight lagged variables finds in favour of the Barro model is interesting because the 
non-dynamic regression we criticise above for being misspecifying the dynamic 
present in the data set found in favour of the same model. 
Table 7.8 below repeats the analysis found in Table 7.2 but using the regression 
results from the restricted sample dynamic regression with 5-yearly averaged data 
and the dynamic regression with annual observations and 8 lags of the explanatory 
variables. It appears from Table 7.8 that there is a consistent set of fiscal variables 
that have large effects on the growth rate. 
Table 7.8: Change in Growth from a 1% Mean Change of Fiscal Policy 
panel Dynamic Dynamic panel Dynamic Dynamic 
average 5-year annual average 5-year annual 
no. of 1 8 no. of 1 8 
lags lags 
growth rate growth rate growth rate growth rate 
increase rndis 2.370 2.324 increase rdis 2.156 2.251 
decrease rdis decrease rndis 
increase enprd 2.273 2.247 increase eprd 2.326 2.351 
decrease eprd decrease enprd 
increase eprd 2.262 2.303 increase rdis 2.251 2.303 
decrease rdis decrease eprd 
increase enprd 2.233 2.249 increase rdis 2.218 2.238 
decrease rdis decrease enprd 
increase eprd 2.374 2.341 increase rndis 2.346 2.325 
decrease rndis decrease eprd 
increase enprd 
1 
2.350 2.290 increase rndis 2.323 2.294 
decrease rndis 
.1 
decrease enprd 
Note: per capita growth rate in the absence of change in policy is 2.3%. 
The magnitude of the growth effects from changes in fiscal policy for the static panel 
regression display a stronger degree of similarity to the results from the dynamic 
regression using annual observations than the two forms of dynamic regression using 
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5-yearly period averages. The dynamic regressions using 5-year average tend to 
estimate larger long run effects from a change in fiscal policy. For example the 
growth effect of a 1% increase in productive expenditure financed by non- 
distortionary taxation increases growth from 2.3% to 2.342% from the static 
regression, to 2.346% from the dynamic regression with 5-year period averages 
(2.374% with the smaller sample) and 2.341% from the dynamic regression with 
annual observations. 
7.7 Conclusions 
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The regression equation we estimate in this chapter embeds the most common form 
of static panel regression found in the literature into a dynamic version of the same 
equation. Using data for 22 developed countries from 1970-94 averaged across 5- 
year periods we find we cannot reject the inclusion of these lagged terms within the 
regression. That is, the standard approach used within the literature is misspecified in 
terms of its dynamic component. By implication the present empirical literature 
provides us with unreliable information when testing between competing theories. 29 
The choice over the econometric methodology and data transformations does not, in 
conclusion, appear to have a significant impact on the ability to distinguish between 
growth models. Nor does it appear to offer an explanation as to the large variation of 
results found from a review of the literature. Under all of the possible alternatives 
which we consider we find evidence that the endogenous growth model is a closer 
representation of the data used in our sample. We do not however, conclude that the 
current methodology is appropriate. 
The choice of methodology does affect our choice between classes of endogenous 
growth model. We observe small variations in the significance of coefficients 
between studies and large variation in the magnitude of their effects on growth. The 
results then become constant with the observations from a number of competing 
endogenous growth models. For example, the strong support we find for the Barro 
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(1990) version of endogenous growth model from the static regression is weakened 
when we move to a dynamic regression. Most notably the static regression fails to 
find the same insignificant coefficient on the productive/non-productive expenditure 
mix as the dynamic regression. It is not possible to determine whether the results 
from the dynamic regression favour the Cashin (1995) variant of the Barro model (in 
which transfers are productive) or the Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992) version (in 
which productive goods become congested over time). When we restrict the sample 
of countries to exclude those with a short time series element the results favour the 
Cashin variant of the Barro model. 
The robustness of these results is tested by considering different period averages, lag 
structures of the dynamic regression, and alternative estimators. The use of 10-year 
averages as opposed to 5-year averages has no effect on the signs of the estimated 
coefficients but does affect the significance (primarily due to a loss of degrees of 
freedom) and the magnitude of the coefficients (being counter-intuitively greater in 
magnitude in the regressions using 10-yearly averaged data). These results may, in 
part, be explained by a possible simultaneity bias induced by too long period 
averaging (Folster & Henrekson (1997)). This leads us to suggest caution over the 
length of period average; that some sensitivity to alternative period averages is 
advisable and that further investigation be made into the ` black-box' of period 
averaging. 
The results from the static panel regression are also sensitive to the base year chosen 
for the period average. The choice of period average assumes that it adequately filters 
out any short run information contained within the data. We show that moving the 
start year forward by one period can dramatically alter the results. Indeed in certain 
cases the variation in the parameter estimates is well outside the normal statistical 
sampling variation. From this we again recommend caution when using period 
averages and that some robustness testing be used. The use of AH instrumental 
variable estimators has little impact on the significance of the long run fiscal 
variables but does impact on the magnitude of the coefficients. In our final test of 
29 In addition, this result also suggests that lagged values should not be used in instrumental variable 
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robustness we find some slight sensitivity to the use of dynamic panel regressions 
with annual data and long lag structures. Using a general to specific approach we find 
the eighth lagged value adds significantly to the explanatory power of the regression 
which again suggests that 5-year period averages are of an inappropriate length. 
The inability to choose between variants of endogenous growth model is explained 
by the inability of 5-year period averages to remove the short run component of the 
data and therefore to consistently capture the long growth effects of fiscal policy. 
This is shown by; the failure to reject the addition of lagged values to the regression 
and; that the results are sensitive to the choice of start year for period averaging and; 
the length of period average. The dissatisfying nature of the results from the 10-year 
period averages indicates that this methodology may prove to be an unattractive 
alternative. Clearly further investigation is required into what information we 
remove, or possibly add, to the data set when we use period averaging. 
Following Kocherlakota & Yi (1996) we therefore conclude in favour of the use of 
annual observations and long lag structures in the specification of the regression 
equation. Limitations on the length of data set currently available inhibit the use of 
time series techniques hence, further investigation, along the lines of Judson & Owen 
(1997), into the properties of dynamic panel regressions using typical macro data sets 
(small N and small to medium T) is warranted. Drawing upon results found in the 
next chapter we find that the results from such regressions may also be reasonably 
robust to the use of alternative estimators such as Anderson-Hsiao. Finally, 
somewhat perversely when we use this kind of estimator the results correspond 
reasonably closely to those from the static panel regression and also favour the Barro 
(1990) model. 
regressions as they are likely to be correlated with growth themselves. 
Chapter 8 
Growth and the Homogeneity of Expenditures 
8.1 Introduction 
As is shown by Levine & Renelt (1992) and the great variety of results reported in 
the published literature, there is little consensus about the empirical impact of fiscal 
variables on economic growth. We showed in Chapters 6 and 7 that some of this lack 
of consensus can be explained by different or incomplete specifications of the 
government budget constraint, or by different ways of aggregating the data over time. 
A further issue is the optimal level of disaggregation of the fiscal variables 
themselves. 
To reiterate, Barro (1990) models expenditures as being either productive or 
unproductive. Increases in productive expenditure, through the increased returns they 
provide to private production, increase the long run rate of growth of the economy 
while; increases in unproductive expenditure in contrast, through the assumption of 
household behaviour, have no effect on the long run growth rate of the economy. 
There is, therefore, a clear distinction within the model between productive and non- 
productive expenditures in their effect on the steady state rate of growth and the 
theory says little about the likely coefficient on the total expenditure term sometimes 
used in previous research. 
Productive goods are assumed in the Barro model to be homogeneous in their effect 
on output. Productive goods can therefore, be included as a single argument within 
private production function of the model. In reality it is unlikely that £1 of 
expenditure on any form of productive good or service has an identical impact on 
growth as all others (and economists do not always agree on the boundary between 
productive and unproductive expenditures). Disaggregating the productive 
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expenditure variable used in the previous two chapters captures the possibility that 
different forms of expenditure and taxation have different magnitude of effect on 
private production, and in so doing improves the reality of the model (Devarajan et 
al. (1996), Stokey & Rebelo (1995)). 
From an empirical perspective, too high a level of aggregation risks widening the 
confidence intervals of coefficients when different elements of an aggregate are in 
fact characterised by different coefficients. ' On the other hand, too much 
disaggregation risks losing the signal in the noise, since smaller units of expenditure 
are likely to have a lower impact on the growth rate, and this implies lower 
significance levels unless the fit is dramatically improved by disaggregation. 
Within this chapter we concentrate on the homogeneity assumption with regard to 
government expenditures. We draw on the theoretical and empirical work of 
Devarajan et al. (1996) to show how changes in the mix of expenditures can affect 
the growth rate. We then use this to test (i) whether the data support the separation 
of expenditures into two types (productive and non-productive) and (ii) whether the 
assumption of homogeneity can account for the non-robust relationship between 
expenditures and growth. Three levels of aggregation of the data are used. In two of 
these we arbitrarily classify the data as either productive or non-productive, while in 
the third we allow the data to suggest the relationship with growth. Data for 17 
developed countries over the period 1970-94 are used. ' 
' Too much aggregation carries with it the additional possibility of introducing parameter 
heterogeneity problems. 
2 It was decided to concentrate on the expenditure rather than the taxation side of the model for two 
reasons. Firstly the underlying results for taxation are less robust than expenditures to changes in the 
underlying assumptions. The results just within the endogenous growth models can vary between no 
predicted relationship to all types of taxation affecting growth. Such sensitivity makes testing between 
models difficult. Secondly the tax measures used in this study could be thought to more accurately 
reflect average rather than marginal rates of tax. This is not an issue in the theoretical model because 
of the assumed nature of taxation but in reality the two are likely to diverge. 
3 The reduction in the number of countries to 17 is required in the grounds of the dynamic panel data 
estimator being used with annual observations (see Section 7.5.4 for details). 
Chapter 8: Growth and the Homogeneity of Expenditures 
8.2 Existing Literature 
8.2.1 Theoretical Literature 
As shown in Chapter 2 the nature of the effect of any particular government 
expenditures on the steady state rate of growth is determined according to their 
inclusion in the production or consumption side of the model. If the level of 
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expenditure is fixed (which we must assume if we wish to ignore taxation from the 
model) then the steady state rate of growth can only be increased by replacing non- 
productive expenditures with productive forms (that is changes in the mix of 
expenditures). 
The Barro (1990) model assumes that all productive public goods are homogeneous 
in their effect on the returns to investment and can therefore be represented as the 
same single term with the private production function. Devarajan et al. (1996) 
remove the homogenous public good assumption to allow different forms of 
expenditure to have a different effect on private production. Again, as shown in 
Section 2.4, assuming a fixed level of government, the growth affect of an increase in 
one form of expenditure depends upon its relative productivity and the relative size 
of current expenditures compared with the good or service it replaces. 
Changes in other characteristics, such as stocks and flows of public goods (Glomm & 
Ravikumar (1994) or the speed of congestion (Fisher & Turnovsky (1998)) may also 
lead to differences in the magnitude of the coefficient and be used against 
aggregating the data. Cashin (1995) allows the non-productive expenditures of the 
Barro model to have positive effects on growth by including these as additional 
arguments within the firm's production function. These raise the marginal product of 
capital and hence growth. These expenditures are not expected to have the same 
effect on growth as other productive expenditures. This change in the assumptions of 
the model therefore requires formal testing. 
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8.2.2 Empirical Literature 
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Attempting to distinguish whether the level of aggregation of fiscal variables has an 
impact on the findings from previous works is difficult given the effect on the 
parameter estimates of the other sources of instability (such as those identified within 
the previous two chapters). We therefore chose not to provide a detailed review of 
the previous empirical literature but do note several points in the literature where 
there does appear to be an obvious relationship between the level of aggregation and 
the role of fiscal policy. From this review we are able to conclude that, if anything by 
disaggregating the data we can improve the explanatory power of fiscal variables. 
Devarajan, Swaroop & Zou (1996) study the relationship between the rate of growth 
and the composition of government expenditures for 21 developed countries. Using 
data for 1970-90 from the GFSY organised as 5-year moving averages, the rate of 
growth is regressed against four aggregate expenditure categories as a ratio of total 
expenditures, (health, education, defence and transport & communication), and then 
regressed again using disaggregated forms of education and health expenditures. 
When the four aggregate forms of expenditure are included within the same 
regression only transport & communication expenditure has a significant coefficient. 
When health and education expenditures are included in disaggregated form several 
types of expenditures (other education, hospital, other health, primary and secondary 
schooling and universities) are found to have a negative relationship with growth. 
The finding of a positive significant coefficient on the transport & communication 
expenditure term in the Devarajan et al. study matches those found by Barro (1991) 
and Easterly & Rebelo (1993). In contrast, when total public investment (of which 
transport & communication expenditure is a part) is used as the explanatory variable 
the significant relationship disappears. Barth & Bradley (1987), Barro (1989,1991) 
and Easterly & Rebelo (1993) all find insignificant coefficients on total public 
investment variables. 
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8.3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
8.3.1 Data 
We use this section to briefly consider the way in which we have aggregated the 
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available data. Three levels of aggregation are used within this study. The first, and 
most aggregated form, uses the theory as its inspiration; the second uses an expanded 
theoretical data set that, amongst other things, distinguishing between stock and flow 
categories (Glomm & Ravikumar (1994); while the third classifies the data by 
function. This process is described below. 
We follow the practice adopted within the previous chapters and, as in Barro (1990), 
label expenditures as either productive or non-productive 4. Table 8.1 below is 
adapted from the previous chapter in order to summarise how the functional 
classifications of expenditures available in the GFSY have been aggregated and to 
serve as a reminder. 
° In preference to the way we have categorised expenditures as productive or non-productive we 
would have preferred data on capital and current consumption for each country and each form of 
expenditure. However, this data is not available in a disaggregated form for all countries in the GFSY. 
We accept that the functional classifications contain information on both current and capital 
consumption within them but given that have been used before in other studies (Devarajan et al. 
(1996)) it felt that they could still provide some interesting results. 
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Table 8.1: Theoretical/ Functional Classification. 
Classification Functional Classification 
deficit (sur) 
productive expenditures (eprd) 
non-productive expenditures (enprd) 
us/dclicit 
general puhlic services expenditure 
defence expenditure 
educational expenditure 
health expenditure 
housing expenditure 
)rt and communication 1'xpCncliturcc 
social security and welfare expenditure 
expenditure on recreation 
expenditure on economic scrviccs 
other expenditure (eot/i) other expenditure 
The classification of expenditures in the manner described above is open to debate. 
In order to address this we disaggregate the data in order to focus On some 
expenditure forms that are either commonly used in previous studies; that produce 
sonic of the consistently strong results; or that Constitute such large proportions of 
total expenditures as to swamp the other results. This level of aggregation we call the 
re-classified data set and is illustrated in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2: Rc-classifird 1), uta 
New Fiscal Variable Old Fiscal variable 
surplus/deficit (sur) surplus/deficit 
productive flows (epD general puhlic services expenditure 
defence expenditure 
productive stocks (eps) educational expenditure 
housing expenditure 
transport and communication expenditure 
health expenditure (ehlth) health expenditure 
social security and welfare expenditure social security and welfare expenditure 
(ess) 
other expenditure (eoth) expenditure on recreation 
expenditure on economic services 
other expenditure 
There is no longer a non-productive expenditure category as expenditure on social 
security and welfare have been separated Out (social security expenditure is by I'M the 
largest component of both the budget of the average country, and the non-productive 
expenditure category defined above). The remainder of the etilw(l expenditure 
category, (recreation and economic services), have horn included within 'uthcr 
expenditures' and are ignored in the subsequent discussion. The other difference 
from the previous aggregation is the separation out of those cxpencliturts Nvhich are 
perceived to he productive as a flow of goods and services, such as defence, and 
those arguably productive as a stock of goods, such its transport & communication 
expenditure. The expenditure categories descrihed as the stock of pprodiuctive toooodds 
actually represent flows into the stock of public goods. It was felt that the forces of 
congestion and depreciation that act on the stock expenditure may lead the 
coefficients on these two variables to differ and hence were separated. 
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8.3.2 Empirical Methodology 
In this study we wish to concentrate on what Devarajan, Swaroop & Zou (1996) 
describe as the composition effect of government expenditures rather than the level 
effect. The development of the government budget constraint methodology in 
Chapter 6 provides with the means of separating these two effects (we refer the 
reader to Section 6.2.2 for a review). To this we combine the use of dynamic panel 
regressions with annual observation and long' lag structures preferred in Chapter 7. s 
Alternative estimators of the long run are considered in the sensitivity tests of section 
8.5.1. 
8.4 Empirical Results 
Theoretically Restricted Fiscal Data 
It is evident from tables 8.3 to 8.5 that the way in which we classify the expenditure 
data has important implications for the way in which we interpret their impact on 
growth. We also note the explanatory power of the regression falls as we 
disaggregate the data. The adjusted R2 falls from 73.9% when we classify the data 
according to the theory, to 68.1% when we disaggregate out certain elements of the 
theoretical classifications, and down to 63.5% when we classify the data by function. 
The relative number of significant coefficients in the fiscal matrix of results also falls 
as we disaggregate the data. This fall in the explanatory power and the relative 
number of significant coefficients may be because the estimated coefficients provide 
SA degrees of freedom problem meant that the regressions which used the data as classified in the 
GFSY (i. e. the most disaggregated form of the data) were estimated using an alternative procedure. 
This approach aggregates upwards from the theoretically restricted data set to leave only one revenue 
category, one expenditure category and the surplus variable. Two revenue or expenditure categories 
are then disaggregated out from this and there co-relationship tested. For example expenditure on 
health and education were disaggregated out of the one aggregate expenditure category and then in 
turn left out of the regression as before in order to estimate the growth effects of a change in this 
portion of the expenditure mix. The fiscal matrix is then reduced to one set of coefficients, that of a 
pair of coefficients relating to the growth effects of the mix between health and education 
expenditure. This allows us to estimate the regressions without the degrees of freedom problem. The 
fiscal matrix appears identical in form however as we combine these pairs of coefficients into a single 
matrix. Under the old method the expenditure mix would have been made up from seven regressions 
it is now made up from twenty-one regressions. 
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us with information as to the net effect of a change in one form of expendilwe an, vo 
because the fiscal variables account for much smaller hcrccntages so that tlic. 
signal is lost in the noise of the data set. 
Table S. 3: Results Using "Theoretical Data Set 
ept'd 0.348' 
enprd 1 -0.348' 
(5.49) 
ad, j It` 0,739 
Notes: I) t-statistics in parenthesis. 
2) * denotes significance at the 511: level, at the IO`, level. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
Of the variables in the conditioning matrix of the regression there is somC sensitivity 
to the way in which we classify the data. The investment variahlr has a significant 
positive effect on the long run rate of growth in the first set of regressions and second 
set of regressions but is outside of the critical value when the fiscal variahles , 11-L- in 
their most disaggregated form. The rate of growth of the lahour force has an 
insignificant effect on the rate of growth in the first and third classifications it the 
data but a significant negative effect (at the 10", ( level of significnce) in the se'c'ond 
classification of the data. 
In the Barro (1990) and Devarajan et aI. (1996) models productive government 
expenditures are included within private production functions and help to increase 
output of the economy. Non-productive expenditures, oil the other hand, have no 
effect on output. An increase in productive expenditure funded hv a corresponding 
decrease in non-productive expenditure leads to an increase of the rate of growth of' 
output. Our classification of the data as either productive or non-productive appLears 
to be consistent with the theory. Increasing non-productive forms of expenditure 
(expenditures on social security, recreation and economic services) as a ratio to (d)I' 
by 1% and compensating through a decrease in productive expenditures 
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(expenditures on general public services, defence, education, health, housing and 
transport and communication) and leaving constant the overall level of expenditures 
reduces the growth rate by some 0.348 of a percentage point. 
Differences in the organisation of the data as well as interpretation of the coefficients 
between this and previous works (the coefficients in previous studies contain 
composition and level effects together) makes comparisons difficult. Government 
consumption expenditure as a ratio to GDP has often been used as a proxy for the 
`non-productive' expenditure category of the Barro model (for example Kormendi & 
Meguire (1985), Landau (1985) and Barro (1991)); and public investment 
expenditure used as a proxy for the ` productive' expenditure category (for example 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) and Barro (1991)). Those studies that have used 
government consumption expenditure find similar evidence to that found here. 
Government consumption expenditure often enters growth regressions with a 
significant negative coefficient (Landau (1983,1986), Grier & Tullock (1989), 
Alexander (1990) and Barro (1991)). The evidence from this study is that the 
negative coefficient on government consumption expenditure is at least in part 
attributable to the reductions in `productive' expenditures implicitly used to finance 
these increases. 
Public capital expenditures generally enter growth regressions with insignificant 
coefficient (Barth & Bradley (1987), Barro (1989,1991) and Easterly & Rebeln 
(1993)). As explained above the government budget constraint allows us to separate 
out the effect on the rate of growth of an increase of productive goods and services 
funded by a decrease of non-productive expenditures (the composition effect) from 
the effect of tax or surplus financed increases in productive expenditure (the level 
effect). Once this is done there is evidence of a significant affect on growth. Our 
interpretation of the coefficients in previous studies is that they fail to find significant 
coefficients because they conflate composition and level effects. 
The estimation of an insignificant relationship of public capital expenditure and 
growth is not consistent across studies, and indeed in certain cases come close to the 
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estimates from the production function approach of Aschauer (1989). For example 
Fuente (1997) estimates that raising capital expenditure as a ratio to GDP by 1% adds 
0.7 of a percentage point to growth. The Devarajan et al. study (1996) comes the 
closest to the methodology used in this paper through their attempt to control for 
level and composition effects of expenditures. When they include total expenditures 
as a ratio to GDP (in order to separate out level effects) with either current 
expenditures or capital expenditures they find similar results to those here. The effect 
of a 1% increase in the ratio of current expenditures to total expenditures reduces 
growth by 0.074 of a percentage point; while a 1% increase in the ratio of capital 
expenditures out of total expenditure raises growth by 0.072 of a percentage point. If 
one allows for the fact that the ratio of total expenditures to GDP is on average a little 
over a third then the results become reasonably close to the estimates from this study. 
As we move to a disaggregated form of the data the strong evidence in favour of the 
general structure of the Barro model remains. But there is evidence that different 
forms of productive expenditure have very different relationships with the social 
security and welfare expenditure category, (ess expenditure is the largest component 
of the non-productive expenditure category defined above). The estimated 
coefficients on expenditures on productive stocks and flows have significant negative 
coefficients, as expected. Indeed reducing the percentage of ess expenditure out of 
GDP by 1% to fund an increase in epf (eps) raises growth by a rather large 0.565 
(0.587) of a percentage point. 
Somewhat out of line with our expectations the coefficient estimated from increasing 
social security expenditure by decreasing health is positive and insignificant (with a 
point estimate of 0.151). Assuming the consumption side of the model is correct then 
this result suggests that there is an over provision of health care by the government 
(though the estimated effect on growth from switching resources between health and 
social security is statistically insignificant). Disaggregating the data still further 
allows us to pursue whether this relationship for health expenditure still holds or 
whether it is a feature of the aggregation process. We therefore delay any 
interpretation of this estimated long run coefficient until then. 
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Table 8.4: Results t sing, Rc-Classified Data 
e1)f eps ehlth ess 
ept 0 02 0.716* 0.565* 
(0.13) (4.10) (3.57) 
eps 0.02 0.737* 0.587* 
(0.13) (3.14) (2.81) 
ehith -0.716* -0.737* 0151 
(4.10) (3.14) (1.26) 
ess 
-0.565* -0.587* 0151 
(3.57) (2.81) (1.26) 
ad j K' 0.681 
Notes: I) t ýl lI tlcti in pawnthcsi". 
2) * denotes significance at the level, '"* at the IU'r Ikýel. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
Functional Classification of Fiscal Data 
Disaggregating the productive and non-productive expenditure data toi the level of' 
functional classification leads to further interesting results. Increases in expenditures 
on social-security when funded by compensatory decreases in general public services 
(egps), defence (edel), housing (eh0), and transport , connmLill ication all have 
a negative effect on the long run rate of growth as we would expert hut, only in the 
case of eggs is this effect significant. This might indicate that the signal is Icing lost 
in the noise of the data set as these expenditures now account for around I 
. 
(1 to 3.0"i 
of GDP. 
The average value for housing across the sample is 0.7'ý of GDP. 
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Table 8.5: Results Using Data Classified by Function 
egps odef oduc ehith ess eho etcm 
ßgps 
-0.820* 0.893' 0.203 0.228" 0 308 
-0.451 
(2.16) (2.38) (1.16) (1.66) (0.88) (1.96) 
edel 
0.820' 1.007* 0.863* 0.178 0.766" 
-0.244 
(2.16) (2.01) (2.03) (0.58) (1.89) (042) 
oduc 
-0.893* -1.007' 0.261 -0.627" -0.733" -1.334' 
(2.38) (2.01) (0 G): ý) (1.88) (1.66) (3.88) 
ehith 
-0.203 -0.863' 0 »''') 0 163 0.227 
-0.647 
(1.16) (2.03) (0.6: (1 29) (0.83) (2.31) 
ess 
-0.228' -0.176 
0.627 0.163 ) 006 
-0.191 
(1.66) (0.58) (1.88) (1.29) (1 04) 
eho 
-0.308 -0.766" 0.753" -0.227 -0.986' 
(0.88) (1.89) (1.66) (0.83) (3.06) 
etcm 
* * * 0.451 0.244 1.334 0.647 0,191 0.986* 
(1.96) (0.42) (3.88) (2.31) (1.04) (3.06) 
aclj N2 
0.635 
Notes: I) t-statistics in parcmnctiiý. 
denotes significance at the 51; r level, ** at the 1(Y7( level. 
3) coefficients arc long run estimates 
Productive/Noir-jproductive Expenditure Mix 
Certain forms of expenditure traditionally perceived to he 'growth enhancing' arc, in 
Table 8.5, estimated here to have the opposite relationship with social security 
expenditure and growth to that expected. Increases in expenditures on ecluratiun 
(health) funded by decreases in social security expenditures decreases the growth rate 
by 0.627 (0.163) of a percentage point. The divergence between theory sind empirics 
may exist for a number of reasons. Firstly, the marginal benefit of an increase in 
health or education expenditure may he negative. The political sensitivity A 
education and health expenditure may lead to their over-supply hy governnicnts. "I'his 
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could, quite reasonably, cause the marginal benefit to the rate of growth to become 
negative (although this possibility is not currently allowed within the model). Or it 
could be because expenditures are inappropriately used. As Pritchett (1995) writes 
"perhaps schooling has created cognitive skills but the typical institutional 
environment was sufficiently bad that these skills were devoted to privately 
remunerative but socially wasteful, or even counter-productive, activities. "' That is, 
the payoff from education is conditional on the type of skills gained not on the level 
of skills gained. Or equally it could be that the time lag between expenditure on 
education and the addition of this human capital to the labour force is not captured by 
the lag structure of the current model. Secondly, the positive effects in favour of ess 
may be because social security and welfare expenditure are genuinely growth 
enhancing. Cashin (1995) perceives transfer payments to be productive through the 
effect of inter and intra-generation transfers on property rights and hence the returns 
from investment. 
A final explanation is that the functional classifications of expenditure in the GFSY 
contain consumption expenditure as well as capital expenditures (this may also be 
true for education and health expenditure). The positive coefficients of social security 
expenditure against health and education expenditures may, therefore, be a product of 
the failure to distinguish ` non-productive' expenditure adequately with this data set. 
Productive Expenditure Mix 
According to the Devarajan et al. (1996) model the growth effects of changes to the 
mix of productive expenditure depends upon the relative marginal productivity, and 
the relative size, of the expenditures. If not at the optimum level then gains can be 
made from switching resources between types of expenditure. Disaggregating the 
data from the single productive expenditure variable used up until now allows us to 
make a direct comparison of the growth effects of different forms of productive 
expenditure and to tell which components of expenditure in fact conform to the 
theoretical definitions of productive and non-productive expenditure. 
' Pritchett (1995) pp. 42 
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As the `productive expenditure' category in the theoretical classifications of the data 
is disaggregated evidence of significant imbalance in the allocation of expenditures 
becomes apparent. By decreasing expenditures on health and replacing them with 
either productive stocks or flows we can increase the rate of growth of the economy 
by significant amounts (the point estimate of both of these categories of expenditure 
is over 0.7). It does not necessarily follow from these results that the categorisation 
of health expenditure as `productive' is mistaken but, by so doing we raise the 
confidence intervals on the eprd variable unnecessarily. Including health expenditure 
within the `productive' expenditure category forces health expenditure to have the 
same relationship with growth as other forms of productive expenditure (such as 
productive stocks and flows); when tested this assumption it was found not to hold. 
Imbalance within the productive expenditure mix of the average country remains a 
feature of the data when the functional classifications of the data are used. The 
significant imbalance between stocks and flows in the above classification of the data 
appears to be driven by the imbalance between health and defence expenditures (part 
of the epf expenditure category) and transport and communication expenditures (part 
of the eps expenditure category). In both cases by re-allocating expenditures away 
from health raises the long run growth rate of the average country (by 0.863 of a 
percentage point in the case of edef and 0.647 in the case of ctcm). Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) in a pooled regression using 10-year averages estimate an insignificant effect 
on growth from increases in health expenditure but their estimate on etcm is 
significant and around 0.6 of a percentage point. Devarajan et al. (1996) find the 
relationship between health and growth to be non-robust (the coefficients vary 
between 0.019 and 0.048) but when they disaggregate out certain components of 
health expenditure they find evidence of strong positive effects from changes to 
certain types of health expenditure (expenditure on hospitals (0.056) and other health 
(0.11)). In this study we find that increases in health expenditure only increase the 
rate of growth if financed by reductions in education or housing expenditure (though 
in neither case is this effect significant). 
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The aggregation of the data as productive stocks and flows masks the available gains 
to the rate of growth from re-allocating government resources between certain 
components of expenditures. In addition to the results discussed above there appears 
to be significant under-funding (with respect to growth effects) of. defence 
expenditure (part of the epf expenditure category) in favour of expenditures egps, 
educ and eho; and of transport and communication (part of the eps expenditure 
category), in favour of expenditures on egps, educ and eho. Indeed by re-allocating 
1% of GDP towards etcm and away from eho there is an increase of almost a one- 
percentage point (0.986) in the long term growth rate. The positive growth effects of 
increases in transport and communication expenditure are supported by the results 
from Devarajan et al. (1996) as well as those by Barro (1991) and Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993). The significant benefit to the long run rate of growth from increases to 
transport and communication expenditure are possibly due to the productivity gains 
that can be achieved through a reduction in congestion in the stock of public goods, 
such as roads. This result is also interesting given the debate in the literature as to the 
relationship between public infrastructure and output. ' For example, Sturm et al. 
(1995) using a VAR approach on infrastructure, output and machinery investment 
find evidence that infrastructure Granger causes output (investment has direct effects 
on output) but does not Granger cause machinery investment (there are no indirect 
effects of infrastructure on output). ' 
The strong negative effects found from the housing expenditure term are perhaps 
surprising given that these expenditures account for only some 0.7% of GDP (2% of 
the total budget) and in light of the very strong positive effects estimated for the 
same variable by Easterly & Rebelo (1993). They find that increasing expenditures 
on housing as a ratio to GDP by 1% will raise the growth rate somewhere between 
0.88 and 1.49 percentage points. One possible explanation for this difference might 
be explained by the inclusion of LDCs amongst the sample of countries by Easterly 
& Rebelo. 
8 See Sturm et al. (1996) for an excellent summary of the literature. 
In their review of the literature Sturm et al. (1996) note that the Sturm et al. (1995) study is based on 
the most advanced econometric methodology but uses 19`h century data, therefore making policy 
recommendations valueless. 
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The growth benefits of defence expenditure may be thought of as being an indirect 
aid to private production by maintaining property rights which lowers the risk 
premium and raises the returns to private investment (Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995)). 
Such an effect is, however, likely to be small in the sample of developed countries 
used here and possible alternative explanations are the level of R&D investment by 
the military and the export of defence equipment abroad. The coefficients estimated 
for defence expenditure here do not support those from Devarajan et al. (1996) who 
find evidence of a insignificant negative relationship with the rate of growth. 
Finally we also evidence from this data set of over-funding of expenditures on 
education (part of the eps expenditure category) at the cost of expenditures on 
general public services (egps) and housing (eho). The appropriate interpretation of 
these results is not necessarily that education expenditure is non-productive but 
instead that the net marginal benefit is less than that for other forms of expenditure. 
This could be because the net benefits of education to the economy are only felt with 
a considerable lag. Or that the slowest growing countries in the sample spend 
relatively more on education (possibly in the hope of improving growth rates). 
Alternatively the slower growing countries of the sample may be directing education 
expenditures at the wrong areas. Devarajan et al. (1996) disaggregate education 
expenditure and find evidence that certain types of education expenditure 
(expenditures on schools and universities) retard the rate of growth, although total 
education expenditure has an insignificant positive effect. 
8. S Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section we test whether the above results are statistical anomalies or whether 
they are robust to alternative specifications of the regression equation. The first test 
considers the bias of the estimated coefficients introduced through the inclusion of 
lagged dependent variables to the regression equation. Anderson-Hsiao instrumental 
variable estimators (as recommended by Judson & Owen (1997)) are used to replace 
the lagged dependent variables in the regression equation. The second test considers 
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the averaging of the data across 5-year time periods in order to test whether the 
results are sensitive to alternative methods employed in the literature to remove the 
business cycle from the data. 
8.5.1 Alternative Estimators 
The parameter estimates from dynamic panel data regressions are, by their 
construction, biased because of the correlation of the lagged dependent variable, 
with the error term. As explained in Chapter 7 Judson & Owen (1997) run Monte 
Carlo experiments to estimate the bias in typical macroeconomic data sets (small N 
and small to large T) for 6 types of estimator OLS, LSDV, corrected LSDV 
(LSDVc), Anderson-Hsiao (AH), and two forms of generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimators. Judson & Owen conclude that the bias cannot be used to 
distinguish between estimators for all except OLS. The bias on the AH and LSDVc 
estimators is smaller than the LSDV and GMM estimators but at the cost over the 
LSDV estimator of a lower efficiency of the parameter estimates. The LSDVc 
estimator requires a balanced panel and is computationally complex, therefore, it was 
decided to test the robustness of the results found above using the AH estimator. 
The AH estimator uses the lagged level to instrument for the lagged difference term. 
Lagged growth is therefore replaced by lagged GDP1° in equation (7.4) of Chapter 
7.11 The results are displayed in tables 8.6 
- 
8.8 below. 
'o Arellano & Bond (1991) and Kiviet (1995) confirm the superiority of using the lagged level as an 
instrument over the lagged difference in simulation results. 
"The regression includes country dummies as instruments and as regressors but time dummies only 
as instruments. 
Chapter 8: Growth and the IIoniogencity of Erpendittn-c"; 
Table 8.6 Results Using Theoretical Classified Data and Al I Estimators 
eprd 1 en 
epr(] 0.305* 
. 
95) 
enprd 1 -0.305* 
. I(J, i R2 0.538 
NoIcs: I) I- tah I in harrnlhras. 
2) * denotes significance at the 51%r level, ++ al the Ilevel. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
Table 8.7: Results Using Rc-classified Data and All I'stimutors 
epf eps ehith ess 
epf 0.045 0.796' 0.623' 
(017) (2.13) (2.03) 
eps -0.045 0.751 0.578* 
(0.17) (1 
. 
56) (2,81) 
ehlth -0.796' -0.751 0.174 
(2.13) (1.56) (0.08) 
ess -0.623* -0.578' 0 17 44 
(2.03) (2.81) (0.88) 
ad j K` 0.554 
Notcs: I) l ýlaII iL in parrIII hi. I. S. 
2) " dcnc lrti significance al the 5';, ' level, *' al Ihr IU':; level. 
3) coefficients arc long run estimates 
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Table 8.8: ResuIIs l! sin,, Data (lass Ificd hy Funrtio 11 ;mil All I "lin1; 1It rti 
egps edef educ ehith ess eho etcm 
egps 
-0.1074 0.851 0.058 0.138 0207 
-0 573 
(0 77) (0.44) (0.10) (0.57) (0.22) (1.24) 
edof 
1.011 0.844 0.753 0.333 0.904 0.721 
(0.77) (0 96) (1.01) (0.93) (142) (1 03) 
educ 
-0.851 -0.844 0.272 -0.380 -0.634 
-1.130* 
(0.44) (0.96) (0-39) (0.89) (0.68) (2.33) 
ehlth 
0.058 
-0.753 0.272 0127 0.393 0.340 
(0.10) (1.01) (0.39) (0 60) (0.528) 
ess 
-0.138 -0.333 0.380 0.1.. 0113 
-0.164 
(0.57) (0.93) (0.89) (0.8x) 68) 
eho 
-0.207 -0.904 0.634 -0.393 01 13 
-2.212- 
(0.22) (1.42) (0.68) (0.60) (0 
', 
'Al (1.85) 
etcm 
0.573 0.721 1.130* 0.340 0.164 2.212" 
(1.24) (1.03) (2.33) (0.528) (068) (1.85) 
ad, j R2 
0.601 
Notes: I) (-, tansur. in ))arcninesis. 
2) tlrnuics tiignificance al Ihr 5`7 level. " al the I11'; Icel. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
The striking feature of the results in tables 8.6 
- 
8.8 is the similarity of the magnitude 
of the parameter estimates to those displayed in tables 8.3 
- 
8.5 ahove. The 
significance of the parameter estimates is lost when we use At I-I V estimators which 
we feel to he a reflection of the expected loss of efficiency from using instrunientirl 
variables given the consistency of the parameter cstinnttcs. Thera re, large hias on 
the fiscal parameters through the introduction of lagged dependent variahles toi the 
regression equation does not appear to he a feature of the data. Some degree of 
caution appears to he necessary when we disaggregate the data in order toi classify the 
data by function. There is both a greater difference in the long run parameter 
estimates of the LSDV and AH-IV estimators and it large rcductiRýn in the nunhhcr OI 
significant variables. This perhaps reflects the 'noise' versus 'signal pr11hIcn't 
highlighted at the beginning of this chapter. 
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8.5.2 5-Year Averages 
A common methodology used in the estimation of dynamic panel (1,11.1 111k)(IL'Is to 
remove the business cycle effect from the data is to take period averages. 'I'lR length 
of the average and the period over which the average is taken is usually chosen oon a 
somewhat arbitrary basis and appears to done more for convenience rather than in 
any attempt to remove the business cycle from the data. Following this practice' 
take period averages over five-years of data with the start date for the first time 
period in 1970. In doing this we take the precedent set in nunicrous other studies 
such as (Mendoza et al. (1996)). A dynamic panel data regression of a similar f'oorm toi 
equation (8.1) above is estimated but where the dynamic component oaf the model is 
captured through the introduction of one lagged (5-year) term. Initial (UOP is 
included as an additional variable to the matrix of conditioning vari, rhles for the 
regressions with period averages to capture the possibility of convergence across the 
time periods. The results are displayed in tables 8.9 
- 
8.11 below. 
'fahle 8.9: Rcsults sing the 'I'hro, rrtical Data Set and 5-year Averages 
eprd 
eprd 0 17ý) 
enprd o., 75 
(1.31) 
adj J 0,524 
Notts: I) t-st, ilistics in parc"nthcsi,,. 
2) * den )le, significance at the 5 level, ** at the I(V level. 
3) cocflicients are long run estimates 
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Table 8.10: Empirical Results Using Rr-cl ts, iFftil Data and 5-year Averages 
epf eps 
I 
ehlth 
I 
ess 
ýýf' 
(0999 0.109 
I 
0401 
eps 0.929 0.821 1.205 
(O. ýi9) (046) (0.88) 
eh lth 0.109 -0.821 0.384 
(0.10) (0.46) (0.56) 
ess 
1 
-0.275 1 -1.205 1 -0.384 
ad, j R2 0.554 
oIes: I) t-. tat tic' in parenthesis. 
2) * denotes significance at the 5`% level, ** at the I11'; i level. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
The results are clearly sensitive to period averaging of the data to remove the 
business cycle effect. In both of the first two levels of aggregation the significance of 
all of the expenditure variables is lost, and it is only when we classify the data by 
function that there is any evidence of significant effects of i'isc, ºI policy on t1w long 
run rate of growth. There are no changes to the signs of the coefficients but there arc 
changes to the magnitude of the estimated coefficients (this Feature of the use of 5- 
year period averages was noted in the previous chapter). These results are "clearly 
unsatisfactory and the analysis of section 8.4 would appear to fail this test I'Or 
robustness, but, given our reservations as to the ad hoc nature of the averaging 
process, it is worth exploring further the sensitivity of the results to alternative period 
averages. The period averages calculated so far have taken the beginning ()t* tile (1,1tj 
set as the year from which the first period average is made (i. e. 1970,1975,198(1, 
1985 and 1990). We test whether moving the start of the period forward two years 
alters the results'2 (the start year for each 5-year period average becoming 1972, 
1977,1982,1987 and 1992 producing 70 observations). The regression equation was 
' It was chosen to move the start of the period average forward two years purely as a 'statistit%il' 
exercise and no statistical or economic rationale influenced its choice. 
Chapter 8: Growth and the Homogeneity of Expenditures 
then estimated using the data as classified by the theory". The co cificicnt on thy, 
enprd/cprd variable was negative as before but is now sig; nIFirarntI\. cliffýrcrIt from 
zero's (as predicted by the theory). " The results using period averages are sensitive to 
the choice of start year of the period averages and are therefore unsatisf'actcýrv as it 
test of long run growth theories. This result requires further invcstigation hut a 
constraint on data prevents further analysis of that sort here. "' 
Table S. 11: Rcsult" lkirig Dull ('I, i ificýl by 1-unction and . 
-ycar Av crag s 
egps edef edue ehith ess chi) etcni 
eggs 
-0.450* 0.261 -1.605" 0.279 1058 
-3.533.. 
(2.81) (0.13) (1.66) (0.42) (0.80) (1.905) 
eduf 
5.450* 3.460* 0.743 1.270 3.047* 2,648 
(2.81) (2.16) (0.51) (0.71) (1.96) (091) 
educ 
-0.261 -3.460 0 111 0.865 0 470 -1 547 
(0.13) (2.16) (0.74) (0.31) (0.99) 
ehith 
1.605- -0.743 0.441 0 524 0.885 0.985 
(1.66) (0.51) (0.30) (u t+ui (114) (0.68) 
ess 
0.279 
-1.270 -0.865 t t0 143 
(0.42) (0.71) (0.74) I0 Ofl' (0 15) 
ello 
-1.058 -3.047* -0.470 -0.885 1 369 
(0.80) (1.96) (0.31) (1.14) (0. i ; :. 
etcm 
3.533- -2.648 1.547 0.985 -0.143 
(1.905) (0.91) (0.99) (0.68) (0 15) 1 11 
adj R2 0.601 
Notes: II I-11aII1IIC1 111 tlJll"11111 11.1" 
2) ^ rlcnl, tcs significance at the S!, ' Irvrl ** at the 1(), (, ICVC1. 
3) coefficients arc long run estimates 
"The regression was run with country but not period dummicti. The estim; rted regression ýýas run 
with only one degree of freedom remaining. 
The long run parameter estimate was -0.454, and the t-test statistic that the , um 
f the short run 
parameters is zero was 4.68 
A lack of degrees of freedom prevented testing the sensitivity at ether levels of aggrc, mtImi ()I tile 
data 
"' We find similar results when we use 197 1 and 1973 as the base year in the d narnie rý f rrýsiýýný. 
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8.6 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the effect of aggregation on the stahilitý(11 
the relationship between fiscal policy and growth. In so doing it is Ihopccdi that this 
might also reveal information as to the support for the assumption of h()nlloocneeitvv 
'fly 
across government expenditures as modelled by Barro (1990) that exists in the data. 
In order to provide this test we draw upon the work by Devarajan, Swaroop & l, ()u 
(1996) which removes the homogeneity assumption and the work contained within 
the previous two chapters. Against the desire to improve the realism of the models 
must be tempered two empirical problems that are faced when aggregating or 
disaggregating data. Too high a level of aggregation risks widening the confidence 
intervals of coefficients when different elements of an aggregate are in fact 
characterised by different coefficients. In contrast too much disaggregation carries 
the opposite risk of losing the signal in the noise. 
Empirical tests are undertaken on a sample of 17 developed countries for the link 
period 1970-94. Government expenditures arc categorised in three ways. 'I'Ii e range 
from organising the data according to the theory down to data classified by function 
(as available at source). Estimation is by dynamic panel regressions with annual 
observation and long lag structures. Some tests of robustness to alternative estimators 
is made. 
In general we find there are gains to he made from disaggregating the expenditure 
categories both in terms of the insights into the underlying structure of the model and 
the composition of expenditures within the average country. From this we suggest 
inappropriate aggregation may help to explain the large variation in the results f'roni 
previous research. 
Using a very aggregated form of the fiscal variables it appears tlic data are \1, 'jj 
represented by a model that separates non-productive expenditures into the 
consumption side of the model and productive expenditures within the production 
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side of the model. As we disaggregate the data we find that the positive growth 
effects from increases in non-productive expenditures funded by a decrease in 
productive expenditures in general still holds. When the data is classified by function 
the strength of this relationship is at its weakest. Indeed, we find for some 
expenditure we a 
-priori perceived as productive, such as education and health, are 
not consistent with observation in this data set. The unusual behaviour of the 
education and health expenditure categories in the results is interesting. The negative 
coefficient against social security and welfare expenditure suggests the possibility 
that the marginal benefit of these two forms of expenditure (health and education) is 
negative, although this possibility is not currently allowed within the model. We 
cannot however, rule out the possibility that this result is explained by the growth 
enhancing effects of social security payments (as modelled by Cashin (1995)) or that 
the data contains `consumption' and `capital' expenditures together in the same 
functional classification. 
We also find support for the Devarajan et al. (1996) model over the simpler Barro 
(1990) model. This conjecture is made on the basis of the significant growth effects 
we estimate from changes in the mix of productive expenditures present in the more 
disaggregated forms of the data. Further to this we estimate that there are some forms 
of expenditure which might traditionally be thought of as productive which do not 
display the expected relationship with growth when we analyse the data. When the 
theoretical data set is disaggregated we discover that there is a difference between 
health care and the other forms of productive expenditure. When we classify the data 
by function we find evidence of an over-provision of education and health 
expenditure against all other forms of expenditure. Given the politically sensitive 
nature of these two expenditure categories this result is perhaps unsurprising. Like 
many previous studies we estimate that re-allocating expenditures towards transport 
and communication expenditures and defence expenditure can increase the rate of 
growth within the average country. 
The sensitivity of the above results is tested by using Anderson-Hsiao Instrumental 
Variable estimators to correct for the bias introduced by the inclusion of lagged 
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dependent terms within the regression equation. We find that in general the 
parameter estimates are insensitive to the use of AH-IV estimators. Where non- 
robustness occurs it appears that this can be explained by the increase in the standard 
errors through the reduced efficiency of the estimator. The loss of efficiency does not 
appear to create a significant problem within the aggregated forms of the data set but 
as we disaggregate the data the loss of efficiency does impact upon the results. 
The second test for robustness we attempt is to use 5-year averages of the data in 
order to remove the business cycle effect. The results from this test are non-robust to 
this change. These results require further analysis, but a problem with the available 
degrees of freedom limits research using this data set. 
Chapter 9 
Fiscal Policy, Investment and Growth 
9.1: Introduction 
According to models of economic growth, such as Barro (1990), fiscal policy 
determines investment and the steady-state rate of growth simultaneously. Taxes, 
such as those on capital, labour and income taxation, distort downwards the returns 
to the factors of production and hence, lower the rate of investment; while certain 
forms of expenditures, such as public infrastructure, because they are included as 
inputs into the private production function raise the marginal product of capital and 
growth. Once again we find however, that the empirical relationship is less clear. 
Levine & Renelt, (1992) find that fiscal variables only enter growth regressions with 
the expected sign when investment is also included as an explanatory variable. Yet, 
they can find no statistical relationship between fiscal policy and investment. 
Thus far in this thesis we have been interested in estimating the relationship between 
fiscal variables and growth conditional on the level of investment. In this chapter we 
search for the direct effects of fiscal policy on investment. Comparisons are made 
between the direct and indirect (via investment) effects of fiscal policy on the growth 
rate in order to determine its use as an explanation for the non-consistent relationship 
between fiscal policy and growth found in the literature. By doing so it is hoped that 
this will also provide information regarding whether the simple mechanisms in the 
endogenous growth model adequately capture the direct and indirect channels 
evident in the data. The main empirical tests are conducted by extending the 
methodology developed in Chapters 6-8 for a sample of 17 countries from 1970-94. 
The results from this chapter lead us to conclude that at first appearances the Barro 
(1990) one-sector model captures well the relationship between fiscal policy, 
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investment and growth that exist within the data, even when the direct effects of 
policy are included. However, our analysis throws up a number of areas where the 
Barro model is incapable of providing an explanation for the results and some of the 
extensions that have been made to this model appear empirically relevant. 
The results for distortionary taxation are strong and accord well with the existing 
literature but the relationship between government expenditure and investment is less 
clear. It is therefore, on the expenditure side of the model where we feel the greatest 
scope for developments of the model appear (such as following Barro & Sala-i- 
Martin (1995) to allow certain expenditures to affect investment rather than growth 
directly). 
Section 9.2 reviews briefly the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship 
between fiscal variables and the level of investment. Of the existing empirical 
literature we concentrate only on those papers from the growth literature that have 
estimated both the investment and growth effects of fiscal policy. Section 9.3 
discusses the additional data used in this chapter and refers the reader to the relevant 
sections of the thesis for the empirical methodology being used (including details of 
the panel data estimators and the government budget constraint). Finally section 9.4 
presents the empirical results and 9.5 concludes. 
9.2: Literature Review 
9,2,1; Theoretical Literature 
In the Barro (1990) model government taxation and expenditures determine the rate 
of growth both directly, and indirectly through investment. Factor income taxation 
reduces the private marginal product of capital and hence the level of investment, 
which, in turn lowers the rate of growth, while productive expenditures have a direct 
rather, and indirect effect on growth through their inclusion in the production 
function (Fuente (1997)). The direct effect on productivity raises output growth but 
also raises the returns to capital, which encourages faster investment. Consumption, 
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lump-sum taxation and non-productive expenditure, because of the assumptions 
regarding the household utility function, have no effect on the rate of growth either 
directly or indirectly (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
9.2.2: Empirical Literature 
In order to separate out the relationship between fiscal policy and investment from 
that between fiscal policy and growth it is necessary to review the studies that have 
attempted to estimate both of these relationships. The empirical literature relating 
private investment to fiscal policy is thin and if we restrict the sample still further to 
those studies which account for the econometric problems of estimating growth 
regressions then this number falls to just two (Mendoza et al. (1996) and Fuente 
(1997)). Therefore, we offer a brief overview of the entire literature for investment 
and then consider in greater detail the combined direct and indirect effects of fiscal 
policy from Mendoza et al. and Fuente. 
General Overview 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) offer perhaps the most comprehensive list of fiscal 
variables to be included in a single study of private investment using both cross- 
section (100 countries, 1970-88) and panel data (28 countries, 1870-1988) 
techniques. Table 9.1 describes the results for this and the other studies reviewed 
here by separating the results into two types; consistently significant negative 
(positive) and in-consistently negative (positive). ' 
The most consistent of any relationship between fiscal policy and investment to be 
found is that for taxation. Increases in taxation significantly decrease the rate of 
' The categorisation of the fiscal variables under the various headings is made according to whether 
the sign and significance estimated on the fiscal variable remains the same despite changes in either 
the set of fiscal variables or in the set of conditioning variables. This is obviously not the same 
definition of robustness found in Levine & Renelt (1992) as we allow the possibility of sign and 
significance switching of fiscal variables through the concept of the government budget constraint as 
discussed in Section 6.2.2 of the thesis. We make the decision not to investigate why certain fiscal 
variables appear to have a non-robust relationship with the investment ratio in the those papers 
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private investment in the economy (only the total tax revenue variable from Fuente 
(1997) suggests an inconsistent relationship). This strong negative relationship is 
present both when aggregate forms of taxation are used (as in Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993) and Fuente (1997)) and disaggregated forms of taxation are used (as in 
Easterly & Rebelo(1997) and Mendoza et al. (1997)). The exception to this general 
rule is the finding by Mendoza et al. (1997) of a significant positive relationship 
between government consumption taxation and investment. They explain this result 
by arguing that their methodology indicates the effects of the tax-mix on investment 
and that consumption taxation is less-distortionary than labour and capital taxation. 
Hence, any shift in the tax-mix towards the increased use of consumption taxation 
raises the rate of private investment. 
By contrast, when government expenditures are used as explanatory variables we 
witness the same instability in the sign and significance of parameters as observed for 
growth regressions in Chapter 5. For example, in Barro (1991) and Easterly & 
Rebelo (1993) government consumption expenditure has a consistently significant 
negative effect on investment, while Fuente (1997) estimates the relationship for this 
same variable to be non-robust (i. e. it is sometimes statistically significant and 
sometimes not). In contrast, Nazimi & Ramirez (1997) estimate a statistically 
significant, positive relationship between government consumption expenditure and 
investment. 
The consistency of the estimated coefficients on the total public investment variable 
are also poor but, Easterly & Rebelo (1993) find that certain components of total 
public investment have a significant relationship with investment (namely education, 
health, housing and transport & communication expenditures). 
As noted above only Fuente (1997) and Mendoza et al. (1997) adequately account for 
some of the statistical biases within the data (although those due to misspecification 
of the government budget constraint persist) when estimating the relationship 
between fiscal policy, investment and growth. For this reason we only use these two 
reviewed because none impose the government budget constraint on the regression equation any 
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studies to compare estimates of the combined direct and indirect effects of fiscal 
policy on growth. We note immediately from this that the same inconsistencies that 
dog comparisons between these studies in Chapter 5 arise again here, despite the 
similarities in the chosen estimation technique and data sample of the two studies. 
Comparisons are made additionally difficult by differences in measurement of the 
variables and the fact that fiscal variables are included and excluded from the 
regression on a fairly ad hoc basis by Fuente. As demonstrated in Chapter 6 this 
gives the impression, albeit possibly false, that relationships are non-robust. 
However, there are several reasonably strong results. 
Mendoza et al. estimate taxation to have a significant effect on investment but can 
find no significant effect on growth from taxation (this relationship is estimated by 
instrumenting for investment). While Fuente uses tax revenue as a ratio to GDP and 
estimates this measure of the tax burden to have a significant negative effect on both 
investment and growth. 
The effect of including (as opposed to excluding) investment within the growth 
regression is found by Fuente to reduce both the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients and the number of significant variables. Both tax revenues and public 
capital investments remain reasonably robust to the inclusion and exclusion of 
investment, although significance is more often at the 10% level when investment is 
included. Mendoza includes investment by two-stage least squares and finds that 
there is little difference for the parameter estimates between the combined direct and 
indirect effects of fiscal policy. 
attempts to impose one on the results is simply too difficult. 
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Table 9.1: Evidence of the Empirical Relationship Between Fiscal Policy and Investment 
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Author(s) Sample Year/ Consistently In. Consistently In- 
Estimation Significant consistently Significant consistently technique positive Significant negative Significant 
positive negative 
Barro 76 1970-85, govt. 
(1991) cross- - Consumption 
section expenditure 
less 
educ & defence 
Easterly & 100(28) 1970-88, govt. Surplus, govt. general public 
Rebelo (1870- (education), Consumption services 
(1993) 1988), (health), (housing), - less educ. & defence, 
cross- (transport & domestic 
section, communication) taxes/GDP, 
(panel)' domestic 
taxes/C+l, 
internat. Trade 
taxes/X+M, 
marginal income 
tax, 
(total public 
investment), 
(agricultural 
investment) 
Mendoza, 18 OECD 1965-91, consumption labour taxation, 
Milesi- panel taxation capital taxation 
Ferretti & (5-yr - 
Asea ayes) 
(1997) 
Nazimi & Mexico 1950-90, current & lagged current & lagged 
Ramirez dynamic (1 period) govt. (1 period) govt. 
(1997) time consumption investment - 
series 
(annual 
data obs. ) 
Fuente 19 OECD 1965-95, govt. Surplus, transfers to total govt tax revenue-,, 
(1997) panel (5- public households revenue, govt. 
yr. aves. ) 
investment, 
b 
total tax revenue, consumption 
su sidies to interest payments 
enterprises 
As in Chapter 5 the divergence between these two studies is somewhat perplexing 
given they are both based on a panel of OECD countries and correct for many of the 
statistical problems encountered when estimating such regressions (see Chapter 5 for 
some discussion of these issues). We suggest from this that the divergence between 
the results from the two studies is explained by a failure to account for the theoretical 
issues raised in Chapter 5 and investigated in Chapter 6 to 8. Both include a 
2 The results in parenthesis in the Easterly & Rebelo (1993) study indicate those from the panel data 
regressions rather than the cross-sectional regressions. 
3 The difference in the results for the tax revenue and government consumption expenditure variables 
in the Fuente (1997) study are due to the different data sources used (see the paper for details). 
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reasonably large number of fiscal variables, but the budget constraint is not complete 
and coefficients are interpreted as the full effect rather than the net effect via the 
budget constraint. Both studies use 5-year period averages but no tests are made to 
the choice of period average; while, Fuente includes a mix of both aggregated (such 
as tax revenues) and disaggregated variables together. However, a potentially 
important additional bias to these is the simple inclusion or exclusion of investment 
from the conditioning matrix for growth by Fuente (1997). If fiscal policy is 
correlated with investment then not controlling for the determinants of investment (as 
in Mendoza et al. (1996)) introduces an omitted variable bias into the results. The 
direction of the bias is determined by the correlations between the omitted and 
included variables. This bias might also be used to explain why Levine & Renelt 
(1992) can only find sensible results for fiscal policy when investment is included in 
the regression and why Sala-i-Martin (1997) finds the robustness of fiscal variables 
improves when investment is included. Briefly surveying the other studies in Table 
9.1 we note that only Barro (1991) reports regressions with both investment included 
and excluded. The parameter estimates for government consumption expenditure are 
however, reasonably consistent across the regressions and remain significant. 
9.3: Data and Empirical Methodology 
9.3.1: Empirical Methodology 
As demonstrated in Chapter 6 accurate testing of the relationship between fiscal 
policy and growth requires the use of the government budget constraint. We continue 
its use within this chapter and refer the reader to Section 6.2.2 for an explanation of 
this approach. Within Chapter 7 we find in favour of using dynamic panel estimators 
with annual observations and a long lag structure. ' These have the advantage over 
° When the data is classified by function (i. e. the most disaggregated form of the data) we soon hit a 
degrees of freedom problem. Therefore, the regression were estimated using an alternative procedure. 
This involved aggregating upwards to leave only total revenues, total expenditures and the surplus 
variable. The pair of fiscal variables under test were then disaggregated out from this and this 
regression estimated. For example, if we are interested in the growth effects of changing the mix of 
expenditures on health and education then these are disaggregated out from the total expenditure 
category and then in turn left out of the regression as before in order to estimate the growth effects of 
a change in this portion of the expenditure mix. We do not report the coefficients from all of these 
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period averages of the data in demonstrating greater robustness to changes in the 
arrangement of the data set and the choice of estimator. Finally, we choose to follow 
the theoretical classifications of the data to facilitate comparisons with previous 
chapters but do follow up several of the results in more disaggregated form. 
9.3.2 Additional Data and Sources 
This Chapter uses a number of additional variables in the estimation of the 
relationship between fiscal policy, investment and growth. These are described in 
greater detail in Appendix A3. 
The investment variable used in estimation throughout chapters 6 to 8 is total 
investment. The more common choice of investment variable used when the 
determinants of investment are also investigated is the private investment rate. 
Although some robustness testing showed no difference in this chapter, or in 
previous chapters, to the use of total investment we follow standard procedure and 
use the private investment rate. The private investment rate is calculated as the net of 
total investment less government capital investment. Data is collated from the World 
Bank CD-ROM and is available for 17 countries (see Appendix A3) from 1970-94. 
As with total investment this is then expressed as a ratio to GDP. 
The choice over the variables to be included in the conditioning matrix for private 
investment are based on those already found in the literature (see Section 9.4.2). 
Greater detail of the exact nature of these variables is left to Appendix A3. These 
other variables are also taken from the World Bank CD ROM and are: the rate of 
growth of prices per annum to represent the inflation rate; exports plus imports as a 
ratio to GDP to measure openness to international trade; the government bond yield 
less the inflation rate to represent real interest rates, and the relative price of 
investment which is calculate as the inverse of the relative price of investment to the 
price of GDP 
other variables only the pair we are interested in. The fiscal matrix appears identical in form but 
where under the old method the expenditure mix would have been made up from seven regressions it 
is now made up from twenty-one regressions. 
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9.4: Empirical Results 
9.4.1 Fiscal Policy, Investment and Growth 
In order to estimate the relationship between fiscal policy, investment and growth 
Fuente (1997) estimates the following system of equations. 
km 
Equation 9.1 gi1 = al +a, + ý'ß11Y, 1 + y, JX J, + ußr 
m 
Equation 9.2 g11 = a, + a, + ß2, W, + r2jX jt + ii,, 
nm 
Equation 9.3 pinv; 1 = a! + ar + 
ýAiz, + 73jX j, + it, j- 
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where g; 1 is the growth rate per-capita 
in country i at time t; Y,, is a set of conditioning 
variables for growth which includes investment; W,, is a set of conditioning variables 
for growth which does not include investment; Z; t is a set of conditioning variables 
for investment and; X;, is a set of fiscal variables; and a; and cc, are country and time 
dummies respectively. 
Fuente uses equation (9.1) to estimate the direct effects (also known as the 
`allocation effect') of fiscal policy on growth, that is the effect of fiscal policy for a 
given level of investment. The results from this equation are then compared to those 
from equation (9.2). In equation (9.2) the matrix of conditioning variables, IV11, does 
not contain investment and therefore the fiscal policy parameters contain estimates of 
both the direct and indirect effects (also known as the ` crowding-out effect') on 
growth. Finally, equation (9.3) is used to estimate the relationship between a matrix 
of conditioning variables for investment (matrix Z;, ) and a matrix of fiscal variables 
(matrix X,, ). 
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Fiscal Policy and Growth 
Table 9.2 below displays the results for the estimation of equation (9.1). These 
estimates can be seen to be very similar to those for total investment in Table 7.7. 
213 
The use of private investment does not appear to significantly alter the results. Of the 
conditioning variables private investment enters with a significant positive 
coefficient and labour force growth a negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficient. The overall pattern of the relationship between fiscal policy and growth 
estimated using the private investment variable is identical to that estimated using 
total investment. For a given size of government Table 9.2 indicates that the rate of 
growth can be increased if we replace distortionary taxation (rdis) with non- 
distortionary taxation (rdis) and productive expenditure (eprd) with non-productive 
expenditure (enprd). According to the results displayed in the table we can also 
significantly increase the long run rate of growth if we finance increases in 
productive expenditures by non-distortionary taxation, or if we decrease non- 
productive expenditures and distortionary taxation together. Increases in productive 
expenditure funded by distortionary taxation and non-distortionary tax financed 
increases in non-productive expenditure have no effect on the long run growth rate. 
Following Fuente (1997) The results from this regression can then be compared to 
those estimated from equation (9.2) where private investment is no longer included 
in the regression equation (Table 9.3). According to Fuente the coefficients on the 
fiscal variables now measure both the direct and indirect effect of fiscal policy on 
growth. 
Comparing Tables 9.2 and 9.3 it is clear that the relationship between fiscal policy 
and growth is much stronger when investment is excluded from the regression 
equation. The results are non-robust to changes in the set of conditioning variables. 
Like Fuente (1997) the results from Table 9.3 suggest the combined direct and 
indirect effects of policy on growth are much larger than the direct effects alone. 
Chapter 9: Investment and the Indirect Effects of Fiscal "°"i' 2 1-1 
'fahle 9.2: Results Using Private Investment 
Estimation Technique annual data k.; lv 
Dependent variable per capita gr ih (17 cmintrics) 
Omitted Variahie 
rdis rndis eprd enprd 
prinv 0.147` 0.147' 11.1-17' u. 1-17' 
(4.02) (4.02) (4.02) 
Ihfg 
-0.154 -(). 154 
-0.154 A), 154 (1.15) (1.15) (1.15) 1.15) 
elmr 0.353 0.125 
-0.280 11.118-1 (1.26) ((1.45) (1.1(2) ((lall) 
Toth 0.404' 
-11. (1(11; 0.369' 0.1S7 
(4.39) ((). Ot; ) (4.08) (1.35) 
Goth 0.028' 0.026 
-0.350 -0.069 (5.12) (0.27) (5.68) ( 1.27) 
stir -11? 17* 0. l95' 
-0.181 1). 11111' 
12.83 (2.28) (3.08) (2.28) 
rdls -11.412' 
-0.030 0 -0.317' 
(3.35 (11.44) (5.113) 
rndls 0.412 (º. i70* 0.1115 
(3.35) 14.6-1) 
eprd -u. 03o 11.376' n. K 
((). 44) (4.62) ý, Alo 
enprd -0.317" 0.095 (5.03) 0. 
_, 
()) I ý. Ilb l 
Note,,: (-titatiSfic> in parrntlies is. 
denotes siunilirance at the 5 Ieýrl at the II)'; level. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
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Table 9.3: Estimation Excluding Private Investment from the Regression 
Estimation Technique annual data ' way 
Dependent variable per capita growth (17 countries) 
Omitted Variable 
  "go a aavaw, S`/a U \ Bxjoa Y 
--- lhfg (). ()27 0.027 (). 027 0.027 
((). 22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
elmr 0.487" 0.225 -0.3 I' -0.100 
(1.74) (0.80) (1.1 1º (0.3$) 
roth 0.475` -0.182' 0.246' 
-0.013 
(5.91) (2.15) (3.25) (0L23) 
eoth 
-0.484' 0.173' -0.255' 0.004 
(6.49) (2.22) (4.77) ((). ()8) 
sur -(. 353* 0.304' -0.124' 0.135' (4.96) (4.41) (2.31) (3.17) 
rdis -0.657* -0.230` -0.489 
(0.65) (3.53) (9.71)* 
rndis 0.657' 0.428' 0.168' 
(6.65) (6.06) (2.63) 
eprd -0.230' 0.428' (º. 259' 
(3.53) (6.06) 1 ý. n 1 
enprd -0.489' 0.168' -0.259, 
(9.71) (2.63) (5.04) 
adi R2 1 0.700 0.700 1 OM M) 1 0.700 
Notes. I) I-slalislics in pare nt ties u. 
* denotes significance at the 5 lesel, ** at the Ill"r level. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
There are several noticeable changes between the results in Tables 2 and 3. 
According to Table 9.3 the combined direct and indirect effects of chanLcs in 
eprd/rdis and rndis/enprd are significant on growth whereas the direct et*Crcts alone 
are insignificant. The point estimates on these two variables are 
-(1.23(1 and (). 168 in 
Table 9.3 compared to 
-0.036 and 0.095 in Table 9.2. The increase in the magnitude 
of the coefficients on these two combinations of policy is also evident elsewhere in 
the results. For example, from Table 9.3 the effect of a one percentage point increase 
in the ratio of distortionary tax revenue as a ratio to GDP funded by it compensatory 
decrease in non-distortionary taxation is estimated to lower the growth rate by 0.657 
of a percentage point compared to 0.412 ot* it percentage point in "fahle 9.2. 
The failure to account for the budget constraint by Fuente (1997) makes comparisons 
with the results here difficult. For example, the point estimates for total tax revenue 
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from Fuente varies between 0.01 to 0.09 of percentage point (depending on the 
measure of tax revenue chosen). These are below those found in Table 9.3 but this 
may be because estimates are for total tax revenue rather than the more disaggregated 
forms of tax revenue used here. The point estimates for public capital expenditure by 
Fuente are also variable (they vary between 0.5 to 0.9 of a percentage point 
depending on the specification of the regression equation) but in general these are 
above estimates for the productive expenditure variable used here. 
If fiscal policy is correlated with investment, as both we and Fuente find it to be, then 
the exclusion of investment from the conditioning matrix for growth in (2) introduces 
an omitted variable bias. Equation (9.2) should instead be estimated by solving for 
the determinants of investment from equation (9.3). Mendoza et al. (1996) adopt a 
two-stage least squares approach and instrument for investment in (9.1) and this 
would be the preferred method here but for the limitation on the computer power of 
the dynamic panel estimator computer package. 
In order to solve for investment firstly we need to estimate the determinants of 
investment, which we do in the next section. Section 9.4.2 then returns to the 
question of the combined direct and indirect effects of policy. 
9.4.2: Fiscal Policy and Investment 
Benchmark Regression 
Equation (9.3) estimates the direct effects of fiscal policy on the rate of private 
investment. Following Chapter 7a general to specific approach was adopted in order 
to determine the lag structure of the dynamic regression. Test were begun with 9 lags 
of the explanatory variables and completed after the acceptance of the joint 
significance of the 7`h lagged term. Included in the Z matrix of equation (9.3) is a set 
of conditioning variables specific to investment. The choice of conditioning variables 
were based on the empirical literature as reviewed in Table 9.2 above. Limitations on 
the availability of data in the conditioning matrix for investment meant that equation 
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(9.3) was estimated across data for 15 rather than the 17 countries used to estimate 
equations (9.1) and (9.2). This reduction in the size of the sample was tested for by 
regressing equations (9.1) and (9.2) across the smaller sample. The results from the 
reduced sample regressions were found to be very similar to those from the larger 
sample and so we choose not to present the results. We begin with the estimation of 
equation (9.3) only using the set of conditioning variables as determinants of 
investment. The results from this regression can be found in Table 9.4. 
The adjusted R2 value in Table 9.4 is high at 0.878 but is perhaps not unsurprisingly 
high given the lagged explanatory variables in the regressions and that the investment 
ratio does not alter greatly over the sample periods The lagged growth term, which, 
may be thought of as representing either technological catch-up (the scope for 
imitation of the technology of the leader country) or the Keynesian accelerator 
(greater investment expenditure in the current period leading to greater output and 
hence investment in later periods), enters with the expected negative coefficient. This 
suggests either positive feedback between growth and investment (in the case of the 
accelerator) or technological catch-up over the period (in the case of imitation) or 
both. Lagged GDP rather than growth6 is more commonly used to proxy for 
technological catch-up (see Barro (1991), Easterly & Rebelo (1993) Mendoza et al. 
(1997) and Fuente (1997)) and enters investment regressions consistently with a 
significant negative coefficient. 
Of the remaining conditioning variables the real interest rate (as previously used by 
Nazimi & Ramirez (1997)) and the relative cost of investment (as previously used by 
Fuente (1997) and in a related form by Easterly & Rebelo (1993)) enter the 
regression with the expected signs and coefficients, and are in agreement with the 
previous literature. ' The results suggest an increase in the real interest rate and an 
IA Wald test of the joint significance of the country dummies and time dummies shows them to be 
statistically significantly different from zero. In the case of the time dummies this significance is 
around the 10% level but given there was little impact on the estimated coefficients it was decided to 
report the results with the time dummies included. 
'The exception is the Nazimi & Ramirez (1997) paper. 
For the Fuente measure this is a positive coefficient and for the Easterly & Rebelo negative. The 
difference relates to the fact that the Fuente measure is written as the inverse of the relative cost of 
investment goods. 
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increase in the relative cost of investment (relative to output) hoth lead toi a recluctihH i 
in the level of investment. 
Measures of international trade are commonly used as conditioning variables in 
investment regressions although they differ in interpretation. Easterly & Rehulo 
(1993) and Nazimi & Ramirez (1997) use measures which aim to reflect the et't'ects 
of the expansion or the openness to trade on investment while Mendoza et ail. (I Y97) 
use changes in terms of trade as a proxy for macroeconomic instability. "l'hcc 
insignificant coefficient on the exim variable in Table 9.3 conilpaRcs well with Naziani 
& Ramirez who find no evidence of a statistically insignificant relationship using 
growth of exports and Easterly & Rehelo who find a noon-robust relationship using 
the trade share. Finally the insignificant coefficient on the macroeconomic instahilitývariable 
used in this study (the rate of inflation) does not appear to have a significant 
effect on investment that the proxy used by Mendoza et al. (changes in the terms of' 
trade) has. This may he due to the poor nature of the proxy for macroeconomic 
instability used here. 
9.4: Benchmark Regression for Investment 
' %k; l% IT Estimation Technique M111LIA daai; l 
Dependent variable pinnV 
Igrowth 
-1.8118' 
I 'S) 
exiin 
r-rate 
-fº. ý ýý. 
rcinv 0.244' 
14.24 ) 
Nuics: II t-stalisucs In Irirrnlnrsis. 
2) ' (Icnutrs swniliciucc at the 5`4 Icvcl ** at the I(1'; lc%cl. 
3) coefficients arc long run estimates 
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Fiscal Policy and Investment 
Table 9.5 presents the results for the estimation of equation (9.3) with the set of fiscal 
variables included as determinants of the investment ratio. The addition of current 
and lagged fiscal variables to the regression increases the explanatory power of the 
regression equation from 88% to 93% of the variation in investment. Of the variables 
contained within the conditioning matrix the lagged growth term now becomes 
insignificant while the real interest rate variable is positive and significant. The loss 
of the significance of the lagged growth term suggests misspecification in Table 9.4. 
The change in the sign on the real interest rate term is more difficult to explain. One 
potential explanation is that the real interest rate term is correlated with the 
government budget surplus (which is included in the regression equation but not 
reported). Upon investigation even the strongest correlation between interest rates 
and the surplus, for up to seven lags of each variable, never exceeds +/- 0.16. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly when we re-estimate the regression with the interest rate term omitted 
the parameter estimates and t-statistics on the variables in the fiscal matrix displayed 
change little. ' Other alternative explanations such as the correlation between 
contemporaneous interest rate and the rate of inflation (due to the way in which they 
were constructed) were investigated (by omitting either the inflation or the interest 
rate term). There were no significant changes to the results for the fiscal matrix from 
this exercise although it did succeed in producing a significant negative coefficient 
on the inflation term (when interest rates were omitted) and an insignificant, although 
still positive, term on the real-interest rate variable (when inflation was the omitted 
variable). 
The most notable result from the fiscal matrix in Table 9.5 is the strength of the 
distortionary effects on investment of the variable rdis. An increase in the revenue 
from distortionary forms of taxation and the use of the proceeds to finance either a; 
reduction in consumption taxation (rndis); increase in productive expenditure (eprd) 
or; increase non-productive expenditures (enprd) leads to a reduction in the long run 
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aggregate investment ratio. This matches well the results from the prcvioris liter; rturý. 
The negative relationship of taxation with investment (when measured as total 
revenue, average tax rates or marginal rates of taxation) was by t'ar the most 
consistent result from the previous literature and is replicated in this study when We 
use tax revenue. Mendoza et al. (1997) and Fuente (1997) also estimate coefficients 
of a similar magnitude to those here, despite the differences in the measurement (ºf 
the tax variables and specification of the regression etIuatiun. 
"fahle 9.5: Empirical Relationship Between Fiscal Policy and Invcstnicnt 
Estimation Technique annum da<<º - way ºI 
Dependent variable I pinv (I S rountriCS) 
Omitted Variable 
rdis rndis eprd enprd 
Igrowth 0 "lo it jt, 
int' 
-0.180 -6.186 (). 180 (0.4ß) (0.43) (falz) 
exim 16.797 16.797 10.71)7 
I. *) (l. 3S) ,ý; 
r-rate 0.902.. 0.902'. 0.902" 0.9112 
(1.86) (1.86) (1.86) I I. tt(º) 
rci nv 0.305 0.305' 0.305' 11.3 ) 
(2.53) (2.53) (953) 
. 
531 
elmr 2.890 6.541 4.943' 4.519' (1.71) (3.13) 12.641 x. 11i 
roth -0.78(I 2.873' 1.274" 0.900- 
(1.16) (3.00) 11.711 11.881 
eoth 1.798" -1.8; 5 
-0.2.56 0.1 IS (1.90) (1.92) (11.26) (I). I3) 
sur -IL588 3.065' 1.466 1.092 
I(Lti7) (2.95) (11.8O) (1. 
_'h) 
rdis -3.653' 
-2.054' 1.680' 
13.08) (2.23) (2'. 11; 1 
rndis 3.6.53. 1.970' -- 
(3.08) i2. OS1 
eprd -2.054' 
(2.23) 
enprd -1.680' 1.970' 
(2.05) (2.05) ad. 
- il` 0.930 
`ulc III III p, jI, 11111,1,. 
2) ' denot cs sis! niIii; tncc ; tt Ihr IkýcI, at Iltr III' f Irýr 
3) coefficients arc long run estimates 
" We tried estimating the regression without the country dumnmies but including the real interest rite. 
In those regressions the real interest rate returns with the expected sign and significaance. 
Chapter 9: Investment and the Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policy 221 
The results in Table 9.5 also appear to capture the same relationship within the tax 
mix as Mendoza et al. (1997). A reduction in revenues from distortionary tax (which 
contains capital and labour taxes) and its replacement by non-distortionary taxation 
(revenue from consumption taxes) so as to leave the overall size of government 
constant has a significant positive effect on the level of investment. In a simple one 
sector growth model the reduction in the returns to the factors of production through 
their increased taxation and the benign effect of consumption taxation on the 
investment decision (due to the nature of household preferences) leads to an increase 
in the rate of investment. 
The results in Table 9.5 can be used to support the view that the relationship between 
government expenditures and investment depends crucially on the method of 
financing. Distortionary tax financed increases in productive or un-productive 
expenditures are significant and negative (as noted above) but when financed by non- 
distortionary taxation the coefficient is significant only if it is non-productive 
expenditures that are increased. The results for this fiscal variable go some way to 
explain the finding of a positive but non-robust, effect of transfers to households on 
the investment ratio by Fuente (1997). The results for government expenditure are 
somewhat surprising given the simple one sector model suggests that if any type of 
expenditure should enter the regression with an insignificant coefficient it should be 
non-productive expenditure. Non-productive expenditures have no effect on either 
investment or growth in the theoretical model whereas productive expenditure are 
expected to increase the marginal product of capital and therefore investment and 
growth. Cashin (1995) and Fuente both allow for the possibility that expenditures 
traditionally thought of as being non-productive may be in some way productive but 
model them as inputs into the production function. Cashin argues that some forms of 
transfer payments such as inter and intra-generational transfers increase the marginal 
product of capital by helping to enforce property rights through reductions in crime. 
Similarly, Fuente (1997) highlights the productive potential of non-productive 
expenditures by arguing they contribute to `social cohesion' (although he does also 
discuss their potential negative effects). 
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The finding of a strong positive relationship between non-productive expenditures 
and investment can be contrasted with the results for the same variable with growth. 
In Chapter 6 we could find no statistically significant effects from this variable and 
when a general-to-specific approach was used to specify the budget constraint could 
not reject the null hypothesis that it could be safely excluded from the regression. In 
order to model transfers as having only an indirect effect on growth through 
investment they would have to affect the incentives to investment, as in Barro & 
Sala-i-Martin (1995), rather than the production function. Barro & Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) argue the expected returns to investment are a function of government 
expenditures because of their effect on the protection of property rights. Investment 
is then an increasing function of government expenditure and the effect of 
government expenditures on growth is indirect rather than direct. 
Public investment (for which we use the eprd variable as a proxy) is found to have no 
statistically significant effect on the rate of (private) investment when financed by 
either reductions in non-productive expenditure or non-distortionary taxation and a 
significant negative one if financed by distortionary taxation. The negative 
relationship between private investment and public investment found in the previous 
literature (for example Easterly & Rebeln (1993) and Nazimi & Ramirez (1997)) has 
been used to argue in favour of crowding out of private investment by public 
investment. We find no evidence in support of such a claim 
.9 Here it was found that 
productive expenditures have a strong direct effect on the growth rate. 
The results from Table 9.5 can also be used to indicate the likely direction of the bias 
from the exclusion of investment in the estimation of equation (9.2). The strong 
negative effects of taxation on investment are likely to bias the same coefficients 
away from zero (either positively or negatively depending upon the choice of 
compensating fiscal variable) when investment is excluded from the growth 
regression. The positive coefficient on enprd/rndis is likely to be biased away from 
zero in a positive direction the same variable in a growth regression; whereas the 
9 We could also look at the surplus term to support or refute this argument but due to the way that the 
surplus term has been used to enforce statistical balance across the government budget identity, and 
therefore potentially contains any errors from the data set, this is not appropriate. 
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insignificant parameter on eprd/rndis is likely to direct the bias for this variable 
towards zero when investment is excluded from the growth regression. 
9.4.3 Fiscal Policy, Growth and the Determinants of Investment 
In the estimation of equation (9.2) the exclusion of investment may lead the 
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parameter estimates to include some bias from the omission of relevant variables. In 
this section we re-estimate equation (9.2) by solving for the determinants of 
investment estimated in the previous section. The availability of data limits the 
number of countries to 15 and the data period from 1970 to 1992. Estimation is of a 
regression in the form of equation (9.4). The parameter estimates in the fiscal matrix 
X contains estimates of the direct and indirect effects of fiscal policy. Ideally 
estimation would be through two-stage least squares. Equation (93) would be 
estimated and then the predicted values from this regression included in place of 
investment in equation (9.1) (the same approach as in Mendoza et al. (1996). 
However, a lack of computing power means we are limited to estimating an equation 
of the following form. 
R rn 
Equation 9.4 g11= a+ ß21Wt + Xß Z,, + (y21 + y31)X P+tt,, 
The results from the fiscal matrix are robust to the use of a reduced form estimation 
of equation (9.2) and the likely direction of the bias indicated in the results from 
Table 9.3 appears to be confirmed. The number of degrees of freedom is reduced 
sharply by the inclusion of such a large number of variables but the fit of the 
regression rises to 0.803. The most notable departures from the results in Table 9.3 is 
the estimation of an insignificant coefficient on the eprd/rdis and enprd/rndis 
variables. In the case of enprdlrndis this appears to be due to an increase in the 
standard error of the parameter rather than any large change in the point estimate 
(0.152 in Table 9.6 against 0.168 in Table 93). 
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'f'ahle 9.6: Fnipirical Relationship Between Fiscal Policy and the 1)rtcrniinants (d Invcstincnt 
.i 
Estimation Technique annual data 2 way IT, 
Dependent variahle I pcr capita growth c wnirýý t 
Omitted \/ riahli 
rdis rndis eprd enprd 
Ibfg 
-0.691 * -0.69I 
-O. 69 1' 
-0.091, (2.35) (2.35) 12.35( (2.35) 
inf (1.029 0.029 ((. u"º 0.029 (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) 
exim 2.802 2.802 2.802 2.8112 
(1.39) (1.39) (1.39) 
r-rate 0.119 0.119 0.1 I') 0.1 I') 
(1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) 
rcinv 0.029 0.029 0.029 I). 029 (0.92) ((). 92) (n. 92) ((). 92) 
elms 
-0.386 (1.133 
-0.249 -0.019 (1.54) (0.47) (0.87) (0.00) 
roth (1.246 
-0.273" 0.10$ 0.1 
(1.80) (1.71) (0.77) (0.1). 
eoth -0.246 0.273' 
-(). 10$ ((. 1 21 (2.13) (1.96) (0.83) (0.72) 
stir 
-0.174 0.345 0.037 0.193' 
(2.72) ((1.35) (2.04) 
rdis 
-0.519 
-((. 13$ -0.307* 
(0.81) 12.34 
rndis 11. E 9, (º.? xý' (I. 1 >, 
(2.96) ( 1.14) 
eprd -0.138 u. 3t; 2, 0.230* (0.82) (2.7-1( 1.89 
enprd -0.367' 0.15-1 
L 
(2.34) (1.1 11 (I. ); ýºi 
adj K2 
0.803 0.803 0.803 0.803 
ý, i ,: tt wu. u III I) trrntnrtii'. 
JcnUtcs significancc at the ý(; Icvcl, " at the IIP; Icvcl. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
In general the estimates from Table 9.6 are significantly larger than the point 
estimates from Mendoza et al. (1996). For example, according to Mcndui, a L-t al. the 
point estimates from a change in taxation on growth is around O. I toi O. 2 of a 
percentage point; whereas we estimate the same change to he in the region U. 14 to 
0.52 of a percentage point depending can the choice of COn'tpcilsatino, fiscal ý, rri, rhlc. 
The failure to fully account for the government hudert constriint hN 
makes comparison difficult. 
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The results from Table 9.6 are interesting as a test of the public policy endogenous 
growth models. The results suggest that even if we include the effects of fiscal policy 
on investment within the regression equation then the results still match the 
predictions from the Barro (1990) model. That is, the effects of fiscal policy on 
growth are adequately captured by the simple model that separates fiscal policy into 
one of four types (distortionary and non-distortionary taxation and productive and 
non-productive expenditure). The discussion of the results in Table 9.5 indicates 
however, that the model is not able to account for all of the movement in the data. In 
order to draw out these possible extensions to the model we choose to disaggregate 
the data further. 
9.4.4 Government Expenditures and Investment 
We observe in the previous section weak effects of government expenditures and 
non-distortionary taxation on the level of investment but strong negative effects from 
the use of certain types of taxation (those that were pre-classified as distortionary). 
Given this it is more interesting to investigate further the relationship between 
government expenditures and the investment ratio rather than the much stronger 
relationship of taxation and investment. Following Chapter 8 this is achieved by 
disaggregating the expenditure data in two stages and concentrating on the results for 
the expenditure mix. 1° The first level of disaggregation (the results for which are in 
Table 9.7) separates out health and social security expenditures and categorises the 
remaining productive expenditures as either likely to be productive as a stock or as a 
flow (details of this disaggregation can be found in Chapter 8). The second level of 
disaggregation (the results from which are in Table 9.8) uses the functional 
classification of expenditures from the GFSY. Only three forms of expenditure were 
considered at this level of disaggregation (social security (ess), general public 
expenditures (egps) and defence expenditures (edef)). The choice of these three 
expenditures was decided on the basis of the results from using the first level of 
disaggregation and is explained further below. 
10 The elmr is been subsumed into the surplus term and so is not included in the table of results. 
Chapter 9: lnvcstiriciit and the Indirect Effi'cts of Fiscal l'ulic. r 
Table 9.7: Government Expenditures and Investment Using Re-clas`ified Data 
Estimation Technique I annual data 2 way I I`. 
Dependent variable I hinv ((s comill W) 
Omittcd VariahIc 
epf eps ehith ess 
Igrowth 1.228 1.228 1.228 1.228 
(2.43) (2.43) (2.43) (2.43) 
inf 
-0.283 -0.283 -II. 2ft -0.2 ; (1.08) (I. (18) (1.08) (I 
. 
I)xl 
exim 11.384 0.384 0.38.1 (1.384 
(I(. 18) (0. ()8) (((. ()8) (Ii_I)8) 
r-rate -((. 092 -0.092 -0.102 (11.35) ((1.35) (li.. týl n 
reinv 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 
(3.57) (3.57) (3.57) (3.571 
sur -0.343 0.771 
(0.50) (1.2 I) ((I II III "1 
treu ... ;ýI. -((. 734 18) (1.38) 
epf I. IIl II, l lý I. 05 i 
(Iýý_, l (1.23) (1.71) 
eps 
ehith -0.99, .. '.. (1.23) 
ess -1.054 .... 
ý1 
(1.71) (0.07) 
adj R2 . 926 . 926 . 926 . 926 
'ýýill ti: III ýL. II I'll ICS III I); IIi I1tI1CSI . 
' (Icnotc. ""OlltiL iI1C at the ICv'LI, " ill tIi IU', Ii eI. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
There is a reduction in the explanatory power of the regression in terms Ot the vv, iIuc 
of the adjusted R2 as we disaggregate the fiscal variahles»' The previously significant 
positive relationship of the real interest rate disappears however. According to 'I'ahlcs 
7 and 8 there is no long-run relationship hetwern the real interest rate and the 
decision to invest (in contrast to the earlier level ("t aggregation). The real interest 
rate appears to affect the tinging, rather than the level, of inv'estmrnt. Of the 
remaining conditioning variables there is little change in the relationship with the 
investment ratio, with only the relative cost oof investment uppearring toi have ,i 
significant effect on the long run level of investnment. 
" This is probably due to the fact that as the fiscal variables now account for smaller pcrrrnt; u es of 
GDP the signal is more likely to get lost in the noise 
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The fiscal matrix within Tables 7 and 8 provide us with information regarding the 
effect on investment of changes in the mix of expenditures (the replacement of one 
kind of government expenditure with another but keeping total government 
expenditures constant). The statistically insignificant relationship of government 
expenditures with the investment ratio can be seen to hold as we move to the next 
level of aggregation of government expenditures. Only by replacing social security 
expenditure with expenditures on productive flows (expenditure on general public 
services and defence) can we increase the long run investment ratio. It is this 
relationship we chose to investigate further by disaggregating the epf variable into its 
component parts (expenditures on general public services and defence). 
From Table 9.8 we discover that there is in fact a difference between the way general 
public services financed increases in social security expenditure and defence 
expenditure finances increases social security expenditure affect investment. The 
long run level of investment can be increased by 1.82 percentage points if social 
security expenditure is replaced with general public services, but decreased by 2.99 
percentage points if social security expenditure is replaced with defence expenditure. 
General public service expenditure contains expenditure on law and order that could 
reasonably be thought of as protecting property rights and therefore the returns to 
investment (as in Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995)). Earlier in this chapter, we also 
discovered evidence of a significant effect on growth from this pair of expenditures. 
The coefficients estimated in Table 9.8 measure the net effect of changes in pairs of 
expenditure items. There therefore exists a multiplicity of possible interpretations of 
the estimated coefficients. Defence expenditure is often used (justified) as an 
example of expenditures that reduce the risk factor of investment through the 
maintenance of property rights (Smith (1977)). In this sense the coefficient on this 
variable is surprising but not inconsistent with previous findings. Smith (1977) also 
finds a significant negative relationship of defence expenditure with the investment 
ratio for 15 OECD countries using a cross sectional approach and a panel of annual 
time series observations (in both cases the time period used is 1960-70). Further 
investigation using input-output tables leads Smith to explain at least some of this 
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negative relationship as a result of a supply constraint causcd by military c(luiP)nfccnt 
often being produced by investment good industries. It is di1licult to use this to 
explain the long run negative relationship as presumahly it short run supply constraint 
is just that: short run. Smith however argues that the continual divcrsioýn of resources 
away from investment may lead to a capacity constraint on the c-cuýnomy and hoossilhiy 
inefficiencies in industries as a result of `soft' government contracts. A similar 
process may also exist if military R&D expenditure crowds out the private sector 
from the stock of human capital. Alternatively, the siinit'icant coef'f'icient ()n 
may have been caused by the positive investment effects of social-securiIN, 
expenditures ( as already discussed above). '2 
Table 9.8: Government Expenditures and Investment Using Data Classified by FFunetio n 
Estimation Technique annual data 1-1 
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.....,, 
rcinv 0.249 0? 41) n. 2-1ýº 
(4.01) (-0.01) (ý. (ºI 
sur 0.587 0.725' 
' ((. 54) ((. 0)) (2.8l )) 
trev -0.332 0.794. (0.91) (I Ui) 
texp u 2n hi' 0.798' 
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egps - 
. 
x2(1 
I. 65I 
edel - 
- 
94º 
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(1.65) 12.1 11 
ad, j R2 0.910 0.910 0.910 
N(, Ics: I) t-, t: l tC> to h, trcnlncsis. 
tlrnulLs siLnhIir; tnrr at the 5'; IC\'cl ** at the iw;; level. 
3) coefficients are long run estimates 
12 In the growth regression equivalent in chapter 6 the estimated relationship 
insignificant. 
Chapter 9: Investment and the Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policy 229 
9.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have attempted to estimate the long run effects of different 
government taxation and expenditure polices on the private investment ratio and 
growth. Using data for 17 countries from 1970-94 we estimate a dynamic panel 
regression using annual observations and long lag structures taking account of the 
government budget constraint. We find that a great deal of the apparent non- 
robustness of the relationship between fiscal policy and investment may be accounted 
for by the same issues investigated in Chapters 6 to 8 for growth. However, further 
explanation is found for by the exclusion of investment from the set of conditioning 
variables. We find that the exclusion of investment from the regression strengthens 
the relationship between fiscal policy and growth (similar findings are made by 
Fuente (1997)). This contrasts with Sala-i-Martin (1997) who, like Levine & Renelt 
(1992), find that the relationship between fiscal policy and growth is more likely to 
be statistically significant when investment is included within the regression. We 
show however, that the bias induced on the parameters by the exclusion of 
investment from the regressions depends in part on the excluded fiscal variables also. 
It is the importance of the government budget constraint for the direction of the bias 
that we feel explains for the differences between the Fuente, Levine & Renelt and 
Sala-i-Martin studies. Once we control for the determinants of investment the strong 
support for the Barro (1990) model is restored. However, in searching for the 
relationship between fiscal policy and investment we find a number of results which 
are left unexplained by the Barro model. 
The strongest relationships we estimate between fiscal policy and investment occur 
for distortionary taxes. Within the Barro model increases in distortionary taxation 
have an un-ambiguously negative relationship with private investment. Factor 
taxation reduces the returns to investment and hence the level of investment. The 
long run relationship of government expenditures with investment is less clear and 
there is a greater dependence on the method of financing on the parameter estimates 
than with taxation. 
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In contrast to our a -priori predictions we find some evidence of a positive effect on 
investment from non-productive expenditures, but only if financed by non- 
distortionary taxation (in Chapter 6 we found no evidence of a direct relationship on 
the long run rate of growth). This leads us to suggest that certain forms of 
expenditure (such as those we pre-classified as non-productive) affect investment 
rather than growth. This sort of relationship is captured best by the Barro & Sala-i- 
Martin (1995) extension to the basic model. Certain government expenditures may 
affect the perceived returns to investment that leads to changes in the level of 
investment. 
We can find no significant relationship between productive expenditures and 
investment in our results: the ` crowding out' effects of public investment on private 
investment found by Easterly & Rebelo (1993) and Nazimi & Ramirez (1997) are 
therefore not apparent in this data set. Further investigation of the relationship 
between government expenditures and investment demonstrates that we can gain 
additional insights from disaggregating the data further. We find that financing 
increases in social-security expenditure by decreasing defence expenditure increases 
the long run investment ratio but if financed by decreases in general public services 
the long run investment ratio falls. Possible theoretical extensions might therefore 
concentrate on the distinction between direct and indirect growth effects of 
government expenditures. 
Chapter 10 
Conclusions, Further Research and Policy Implications 
The weight of evidence in the thesis allows us to conclude that it is important to 
consider both the level and the mix of policy when explaining the slowdown in 
growth over the post-war period. The increase in social security and welfare 
payments at the expense of productive expenditures (evident in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 of 
Chapter 1) offers part of the explanation, along with differences between countries in 
the method chosen to finance these increased expenditures. The increased use of 
distortionary taxation, by lowering the returns to and discouraging investment, ' 
significantly slows down growth. 
10.1 Predictions from Theory 
The public-policy neoclassical growth models (for example, Judd, 1985 or Chamley, 
1986) consign the role of fiscal policy to one of determining the level of output rather 
than the long-run growth rate. The steady-state growth rate is driven by the 
exogenous factors of population growth and technological progress, while fiscal 
policy can affect growth only in the transition path to this steady-state. In these 
models, tax and expenditure measures that influence the savings rate or the incentive 
to invest in physical or human capital ultimately affect the equilibrium factor ratios 
rather than the steady-state growth rate. By contrast, the public-policy endogenous 
growth models of Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992,1995) and Mendoza 
et al. (1997) fiscal policy determines both the level of output and the steady-state 
growth rate. By restricting the form of the production function, or using productive 
expenditures to raise the marginal product of capital to such an extent that 
diminishing marginal returns are permanently offset, the growth rate is a positive 
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constant. ' Our explanation of the slowdown in growth is therefore, consistent only 
with the endogenous growth models. 
The endogenous growth models are rich enough for fiscal policy to display a wide 
range of characteristics (for example Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992), Glomm & 
Ravikumar (1994), Capolupo (1996)). The most important, though, for determining 
the effect on growth is which of the sectors the policy affects consumption or 
production. Those policies that affect the production sector affect either the savings 
rate or the incentive to invest in physical or human capital? Policies that affect 
consumption have no effect on growth but may affect the equilibrium factor ratios. 
There are only two caveats to this conclusion in the literature. The first is when 
productive expenditures are subject to congestion. Under such conditions productive 
expenditures cannot be used to prevent diminishing marginal returns in the 
accumulation of capital and, in the absence of technological change, the growth rate 
falls to zero. However, if diminishing marginal returns to capital are assumed away 
and the level of congestion is maintained at a constant level in the steady state (i. e. 
G/Y is assumed constant rather than G) then fiscal policy still affects the growth rate. 
The second caveat is when a leisure-education choice is included in households' 
preference function. If the supply of labour is not perfectly inelastic then greater 
consumption taxation encourages education, lowering the returns to investment and 
hence growth. 
It follows from the endogenous growth models that the size of government is not the 
only determinant of the growth rate and instead the mix of available policies is as 
important. If an increased proportion of the expenditure budget is used for productive 
over non-productive expenditure (Chapter 2) or revenues collected from non- 
distortionary rather than distortionary taxation (Chapter 3) then the growth rate is 
increased. Devarajan et al. (1996) and Rebelo (1991) extend this to show that further 
gains to the growth rate can be made if the marginal effect of different types of 
' Fiscal policy generates endogenous growth only in models which include both productive 
expenditures and distortionary taxation (see Chapter 4). 
2 If there is more than one reproducible factor then this depends on the relative tax rate on each factor. 
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productive expenditures and of distortionary taxes is non-homogenous. Both halves 
of the government budget are brought together in Chapter 4 and from this we 
conclude the method of financing is important for the effect on growth of a change in 
expenditures. For example, if increases in productive expenditures are financed 
through non-distortionary taxation the model predicts the effect on growth to be 
positive; whereas if distortionary tax financed the effects on growth from the same 
increase in productive expenditure can vary between negative and positive depending 
on the current level of expenditures. 
10.2 Empirical Evidence 
Empirical testing of the relationship between fiscal policy and growth has, generally, 
been only loosely based around the findings from the theoretical models. It can be 
argued that this failing helps to explain the inconsistency of the results for similar 
variables even within similarly specified regressions found in the literature. Within 
Chapter 5 we identify a number of empirical issues that have been identified as 
creating a statistical bias in the parameter estimates from growth regressions and 
show that, even once many of these empirical issues have been accounted for, 
comparisons of results still imply a non-robust relationship. 
We use this finding as evidence that so far the empirical tests of growth models have 
been incomplete. Accordingly, we draw out four potential explanations for non- 
robustness from the review of the theoretical literature. The first stresses the method 
of financing a given change in policy by developing a methodology proposed by 
Helms (1985), Mofidi & Stone (1990) and Miller & Russek (1993) (Chapter 6). 
Chapter 7 distinguishes between the steady state implications for fiscal policy 
between new and old theories of growth. We test the robustness of the current 
statistical methodology adopted in the literature to a list of possible alternatives. 
Chapter 8 tests the homogeneity of productive expenditure assumption in the Barro 
model. Tests are based around a similar study by Devarajan et al. (1996) but where 
level and composition effects of expenditure are correctly separated. The final test, 
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Chapter 9, separates the direct from the indirect (via investment) effects of fiscal 
policy on growth. 
In order to avoid many of the statistical biases identified in Chapter 5 the study 
adopts many features from other studies. In addition, this also suggests our results do 
not derive from deviations from normal procedure. A sample of 22 OECD countries 
is used with data stretching over the period 1970 to 1994. OECD countries are 
chosen in order to reduce possible simultaneity bias caused by Wagner's law 
(Easterly & Rebelo (1993)) and heterogeneity of parameters across countries. These 
data are then averaged across 5-year periods to again reduce possible simultaneity 
caused by Wagner's law but also from the business cycle. Estimation is through 
panel data techniques to reduce bias from omitted country and time specific effects. 
The data on fiscal expenditures and tax revenues are taken from the GFSY. These are 
expressed as ratios to GDP and classified in accordance with the theory i. e. as 
productive or un-productive expenditures and as distortionary and non-distortionary 
taxation. 
The classification of the data in accordance with theory does not appear to alter our 
ability to replicate the results from previous studies. We find that two of the most 
common results, the negative coefficient on distortionary taxation and the negative 
coefficient on non-productive expenditure, are easily replicated. One of the most 
interesting findings from this section is that the negative coefficient on distortionary 
taxation is non-robust to the inclusion of non-productive expenditure within the same 
regression. This matches a conclusion made in Chapter 5 when comparing the results 
across the Fuente (1997) and Mendoza et al. (1996) studies. 
The evidence presented in the thesis supports the endogenous over the neoclassical 
growth models. Consistently the long run relationship between fiscal policy is 
estimated as being statistically significant. In turn, of the various forms of 
endogenous growth model the strongest support is found for the Barro (1990) one- 
sector model we reviewed in Section 4.2.1. Policies that are perceived to affect the 
supply side of the model are found to significantly alter the growth rate whereas 
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those that affect the demand side of the model do not. However, the evidence for the 
Barro model is not absolute and by changing the statistical methodology it possible 
to remove some but not all of the results. 
In Chapter 4 when the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget are brought 
together consideration as to the method of financing is important in determining the 
effect of policy changes on the growth rate. Helms (1985), Mofidi & Stone (1990) 
and Miller & Russek (1993) show that the estimated coefficient of one element of the 
government budget will vary according to the specification of the estimating 
equation with respect to the other elements. We draw out this work to form our 
empirical tests in Chapter 6. 
When we specify the budget constraint completely we find that the estimated 
coefficients on a given fiscal variable depend upon the choice of the compensating 
fiscal variables. However, we find the non-robust relationship between fiscal policy 
and growth matches exactly that predicted by the Barro (1990) public policy growth 
model. This leads us to conclude that tests for statistical robustness along the lines of 
Levine & Renelt (1992) or Sala-i-Martin (1997) are, at least in the case of fiscal 
variables, misdirected. Non-robustness is a feature of the data generating process for 
fiscal variables, and would therefore occur even if one could account for the 
statistical problems which Levine & Renelt and Sala-i-Martin (perhaps incorrectly) 
attribute to non-robustness. We conclude that the relationship between fiscal policy 
and growth is statistically non-robust but theoretically robust (i. e. the non-robustness 
corresponds to misspecification biases that we can explain theoretically). 
The findings from this chapter are robust to tests for some of the statistical bias that 
might remain in the data, but not all. The exclusion of initial GDP from the 
regression equation, in contrast to Easterly & Rebelo (1993), does not in this case 
lead to a change in the results. Nor does there appear to be significant heterogeneity 
across parameters. Economic theory tells us that the effect of distortionary tax 
financed increases in productive expenditure by distortionary taxation on growth 
depends on the current level of expenditure. Below some optimum value the growth 
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effects are positive but if above then they are negative. Testing within this study 
leads us to conclude, like Barro (1991), that productive expenditure are `optimally' 
supplied via distortionary taxation within the countries of this data set. 
Period averages of the data are commonly used in the literature to remove possible 
bias caused by simultaneity between fiscal policy and growth. Within Chapter 6 we 
adopt the most common standard and average the data across 5-year periods. When 
we test the robustness of the results to the use of 10-year period averages and 
estimation by instrumental variables we find evidence that simultaneity remains 
within the data. When 10-year period averages are used the standard errors on the 
coefficients become inflated and the parameter values themselves noticeably larger. 
Part of the difference with earlier results in the chapter can be explained by the 
reduction in degrees of freedom after calculating 10-year period averages, but this 
cannot explain for all of the movement in the results. Similar problems are 
encountered when the regression is estimated with instruments of the fiscal variables. 
However, results from Chapter 7 lead us to contest the validity of these two tests for 
robustness and therefore the conclusions drawn from them. 
Chapter 7 uses the different predictions regarding the steady state growth rate 
between the neoclassical and endogenous growth models to explain for the non- 
robust relationship between fiscal policy and growth found in the literature. In the 
neoclassical model the government cannot affect the steady state through its use of 
fiscal policy but does affect the transition; whereas in the endogenous growth model 
fiscal policy affects both the transition and the steady state. Despite the strength of 
this distinction little testing for alternative measures of the steady-state (beyond the 
use of 5-year period averages in a static panel framework) has been attempted. We 
use a number of different arrangements of the data (annual, 5-year and 10-year period 
averages), and two different estimators (static and dynamic panels), but find that this 
has little bearing on the finding of significant parameters. From this we conclude that 
there is strong evidence from our results in support of the endogenous growth model. 
However, we do find the choice of estimator to be important when testing between 
variants of the endogenous growth models. That is, we do not continually find the 
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same fiscal variables to be significant in all regressions (the tax mix is the exception 
to this) and therefore evidence in favour of the same version of the endogenous 
growth model. 
The empirical section of Chapter 7 begins by nesting a typical static panel growth 
regression with 5-year period averages into a dynamic version of the same model 
(with a single lag of the dependent variable used to capture possible dynamics within 
the data). We find we cannot reject the null of the joint significance of these lagged 
dependent terms. That is, the static panel regression with 5-year averages of the data 
is misspecified and incorrectly concludes in favour of the Barro growth model. The 
results from the dynamic regression can also be used to argue against the choice of 
lagged values as instruments in Chapter 6 as the instruments will also be correlated 
with the error term. 
The robustness of the results are tested against a number of alternatives (10-year 
period averages; moving the start year of the period average forward; and using 
annual observations together with and long lag structures in a dynamic regression). 
The finding of non-robust results from these regressions leads us to conclude the 
choice of estimator is important when testing between versions of the endogenous 
growth model. Most notably the results warn against the use of 5-year period 
averages without testing for the sensitivity of the results. The problems with period 
averaging appear to be compounded when longer period transformations of the data 
or dynamic regressions with period averages are used. Period averaging clearly 
transforms the data in ways that are not fully understood and requires further 
research. 
The sensitivity of the results to period averages lead us to favour the use of dynamic 
panel estimators with annual observations of the data and long lag structures. 
However we also recommend that further research, along the lines of Judson & Owen 
(1997), into the properties of these estimators when using `macro-shaped' data sets 
(small N and small to medium T). Interestingly when we use this type of estimator 
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the results are very similar to those from the static panel regression with 5-year 
averages which we criticised for being misspecified! 
The third explanation for the inconsistent relationship between fiscal policy and 
growth surveyed in Chapter 5 is that of inappropriate aggregation. The Barro (1990) 
model suggests that government expenditures need only be classified into one of two 
types (whether they affect the supply or the demand side of the economy) in order to 
determine their effect of growth. Devarajan et al. (1996) develop this model and 
demonstrate that further gains to growth can be achieved by changes in the mix of 
productive expenditure. If the ratios of current expenditure and relative productivity 
are away from their optimum levels then the growth rate can be increased by changes 
in their relative mix. That is, productive expenditures are non-homogeneous in their 
effects on growth and the inappropriate aggregation of the data may increase the 
confidence intervals on the productive expenditure term. Against the desire to 
increase the realism of the model must be balanced the problem that too much 
disaggregation risks losing more of the signal within the noise as expenditures now 
account for a much smaller percentage of GDP. 
Evidence from this chapter supports the Devarajan et al. model in which productive 
expenditures are categorised by different coefficients. The assumption of 
homogeneity appears to be a reasonable first approximation and does not upset the 
results but the fit of the model is improved by disaggregation. Of special interest in 
this set of results is the finding of strong negative effects from increases in both 
education and health expenditure. In the case of education this negative effect is even 
found when compensated by decreases in social security expenditure. From a 
theoretical perspective the possibility of a negative marginal effect from the over- 
supply of productive expenditures is not possible in either the Devarajan et al. or 
Barro models; while from an empirical perspective, research into the ` value added' 
from these expenditure types is warranted. These results are found to be robust to the 
use of AH-estimators (up until a very disaggregated form of the data) but not to the 
use of 5-year period averaged data (greater robustness is found when 5-year period 
averages are used with the lowest level of aggregation of the expenditure data). 
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The final explanation for non-robustness that we investigate is the choice of 
conditioning variables, namely the rate of private investment. Levine & Renelt 
(1992) find that fiscal policy variables only enter growth regressions with the 
expected sign when investment is included amongst the regressors. Yet, they can find 
no relationship between fiscal policy and investment itself. Similarly, Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) finds that the relationship between fiscal policy and growth is only 
`statistically robust' when investment is included amongst the set of conditioning 
variables. We demonstrate that the divergence of these results may be due to a failure 
to account for the issues raised in Chapter 6-8 along with an additional omitted 
variable bias caused by the exclusion of investment from the regression. The 
direction of this bias depends in part upon the specification of the budget constraint. 
This helps to explain further the diversity in the estimated coefficients for fiscal 
variables between studies. Once we control for the determinants of investment (as in 
Mendoza et al. (1996)), fully specify the budget constraint and use dynamic panel 
estimators with annual observations and long lag structures we find that the support 
for the Barro version of the endogenous growth model returns. 
When we investigate further the way in which fiscal policy affects investment we 
notice, in places, further divergence from the Barro model. Somewhat surprisingly 
however it is the non-productive expenditure term (which consists mostly of social 
security expenditure) which appears to affect investment positively. This would 
suggest that increases in these (indirectly productive) expenditures raise the 
probability of maintaining ownership over the returns from investment and therefore 
investment itself. When we research this result further we find there is still strong 
support but only for certain categories of expenditure. The assumption of 
homogeneity across productive expenditures affecting investment also appears to be 
inappropriate. Positive growth effects are found from general public services (which 
includes expenditures on policing) funded by decreases in social-security expenditure 
but negative growth effects from defence expenditure for the same increase in social 
security expenditure are also estimated. Only the first of these findings is consistent 
with the original Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) paper. It is unclear whether the latter 
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of these two results is because of crowding out by defence expenditure or positive 
growth effects from social-security and welfare expenditure. 
If we collect together all of the results using the fiscal data as classified by the theory 
then we notice a strong measure of consistency across different econometric 
techniques and methods of averaging the data. For example, in the 14 sets of results 
we display in Table 10.1 all find significant positive growth effects from increasing 
non-distortionary taxes and decreasing distortionary ones. From this we can perhaps 
also conclude that the strongest explanation for the lack of consistent results we find 
within the thesis is that of the government budget constraint. That is, once the 
omitted variable bias from incorrectly specifying the budget constraint is accounted 
for the results become remarkably robust to most other changes. Where different 
measures of the long run are employed these tend to affect the significance of the 
variables rather than the sign. We find however that this is important for testing 
between variants of the endogenous growth model where the theory predicts some 
but not all coefficients to significantly affect growth. 
If we ignore those regressions which use period averages, static panel regression 
estimation or contain an omitted variable bias from excluding investment then we are 
left with only two sets of regression results, those for regressions 11 and 14. If the 
results from these regressions are then compared to the summary of the expected 
findings from the Barro model (presented as the first row of the table) then we can 
conclude that the Barro model is a-good representation of the data set. However, as 
we begin to disaggregate the data in Chapters 8 and 9 (but do not include in the table) 
then we find the strength of this relationship is weakened. Elements of expenditure 
we a-priori predicted to be either productive or non-productive no longer enter the 
regression with the expected sign or significance. This we feel to be a failing of the 
theory rather than the statistical procedures adopted. 
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Table 10.1: Summary of the Results for the Theoretically Classified Data 
Estimation Technique rndis/ 
rdis 
eprd/ 
enprd 
eprd/ 
rdis 
eprd/ 
rndis 
enprd 
His 
enprd 
/rndis 
Barro Model + + ? + 
_ 
0 
Static, 5-year 
1 22 countries + + 
_ 
+ 
- 
+ 
2 first period begins 1971 + + + + 
_ 
+ 
3 first period begins 1972 + + 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
4 first period begins 1973 + + 
- 
+ 
5 17 countries + + 
- 
+ 
_ 
+ 
6 GDP excluded + + 
_ 
+ 
7 IV 
_ 
8 Static 10-year + 
- - 
+ 
_ 
+ 
Dynamic 
9 5-year, Nag + 
- 
- 
+ + 
10 AH, 5-year, 1-lag + + 0 + 
11 annual, 8 lags + + + + 
" _ 
12 private invest., 15 
countries 
+ + 
_ 
+ + 
13 private invest. excluded + + 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
14 determinants of invest, + + 
_ 
+ 
_ 
+ 
10.3 Policy Implications 
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We use the next section of this chapter to draw out some possible policy implications 
of the work contained in Chapter 6 to 9. The results from this thesis suggest that 
there are significant gains (and losses) to be made from adjusting the fiscal mix 
within a country. Although one should be cautious about using the parameter 
estimates from any study to give precise measures of the effect on growth from 
changes in policy, we choose to consider such changes in order to compare of the 
relative size of government between countries. To do this we begin by extending the 
analysis made in Tables 7.2 and 7.8 of Chapter 7. That is, we show the effect on 
growth from a 10% increase in each pair of fiscal variables. We consider four 
changes: i) an increase in productive expenditure funded by increases in distortionary 
tax revenues, and vice versa; ii) changing the expenditure mix in favour of 
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productive (non-productive) expenditure; iii) changing the revenue mix in favour of 
distortionary taxation (non-distortionary) and; iv) increases in non-productive 
expenditure financed by distortionary taxation. The analysis is performed on a 
sample of 5 representative countries along with the average across all countries. The 
growth estimates present in the tables are therefore based on each county's own 
particular expenditure and revenue mix. Calculations are based on averages for the 
last available 5-year period in our data set 1990-94, summary statistics for which are 
presented in Table 10.2. 
As can be seen in Table 10.2 there is a reasonable degree of variation amongst the 
countries we use for the policy analysis. Perhaps the most notable of this variation is 
the difference in the per capita growth rate across countries. This mostly reflects 
differences in the point in the business cycle covered by the period, while the 
German figure is high relative to the others because of German reunification. 
Table 10.2: Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in for Policy Analysis 
Average 1990-94 (% of GDP) 
Growth Investment rdis rndis eprd enprd 
France 1.48 22.27 26.31 11.16 16.89 21.06 
Germany 4.05 21.84 2035 7.82 11.73 15.91 
Sweden 
-0.79 18.67 23.14 13.00 13.87 27.09 
UK 
-0.70 15.54 22.10 11.22 16.46 14.03 
US 1.86 18.30 17.18 0.75 12.50 8.04 
All 1.79 20.80 19.98 9.70 14.48 16.57 
The size of government is in general above the average of the full sample of 22 
countries (with the exception of the US) because of the bias in the sample selection 
towards European countries. However, there is still great variation in the policies 
chosen between countries. For example, in France some 2631% of GDP is collected 
by the government as distortionary taxes (the average is 19.98%), while the US 
collects only some 0.75% of GDP as non-distortionary taxes (the average is 9.70%). 
The largest spenders on productive forms of expenditure are the UK and France at 
roughly 16%. This is interesting in the case of the UK as this country had one of the 
slowest per capita growth rates over the period. Sweden, perhaps unsurprisingly, is 
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the largest spender on non-productive xpenditure at some 27.09% of GDP compared 
to the US which is the lowest at 8.04%. 
Table 10.3 below presents the results conditional on the level of investment. An 
increase in productive expenditure by 10% is not equivalent to a 10% change in non- 
productive expenditure as each represents a different proportion of GDP. The growth 
effects estimated for both of these policy changes are presented in the table, with an 
increase in the second of the policy variables in the column headings presented in 
parenthese. 
The implications for growth can be seen to vary significantly both between policies 
and between countries for the same policy. The growth effects of increases in 
productive expenditure by distortionary taxation are very small (only 0.026 of a 
percentage point on average); whereas the same increase in productive expenditure 
funded by decreasing non-productive expenditures are much larger (0539 of a 
percentage point on average). 
The largest growth effects in Table 103 can be found, however, from changes in 
either distortionary taxation or non-productive expenditure. Increases in revenues 
from distortionary taxation in France (which accounted for 2631% of GDP in 1990- 
94) decreases the growth rate by 0.692 of a percentage point if used to decrease 
revenues from non-distortionary taxation, while increases in non-productive 
expenditure in Sweden by 10% (which accounts for 27.09% of GDP in 1990-94) 
decreases the growth rate 0.943 of a percentage point if increased at the expense of 
productive expenditures. 
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Table 10.3: Growth Effect of Changes in Government Policy 
244 
policy change 
(coefficient) 
eprd/rdis 
(0.017) 
eprdlenprd 
(0.348) 
rdis/rndis 
(-0.263) 
enprd/rdis 
(-0.331) 
France 0.029 0.588 
-0.692 -0.147 (0.045) (-0.733) (0.294) (0.045) 
Germany 0.020 0.408 
-0.535 0.087 (0.035) (-0.554) (0.206) (0.035) 
Sweden 0.024 0.483 
-0.609 -0.460 (0.039) (-0.943) (0.342) (0.039) 
UK 0.028 0.573 
-0.581 0.059 (0.038) (-0.488) (0.295) (0.038) 
US 0.021 0.435 
-0.452 -0.232 (0.029) (-0.280) (0.020) (0.029) 
All 0.026 0.539 
-0.525 -0.282 (0.034) (-0.577) (0.255) (0.034) 
Table 10.4 considers the same changes as Table 103 but with the effects of fiscal 
policy via investment included. The growth effects of changes in policy are 
accordingly significantly larger in Table 10.4. Indeed, the growth effects of changes 
in the tax mix are over 1 percentage point in growth in all of the countries shown 
except for the US. Non-distortionary taxation accounts for such a small percentage of 
GDP in the US that the growth effects from changes in the tax mix in favour of non- 
distortionary taxation has a relatively small effect on per capita growth only 0.039 of 
a percentage point. 
Table 10.4: Growth Effects of Changes in Policy both Direct and Indirect Via Investment 
policy change 
(coefcient) 
eprdlrdis 
(-0.138) 
eprd/enprd 
(0.230) 
rdislrndis 
(-0.519) 
enprd/rdis 
(0.367) 
France 
-0.233 0.388 -1.366 -0.773 (-0.363) (-0.484) (0.579) (-0.966) 
Germany 
-0.162 0.270 -1.056 -0.584 (-0.281) (-0.366) (0.406) (-0.747) 
Sweden 
-0.191 0.319 -1.201 -0.994 (-0.290) (-0.623) (0.675) (-0.849) 
UK 
-0.227 0.379 -1.147 -0.515 (-0.305) (-0.323) (0.582) (. 0.811) 
us 
-0.173 0.288 -0.891 -0.295 (-0.237) (-0.185) (0.039) (-0.630) 
All 
-0.214 0.356 -1.037 -0.608 (-0.276) (-0.381) (0.504) (-0.733) 
Finding `natural experiments' with which to test the results from the thesis are 
difficult without knowing how changes in expenditure are financed. One recent 
possibility that presents itself however is the UK Spending Review by Gordon 
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Brown in July 1998. We again advise caution in applying the results from the thesis 
to any one country and simplify the proposals set out by the Chancellor in order to 
concentrate on the four main tenets of the speech, the increased expenditure on 
education, health and transport and the (relative) reduction on social security 
spending. Once one takes out the effects of inflation then education and health 
expenditure are set to increase in real terms by around 2.75% a year for three years. 
Transport is to receive a once-and-for-all increase of 25% and social security is set 
only to rise by the increase in inflation (approximately). We stylise these proposals 
somewhat and assume that these increases in expenditure will not require additional 
sources of funds and therefore hold constant the level of total expenditures as a ratio 
to GDP? If the level of total expenditures to GDP is to be maintained at a constant 
rate and we do not allow financing by other means then in order to increase 
expenditure on education, health and transport & communication expenditure as a 
ratio to GDP then social security expenditure must fall as a ratio to GDP 4 
The parameter estimates in the thesis provide us with information as to the effect on 
growth of a given change in expenditure as a percentage ratio of GDP. Along with 
the proposed increases in expenditure we therefore need to predict the expected 
increase in GDP, the growth rate. We choose 2.25% as being an average made by 
various commentators. Combining these figures then we surmise that the education 
and health expenditures will rise as a percentage ratio to GDP by around 15% (from 
132% to 1.53% of GDP for education and 5.66% to 6.53% of GDP for health) over 
the three years and close to 17% in the case of transport (we do not separate transport 
from communication expenditure in the data and so expenditures rise from 0.87% to 
1.02% of GDP). These increases in expenditure are assumed to be funded by 
decreases in social-security and welfare. Although social-security expenditure is 
expected to decline as a percentage ratio to GDP over the period (because of the 
growth of GDP) within the budget we assume for simplicity that no other category of 
expenditure is altered. This probably overestimates the compensating decrease in 
This is amongst the aims of the Chancellor but it is envisaged that additional revenues will be made 
available through reductions in other expenditures such as defence. 
This is again consistent with the Chancellors position where social security expenditure is 
maintained in real terms but because of the growth in output falls as a ratio to GDP. 
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social-security and welfare expenditure that are likely to occur. The results from this 
hypothetical exercise are presented in Table 10.5 below. 
The effect on the long run growth from this crude approximation to the Chancellor's 
proposed spending plans can at best be described as modest. Even at their largest the 
growth effects of increasing education expenditure is expected to be around only 0.1 
of a percentage point, and this effect is negative. Only one of the coefficients, 
ess/educ, was estimated as being significant in Table 8.5 in Chapter 8 and one could 
assume that the effect of the other changes in policy may get lost in the `noise' 
contained within the data. This reflects the fact that once the increases in inflation 
and GDP are accounted for the increases in expenditure in fact represent only very 
small changes in GDP. 
Unfortunately we do not have standard errors on the long run coefficients from which 
to produce confidence intervals of these growth estimates. However we do have 
standard errors from the sum of the short run fiscal parameters. We use these as an 
approximation. These confidence intervals are displayed in column four of the Table 
10.5. Even when we include the confidence intervals the results remain relatively 
modest, but we can be less sure about the direction of the effect on growth. The 
largest changes are once again from increasing education expenditure where the 
effect on growth lies within the range -0.458 to +0.202 of a percentage point. 
Table 10.5: Estimated Growth Effects of UK Spending Review, July 1998 
Relevant Average Growth Confidence Interval 
Coefficient (1990-94) Effect 
educ/ess -0.627 1.33 -0.128 -0.458 --1- 0.202 
ehlth/ess -0.163 5.66 -0.033 -0.159 -ý 0.093 
etcm/ess 0.191 0.88 0.028 -0.152 --º 0.208 
10.4 Further Research 
The availability of data; the number of degrees of freedom and computing power has 
limited the empirical research conducted in this thesis to an investigation into the 
way fiscal policy affects the growth rate directly, or indirectly via investment. For 
this reason, the tests conducted in Chapters 6 to 9 can best be thought of as a test of 
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the one-sector growth models and there remains much scope for the extension of this 
analysis into both existing models and new models of economic growth. 
The work conducted in Chapters 8 and 9 allude to the fact that our understanding of 
the channels by which fiscal policy affects growth even in the one-sector models is 
somewhat limited. Most notable of these limitations is that the government budget 
constraint methodology cannot determine between a number of competing 
explanations of the same result. For example, in Chapters 8 and 9 social security 
expenditures were found to positively affect either growth or investment against 
several forms of expenditure that were perceived a -priori to be productive. Under the 
budget constraint this may be either because social security expenditure is 
`productive', or because the marginal product on some of the ` productive' 
expenditure terms is negative. Two methods to deal with this would be to either 
collate data in which the capital investment component contained within the 
functional classifications are removed from the consumption component; or extend 
the general-to-specific specification of the budget constraint discussed in Chapter 6. 
The main results from the thesis are concentrated on the developments made to the 
expenditure side of the model. The emphasis is placed here rather than on the tax side 
because of the estimates we use for the marginal tax rate. Within the theoretical 
models marginal and average rates of taxation are identical (because all taxes are 
proportional). Such proportionality is unlikely to occur in practice and therefore the 
tax revenues we use are more likely to reflect average rather than marginal rates of 
tax. Although marginal and average tax rates are possibly correlated (and the strength 
of some of the results on the tax variables seems to confirm this) it is the marginal 
rate rather than the average rate which is likely to determine the decision of the 
marginal agent. An interesting extension of the results investigated here would be to 
include measures of the marginal rate of taxation along with the government budget 
constraiint. This may change the exact interpretation of the budget constraint for, 
although the method of financing changes in expenditure would still be important, 
the relationship with growth might appear on the marginal rather than the average tax 
rate. Support for the idea that the budget constraint may still be important can be 
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found in Kocherlakota & Yi (1997), where significant growth effects from fiscal 
policy are only found when public investment is included with an estimate of the 
marginal tax rate in the regression. 
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Tests of taxation within the two-sector models have so far only been investigated 
through simulation studies (Rebelo (1991), Stokey & Rebelo (1995)). The Mendoza 
et al. study is a first attempt at empirical testing of these models but the incomplete 
specification of the budget constraint leaves their results open to criticism. The two- 
sector models have also ignored the expenditure component of fiscal policy. The 
education model of Capolupo (1996) is a useful first breach into the testing of the 
implications of these models by simulation, but empirical testing requires reliable 
measures of human capital. The two-sector congestion model discussed in Section 
43.1 may provide an more interesting contrast to those studies which have 
considered only taxation, as the results are less likely to rely on extreme assumptions 
about the elasticity of labour supply and the production technology of the human 
capital sector (see Section 3.43 for a discussion of these issues). 
As mentioned above, fiscal policy has been limited in this thesis to policies that 
affect growth directly or indirectly via investment. However, fiscal policy may 
further affect growth by a number of additional channels such as the accumulation of 
additional factors of production, or through the invention, innovation and 
implementation of new technology. 
The most obvious additional factor of production that may be accumulated is human 
capital. Many of the current human capital measures available are based on school 
enrolment data, which may be correlated with expenditures on education leading to 
problems of collinearity amongst the regressors. Improved measures of human 
capital are available, but these are generally only calculated for 5-year periods 
(Gemmell (1996)) or for single countries (Jenkins (1995)). The results from Chapter 
7 warn against drawing conclusions from regressions using 5-year period averages 
without testing for robustness. Nonetheless we feel that this line of research may 
prove to be both interesting and fruitful. 
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Perhaps the richest line of possible research is into the way fiscal policy affects the 
innovation or the transmission of new technology into the economy. At present we 
can find only one example of a model in which fiscal policy determines the rate of 
technological change (Levine & Krichel (1996) discussed in Section 2.4). This is 
perhaps surprising given the growth of the recent literature on endogenous growth 
models into the R&D decision of firms (Aghion & Howitt (1998)). Government 
support for R&D is perhaps the obvious starting point for this research but a number 
of more subtle channels may also exist. For example, fiscal policy may affect the 
appropriation of knowledge through international trade, foreign direct investment, or 
by creating the right social-structures. 
10.5: Final Remarks 
Differences in the policies adopted by governments over time and space add 
significantly to our ability to explain the per capita growth rate in a sample of OECD 
countries. In this sense the endogenous growth model, where certain types of fiscal 
policy affect the steady state growth rate, can be better thought of as a closer 
representation of the data set under use than the neoclassical growth model. 
Providing evidence that is consistent with these endogenous growth models requires 
solving the statistical biases that cloud comparisons of the results from previous 
studies. Most notable of these is the bias from the exclusion of relevant fiscal 
variables (Chapter 6), but extends to other factors such as the, measurement of the 
long run (Chapter 7), the aggregation of the data (Chapter 8) and, the exclusion of 
investment from the regression equation (Chapter 9). The results presented in the 
thesis suggest that the description of growth provided by the Barro (1990) receives 
the strongest support and forms a useful basis from which to conduct further 
research. 
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Appendix A: 
Data Sources and Characteristics 
We use this appendix to describe the sources and characteristics of the data used in 
the empirical Chapters 6 to 9. We begin with a description of the fiscal data before 
moving on to the conditioning variables and the growth rate used in Chapters 6 to 8 
(Section A2). The additional variables used in Chapter 9 are described separately 
(Section A3) as they refer to a smaller number of countries. Finally, although the 
ADF tests strictly follow from the discussion made in Appendix B we choose to 
present them here. 
Al: Fiscal Variables 
A1.1: Data Sources 
The fiscal data used in the thesis is collated from the Government Financial Statistics 
Yearbook (GFSY) published by the IMF. Data was available for 22 OECD countries, 
with a dominant time span from 1970 (or 1972) to 1992 (or 1994). This time span is 
not consistent across countries for example data for Switzerland exits only for 1970- 
84. The level of government used in the study is the consolidated level and therefore 
includes data for local, national and supranational levels of government. 
Mendoza et al (1997) note the principal difficulty in empirical investigations of fiscal 
policy is constructing measures of taxation and government expenditure to accord 
with those found in the theory. The tax measures used in the theory are ad valorem 
taxes which have the appealing feature that the marginal and average tax rates are 
equal but are simplistic in comparison to the real tax structures of countries. Any 
accurate measure of taxation has to compete with problems such as tax exemptions 
and non-progressive taxes: problems which are further complicated when 
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comparisons are to be made across countries. Although accepting that the true 
measures of the tax burden should calculate the marginal rate of tax it is not clear 
how such measures would fit with the idea of the government budget constraint 
considered in Chapter 6. Instead we use tax revenue measures from the GFSY. These 
perhaps most accurately reflect average rather than marginal rate of tax. ' The tax 
revenue variables collected are income, profit and capital gains tax, social security 
contributions, taxation on payroll and manpower, taxation on property, taxation on 
domestic goods and services, taxation on international trade, surplus financing and 
other taxes and non-tax revenues. 
The treatment of public expenditures is generally considered to be less problematic in 
transferring from the theoretical to the empirical literature. However, our choice of 
the functional classifications of the expenditure are imperfect in the sense that they 
contain both consumption (non-productive) and public investment expenditures 
(productive) together. Such classifications do provide us with an indication of the 
area of the economy at which the measures are directed at. Data limitations prevent 
us from improving on these classifications. The expenditure categories collected 
include expenditure on general public services, defence, education, health, social- 
security & welfare, housing & community amenities, recreational & cultural services, 
economic services, transport & communication and other expenditure. 
A1.2 Data Characteristics 
Our analysis of the characteristics of fiscal policy concentrates on classifications of 
the fiscal data taken from the GFSY rather than the aggregated forms used Chapters 
6 to 9, although we do provide a brief description of this data in Section A. 1.3 below. 
The use of aggregate tax measures is not unprecedented in the theory, for example sec Koester & 
Kormendi (1989) and Easterly & Rebelo (1993). 
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Aggregate Measures 
Considering first the broad fiscal aggregates. The average ratio of total revs nur to 
GDP per country across all countries is 32.38', 4 
.' 
't'his ranges between 'l urkev which 
has the smallest size of government under this measure at I $. O5''( to the Netherlands 
at 49.6%. If total expenditures are used to measures the size government then the 
figures are slightly larger in value. The average across all countries is 34. s`*; 
, 
which 
ranges from Netherlands (53.06%%) as the upper limit to Switzerland at the lower 
boundary (18.4%). Table Al presents averages over the period for a small suh- 
sample of countries in order to highlight differences in the size of, government across 
countries. 
Table A. 1: Agg regate Fiscal Data (`; (I(SI)P)I'lla Sull-San)Iile (1I()1 '1 ( uuti iý 
Per- Total Revenue, Total Tax Total 
Capita % of GUP Revenue, (YO of' Expenditure, rIý 
Growth G1)P iºf (. I)1' 
Australia ). U7 25 h 
Austria 2.68 34 31 37 
UK 1.95 35 :1 37 
Us 2.53 20 18 n3 
All 2.84 
In general the size of government has increased over the period. This has heen nit)st 
pronounced in Australia and Belgium, where government has increased tom 23. Yý 
(1970-74) and 38.8% (1970-74) respectively toi 27. (I ý)ý)tº-94) and 5-1. "'c( (I 9 
89). In contrast, Ireland has actually seen a decline in the size of government O VCCF the 
period (from 51.9% (1980-84) to 46.2%/rý (1990-94)). 
The increase in government over the period is sometimes used as all cxpIanation for 
slower growth rates across countries, however, borrowing data from Scction X1.2 we 
can show that there is little correlation between these aggro atc nic<«ures and 
2 All averages discussed in this section arc calculated as the average across all data puuints. 
"1lrhrrrcli_x A. Dula , Soil, cc". ti talc/ (Maroc lcri. sliu". N 
growth. Figure Al shows a scatter of the average total revenue (; 1)11 r; rtiO I)cr 
-cm u ntIN 
against average growth, while Figure A2 shows a scatter of the 
expenditure to GDP ratio per country against average growth. l spun iiiV tigatio'n it 
was found that the partial correlation between government expenditures and growth 
never exceeds 0.25 although the exact correlation varies aý mss countries. 
Figure A. 1 
Scatter of the Average Total Revenue GDP Ratio per Country and Growth 
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Figure A. 2 
Scatter of the Average Total Expenditure to GDP Ratio per Country and Growth 
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The total expenditure term discussed here does not inrludc Icnding, minus repayments which are 
considered as a separate item helow. 
Appendix A: /)ulu 
, 
S'ucrrc"es cure/ ('hurcrc Icviclic. ý 
Taxation 
Within the disaggregatcd data sei three main types oot t. rx, rti(n ddominate the verýrec 
tax budget. These are taxation on income, profit and capital taxation on social 
security and taxation on domestic goods and services (as slm wn in Figure A. 3). 'I*hc" 
revenues are obtained in similar proportions with intonie, profit and capital grins 
taxation accounting for 351% of the average budget, social security for 2W and 
taxation on domestic goods and services for 31 ` iý 
. 
Figure A. 3 
Pie Chart Showing Proportion of Type of Tax revenue for All 
Countries 
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From Figure A. 4 it would appear the relative importance of these tax revenues has 
changed very little over the period, however, these aigregate figures hide sulh, tarltial 
differences in both the revenue breakdown between countries and the chanzes in the 
revenue mix within countries over the period. For exan111I1e income, Ipr01it and calpitarl 
gains taxation provides 68.917c of total tax revenue in Australia hut only 15.4', in 
Switzerland: while social-security taxation provides over half' of tax revenues in 
Germany hut is not used in either Australia or'I'urkev. Ol ('I) countries have also 
altered the hreakdown of their tax revenues over time. For example I, *cigium, have 
collected an increasing share of revenue from income taxes rather then taxes (, n 
goods and services while others, such as the UK, has adopted the opposite strategy. 
Germany and the US have collected a decreasing proportion of revenue's from taws', 
4ppc ndia A: ! lulu Souº"< <s and ('huruc Ic ri. slic. s 
on income and goods and services taxation in favour of increased revenues froiu 
social security taxation, while Finland has not changed the iriAcup of its tax 
revenues over the period. 
Table A. 2: Tax Revenues (Y oL"I'OtaI) liar aSuI)- ti ,irnl)lk (d OI ( 1) ('oIunli ik " 
16 
Australia Austria UK US All 
Income, profit & capital 
gains 
O .1 -ti ý8 34 
Social Security U 37 19 36 
Payroll & Manpower. 0.9 7 I 9 I 
Property 0.5 2 
Domestic goods & 
services 
21 29 1 1 
Internat. trade ? 0.3 2 4 
Other taxes 0.006 2 0.02 (l. O(º : 1 
Figure A. 4 
Tax Revenues by Type, Percentage Ratio of Total Revenues 
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Social security and welfare expenditures dominate the ýIVCrIgC expenditure' hudg(. t 
for the OECD countries in our sample. As shown in Figure A5 social security and 
welfarc payments account for 3({ of the expenditure hudgct, far higher than 
Li, rý. , ýn u! ý.. i r 
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expenditures on general public services' (7'; ), clc lcnwc (8, ( ). u(luc; ttwn (')'( I ), of, 
health (917r) 
Figure A. 5 
Pie Chart Showing Proportion of Type of Expenditure for all 
Countries 
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A diverse nix of expenditures is also evident when comparing across countries. 
Social security and welfare payments account for close to 5ft1? of exp nditures in 
some countries (for example Spain, Luxe mhourg and Germany), whereas Iceland, 
Turkey and the UK offer a much more balanced budget in terms of expenditure. 
Takle A provides a summary of the average of the dif'I'k. rent type of expenditure for a 
small selection of countries available in our sample. 
Governments in industrialised countries have increased expenditures on 
security faster than other forms of expenditure. For this reason (sec Figure A. 6) these 
have increased as a percentage of total expenditure from 30.1 (<< in 1970-74 to 35. S 
in 1985-89. Of the other forms of expenditure in the chart only' one, health 
expenditure, has also increased as a percentage of the average ludet over the period. 
' Expenditures on general public services include expenditures on public order and safety Much are 
disaggrcgated in later editions of the GI SY 
social security and 
welfare 
35% 
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Table A. 3: Avcrrgc Expenditures ('% r)f 'I'nt; rl) for Suh-S, rnilplr of OI ('1) Con III rW" 
Education 7 1(1 3 
Health 1(I 12 13 12 
social 
Security 
77 46 , ti 
Housing... I 3 3 
Religion.. (I. (II (I. (07 (I. 3 (I. 3 (º. ý1 
Economic 
Services 
7 4 7 r. , 
Transport 
Commun - 
7 6 
Other 26 8 (, 1-1 13 
Figure A. 6 
Comparison of Public Expenditures (% Total Expenditures), 1970-75 
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The final fiscal variables to considered arc the government budget surlmIuti; dct'icit and 
the lending minus repayments. Takle A. 4 gives the average budget surplus d elicit 
and lending minus repayment figures for a small sub-sample u1' countries over the 
time period 1970 to 1994. The average budget surplus was 3.68"; ()1' G1)P, while the 
only country to display a net budget surplus over the period is I iixcnrhourg (a 
Appendix- A: Dula Sources und ('hurucleristic". s A () 
surplus of 1.83`%% of GDP). The majority of hurl ýt surplus arc below' thLc Iý: Mt I 
convergence criterion of 4%%% of GDP except for sonic o1' the poorer IJ I comntrics 
(Greece (11.06%), Ireland (7.28'Y(, ), Italy (II. $2(-( ), Portugal (1 1.2' I''. )) and Iii Igiuni 
(7.29%). 
Lending minus repayment refers to "governnment lending for puhlir polio 
less repayments to government 
- 
and government acquisition of equity participation 
for public policy purposes 
- 
less any sales of such equities by governnment. "' Very 
little is made of this variable in the text and we include it in the table only for 
completeness. 
Table A. 4: Sunimarv Statistics for Rtidgct Surplus mid I ending. Minus Repaymcnts 
Overall 
surplus 
Lending 
minus 
repayments 
Australia 
-0.0158 
_0.0085 Belgium 
-0.0729 0.0082 
Germany 
-0.0122 0.0034 
Ireland 
-0.0728 0.0103 
Sweden 
-0.0412 0.0354 
UK 
-0.0317 0.0111 
US 
-0.0345 0.0037 
All 
-0.0368 0.0118 
AI. 3: ii, eureticalhv Classified lulu 
The results from the Barro (1990) model are dependent upon hy the classification OI 
fiscal variables as one cif four types. In accordance with this we aggregate the GI til' 
functional classifications of the fiscal variables into these four categories. This 
process is described in Table A. 5 below. Several of the functional classifications in 
the GFSY have no theoretical counterpart and are relegated to the -othcr cxpccnditurc 
and `other revenue' terms". The final fiscal variahle is the government hudget 
Introduction to GT SY ( 1995) puhlishcd by IMF 
The GFSY includes an expenditure category entitled 'lending minus repaymcnts' which can talc 
either negative or positive values. In order to overcome problems of hrrw to classify' this variable it 
was decided to include this item as a separate variable within the regressions but n( )1 to discuss it. It 
appears under the variable name elm- in the results. 
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surplus/deficit. The sensitivity of the results to this classification ()I thc data is to sled 
for in Section 6.4 and extensively in Chapter 8. 
Table A. 5: Functional/I'hcnrccIicaiI ('I, isý, ifiralioýn,, 
New Classification Functional Classification 
distortionary taxation (rdbi) taxation ºon i11cl)n1C' and Ipr()i'it 
social scruritV contributions 
taxation on I, aVrl)ll and ni tnhuwer 
taxation oil property 
non-distortionary taxation (rudis) taxation on clometitic goods and services 
other revenues (roth) taxation on international trade 
non-tax rý'Vt'l ues 
other tax revenues 
productive expenditures (eprd) £encral public services expenditure 
deftnee expenditure 
educational expenditure' 
health expenditure 
housing expenditure 
transport and curl1mLill ication expenditure 
unproductive expenditures (enprd) social security and welt'are expenditure 
expenditure on recreation 
expenditure on economic services 
other expenditure (eoth) other expenditure 
The theoretical classifications of the data are averaged across 5-year periods in order 
to reduce sonic of the statistical hias likely to he evident within the data (a discussed 
in Chapter 5). In order to maintain ccluality across the government hurl et constraint 
after period averaging, it was necessary to classify one of the 7 available fiscal 
variables as the balancing item. Two methods were used for this: the first was toi 
Af)f)CnAvA: Dula Sources and ('hcrrac lcri. clrr, s 
balance the budget through the surplus term and the second through the `other 
expenditure' and `other revenue' terms. The new surplus variahlc was calculated as 
the sum of the averaged revenue terms minus the avcr, rged expenditure terms. 'I'mre 
new `other revenue' variable was calculate(] as the s tim of the averaged total revenues 
minus the sum of the averaged sub categories of revenue eXCiU iin other revenues. 
The `other expenditure' variable was calculated in a similar manner. The empirical 
results suggest there was no difference between the two methods. Finally, sonic 
descriptive statistics for this data are presented in Table A. 6 below. 
Takle A. 6: Descriptive Statistics fo r'I hcorctic, il I)at, i tint 
Variable Mean Standard Minimum maximum 
Deviation (country) (country) 
sur (% of GDP) 
-ý 0IS I 1.76 I. 
(Porto al) (I 
, 
uxcn'ihourg) 
elmr of GDP) 1.22 1.39 U. II 4.41) 
(Irrland) (Norway) 
rdis (% of GDP) 18.76 7.25 7.10 33.47 
(Irclanrl) (Neiiicrlmnds) 
rndis (% of GDP) 9.15 4.22 0.96 16.77 
(US) (No rwav) 
roth of GDP) 4.56 2.96 1.51 16.72 
(Germany) (Ireland) 
eprd (% of GDP) 14.69 4.57 7.35 7.1 
(Canada) (Italy 
enprd (% of GDP) 15.24 6.05 4.96 
- 
Turkey ý 1.3I 
- 
I. IIXCIl holm. 
eoth (% of GDP) 4.44 3.07 0.98_f_inland 9.16 
- 
Ireland 
A2: Conditioning Variables and Per Capita Growth 
A2.1 Sources 
The other variables we use in the empirical tests contained in ('haptas 6 to 8 are the 
per capita growth rate, the invcstrnent ratio, the labour furcc growth ratL and initial 
GDP. Summary statistics of these variahies can he found in Tahic A. 7. 
1/r/)CndirA: l)a! a Sources and ('lruraclerislir. S 
'fahle A. 7: Oescriptivc StaIistics cif ('on(IItinrririg \'; iri; ihlc. s 
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation (country) (country) 
x. 71) 1.00 I 
.. 
ý 1 I 
GDPp. c. growth (Switzakrn(I) ('l'urk(-y-) 
(% p. a. ) 
initial CDP 10710 3378.78 -966 15113 
((, DI'70) ('1'urkcv) (l is) 
invest. (% of GDP) 
-2. ()6 3.61 18.11 (inv) (UK) (I'rrrtu al) 
lab. force growth 1.06 0.80 
-0.06 2.06 (lbfg) (Germany) (Iceland) 
In accordance with usual practice the growth rate is taken as the log diII rencc 
between annual per capita GDP figures taken from the World Bank ('I) ROM. We do 
not correct for differences in international prices to allow the ; growth data try rctlcct 
the domestic prices agents actually face (Nuxoll (1994)). 'I'he investnient rate and the 
labour force growth rates were taken from the sanic source, and then invccstnient 
expressed as a ratio to GDP. Following Nuxoýll (1994) initial GI)P is taken from ilk 
Penn World tables (Sumnmer & Hrston (I 99 1)). ' 
A2.2 Characlcri, s'iics 
The relationship between growth and initial (SDP is shown in Figure A7 Ix io ý". "I'hL' 
diagram is based on 5 period averaged data. A weak negative correlation of around 
- 
0.5 is found which is typical of that found a moýngst a sanihlr of OF VD countries (for 
example Devarajan et al. (1996)). This can he used as evidence of convvergeence 
amongst income levels in our sample of countries aver the period 1970 toi 1994. 
' For a discussion of the reasons for using nun-I'PI' adjusted data f'oor growth ritc,,. hit I'I'I' aiIjutcd 
[Or initial inrumc see Temple (I99S). 
Figure A. 7 
Scatter of Initial GDP and Growth 
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The scatter of the investment ratio and the growth rate is given in figure A. S. It is 
clear that no strong pattern exists and upon investigation the correlation is I'Mind toi 
be 0.25. The average across all countries is 22 ? ti1'G1W although this varies hetwccn 
Ireland (16.3%) and Norway (30.31, %). In general there has boon ýi decline in this ratio 
over the period. 
Figure A. 8 
Scatter of Investment Ratio and Per Capita Growth 
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The final variable to consider is the growth of the lahour force. Fiiurc AO) presents 
the partial correlation between these two variables, which once agillll can 
Ill' 
', feil toi 
he weak. 
Figure A. 9 
Scatter of the Growth of the Labour Force and Per Capita Growth 
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A3 Variables front Chapter 9 
-i 
Data availability limits the number oo1'countries used in too. jtIst I5 (except 
for private investment ratio where data for 17 countries was available). A lack ()f data 
on actual private investment rates across countries mains we are restricted toi 
following standard practice in the Iitrrature (see Ir example Easterly & Rehelo 
(1993)) and the ratio of private investment rate (pinº) to GI )P was calculated as totaI 
investment less government capital investment. 
When estimating the determinants of investment in Section 9. 
-l. 2' we include scvcral 
conditioning variables. Two cif these. the ratio oof exhorts plus imports toi (iI )I' (c. rim), 
the rate cif growth of prices Per annum (iii/) were taken from the World Krnl. ( 'I ) 
ROM. The relative price of investment (r-rün-) was calculated as the inverse' OI the 
Appendix A: Data Sources and Characteristics 
ratio of the price of investment to the price of GDP taken from the Penn World 
tables. This data was available only for 1970-92. 
A15 
Long run interest rates were proxied by the government bond yield. Limitations on 
data availability meant this measure was used for 13 countries8, while the 24 month 
deposit rate was used for Finland (1981-94), the 6-12 month deposit rate for 
Spain(1978-94) and the 3 month deposit rate for Turkey and Iceland ((1978-93) and 
(1976-93) respectively). All data were taken from IMF data sources. Real long term 
interest rates were then calculated as long term interest rates less the rate of growth of 
prices per annum. Upon inspection the data for Iceland and Turkey were found to be 
highly volatile and mostly negative and so were dropped on the basis that 3-month 
deposits were a poor proxy for long term interest rates during high periods of 
inflation. Table A8 provides a summary of the necessary statistics for these variables. 
Table A. 8: Summary Statistics for Additional Variables Used in Chapter 9. 
prinv exim inf rcstinv rrrate 
average 18.99 0.68 6.76 1.1163 3.12 
standard 
deviation 
3.84 0.42 3.95 0.923 3.84 
minimum 
(country) 
10.66 
(Canada) 
0.12 
(US) -1.30 (Norway) 
0.8917 
(Austria) 
-11.93 
(Spain) 
maximum 
(country) 
34.33 
(Norway) 
2.08 
(Luxembourg) 
26.29 
(UK') 
1.4308 
(Canada) 
14.49 
(Norway) 
A4 Stationarity Tests 
The specification of the dynamic panel equation in Chapters 7 to 9 (and discussed 
further in Appendix B) requires the variables to be stationary. The majority of the 
variables used within this study are expressed as a ratio of GDP and are therefore 
bounded between zero and one. Non-stationarity is unlikely to be evident within the 
data set but nonetheless Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
stationarity tests were carried. Unfortunately stationarity tests for panel data series 
8 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, UK and the US. 
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are relatively under-developed. For this reason we choose to extend the basic DF and 
ADF specification in the following way. The DF test is written as, 
Equation A. 1 oyit w. 1+. y,,, 
_, 
and the ADF test as, 
n 
Equation A. 2 Ay1, aA+ ObYo-i + AAM t-r 
where the hypothesis 4-0 is used to test for the stationarity of y (if 4-0 then the 
null of non-stationarity is accepted). 
Tests carried out for the fiscal variables are presented first followed by the tests on 
the remaining variables. Evidence of autocorrelation amongst the residuals when 
running DF test meant that ADF tests with two lagged dependent variables were used 
for the tests on the fiscal data. 9 No critical values specifically for panel data test for 
stationarity could be found and so for want of an alternative the critical values from 
the standard ADF test (Harris (1995)) were used. The critical values at the 5% level 
of significance were 3.68 when we have 500 observations (we have around 300 
observations) and 3.95 when for a time dimension of 25. In the absence of adequate 
alternatives we use these as the limits for the critical values for panel ADF tests. 
When compared to the t-statistics presented in Table AS clear rejection of the null is 
found, with only elmr coming close to being rejected with a t-statistics of 4.764. 
From this evidence we conclude that the fiscal data appears to be stationary. '° 
9 County dummies were also included within the regression. 
'o Tests were also carried out for each country individually. However, despite the weak power of the 
test with very few observations available for each country a significant number of rejections of the 
null of non-stationarity was found for most of the fiscal variables. 
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Table A. 9: Stationarity Tests for the Fiscal Data 
A17 
Variable sur rot rinc rss rpay rprop rids riot Toth clmr ceps 
t-value -8.598 . 20.588 -33.595 . 11.198 -8.026 -19.415 -13.587 -10.699 -8.768 4.764 -24.182 
Variable edel educ ehlth ess eho erec eserv etcom ecap Goth 
t-value -21.091 -15.607 -16.623 -6.057 -9.034 "13.320 -14.778 -16.207 . 15.201 -12.660 
Conditioning Variables 
The additional variables used in this study (the growth rate, the investment to GDP 
ratio and labour force growth rate) were also tested using the panel data approach. 
Tests favored the ADF test with one lagged dependent variable, the results for which 
are presented in Table A. 10.11 Using the critical values for the ADF test as 3.95 
(T=25) and 3.68 (N*T=500). As with the fiscal variables the t-statistics are clearly 
above the critical values taken from Harris (1995) and so the alternative of 
stationarity of the conditioning variables is accepted. 12 
Table A. 10: Stationarity Tests for the Additional Data 
I ADF (one lag) 
Growth 
-13.231 
Investment 
-11.661 
Labour Force Growth 
1 Rate 
-13.451 
11 The regressions were again estimated including country dummies. 
12 The results for investment match similar ones made by King, Plosscr, Stock & Watson (1991). 
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BI Introduction 
We use this appendix to describe the characteristics of the panel data estimators used 
throughout chapters 6 to 9. We use in Chapter 6 to 9 two different types of panel data 
technique: static panel techniques (no lagged values), and the dynamic (includes 
lagged values). The properties of these two estimators are quite different and we 
therefore review them in some detail here. We begin with a discussion of the static 
panel regressors (section B2) before moving onto the more complex dynamic panel 
regressors (Section B3). The final section of the Appendix (Section B4) is used to 
describe the long run parameters from the dynamic panel regression. 
Panel data estimation offers several advantages over alternatives such as cross- 
section' or time series estimation for this study, the most important of which is the 
shape of the available data set. A time dimension of around 20 observations per 
country is too short to be able to apply time series techniques, whereas if cross- 
section regressions are used we are left with only 22 observations. Data availability 
prevents finding long time series while, the problems of simultaneity and the 
heterogeneity of parameters (see Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.4) can be used to argue 
against finding data for a greater number of cross-sectional units. Using panel data 
techniques allows us to increase the available degrees of freedom without 
aggravating simultaneity or parameter heterogeneity and more importantly allow us 
to use more of the information contained within the data to improve the efficiency of 
the parameter estimates. Panel data estimators also allows us to account for 
unobservable country and time specific effects such as the growth of technology. 
' See Temple (1998) and Durlauf & Quah (1998) for a comprehensive review of the problems of 
cross-country growth regressions. 
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B2: Static Panel Data Estimators 
The basic static panel data regression runs over the equation, 
Equation B. 1 yjr na+x,,, 8 + u1, 
where y; t is the explanatory variable and x;, is a matrix of explanatory variables. The 
112 
error term is assumed to be random but contain the effects of omitted variables. The 
error term u; t can be decomposed into three parts: country varying time invariant 
effects µ;, time varying country invariant effects i,, and a classical error term c (with 
the classical properties of IID(O, (yE2) and E(c 1, x;, )=0). 
Equation B. 2 Ui: = Pi + "If + 
-'it 
The parameter estimates in the ß matrix are unbiased and consistent as both N and T 
tend to infinity, while the properties of µ; and /depend upon the time dimension of 
tý. 
the data series, T--i-oo. The estimation program used within this thesis, LIMDEP 
(Greene (1992)), automatically estimates standard OLS, least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) fixed effects models (with both one way and two way error terms) 
and two-step feasible GLS random effects models. We discuss the principal features 
of the fixed and random effects models here, but the reader is referred to Hsiao 
(1986) or Baltagi (1995) for further details. 
B2.1 Fixed Effects 
Under the fixed effects model the omitted variable terms µ; and X are assumed to be 
fixed parameters to be estimated. Equation (B1) can therefore be written as, 
Equation B. 3 y,, 0a+x,, Q +p++ Eis , 
where dummy variables are used for µ; and ? at the appropriate points and e; l is an 
error term which has the classical properties described above. Both two way error 
component models (where the country and time specific effects are the two error 
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components) and one way error components models (where the one way error 
component are the country specific effects) are calculated by LIMDEP using a 
common transform of (B3) to remove country and time specific effects and conserve 
degrees of freedom. 2 The estimated regression for the two way error component 
model with fixed effects is therefore calculated as, 
Equation B. 4 ýYtr 
'- Yr +Y ýý ° ßýXtr - xý - Xr +X ý+ ýEýr - 6ý - Eý + 
where y,, yl are the means of the cross country and time series elements respectively 
and y is the overall mean of the variable. 
B2.2 Random Effects 
The random effects model treats the country specific and the time specific effects as 
being randomly drawn from a known population. The error term c,;, is assumed to 
have the following properties, 
E(pr) 
° 
E(2r) 
- 
E(err) 
-0 
E(pr2r) 
- 
E(p, Err) 
- 
E(2rer1) 
-0 
Qý, i 
-j E(, u, fui) to, j ;dj 
Equation B. 5E 1Q2 gsat ( J)@ O, s0t 
a, 
,i-j, s nt E(e;, E1s) a O, i x j, s; t 
That is µ;, X,; and c; display the properties of the classical error term and µ;, vj and ci 
are independent of both x; and of each other. 
The variance of y conditional on the variables x;, is given by, 
Z This has the additional advantage of removing any correlation between the fixed effects and the 
regressors in x;,. More of this is made below. 
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Equation B. 6 o'2 ° Q2 + Q2 + UE 
LIMDEP estimates the RE model using two stage GLS (the details of which can be 
found in Greene (1992)), where GLS estimates are more efficient than those from 
B4 
LSDV estimators of the RE model. The variance components are estimated by using 
the residuals from the LSDV FE model described above. 
B2.3 Fixed or Random Effects? 
"The fixed-effects model is viewed as one in which investigators make inferences 
conditional on the effects that are in the sample. The random-effects model is viewed 
as one in which investigators make unconditional or marginal inferences with respect 
to the population of all effects. There is really no distinction in the `nature (of the 
effect). ' It is up to the investigator to decide whether to make inference with respect 
to the population characteristics or only with respect to the effects that are in the 
sample 
. 
993 We follow common practice in the use of macro-shaped data sets (small N. 
small to medium T) in favouring the results from the fixed effects model because the 
sample contains almost all OECD countries rather than a random sample of them: 
and secondly, because of the likely correlation between the explanatory variables and 
the country specific effects (Judson &Owen (1997)). 
Formal testing between the FE and RE models is made using the Hausman (1978) 
specification test. Correlation among the regressors and the country specific 
characteristics results in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates from the GLS 
estimator of the RE model. The transformation used to estimate the FE model (given 
by equation B4 above) does not suffer from this problem as the fixed effects are 
removed from the equation. The null hypothesis is therefore that the estimators of ß 
from the FE and RE models are identical. That is, that there is no correlation between 
the variables in x; t and the individual characteristics. The FE estimators can be used 
3 Hsiao, C. (1986) "Analysis of Panel Data", Econometric Society Monographs, pp-42 
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whether the null hypothesis is accepted or not but the GLS estimator is BLUE only 
when the null is accepted. The null hypothesis is consistently rejected when 
estimating the RE model in Chapter 6 and 7 and so at no point do we present the 
results from the RE models. 
B3 Dynamic Panel Data Estimators 
B5 
Pesaran (1997) argues that in order to estimate empirically the long run or steady 
state from economic growth models then "the steady state solutions can be embedded 
within a suitable multivariate dynamic model. "4 One possible econometric procedure 
for studying the steady state of the type of growth models reviewed in Chapters 1-4 
is through dynamic panel data models. Dynamic panel data regression equations are 
essentially identical to static panel data techniques except the dynamic regressions 
adds lagged values of the explanatory variables. The addition of these terms both 
complicates the estimation procedure and the choice between estimation techniques. 
Indeed Judson & Owen (1997) conclude that no estimator is appropriate in all 
circumstances and the best technique varies with the dimensions of the data set. 
The dynamic panel data regression extends equation (B1) to include lagged terms, 
co 00 
Equation B. 7 Yrr = at + 
Ya 2rYrr-i + Qrxr, 
r-k + sit 
-i -o 
Ignoring for the moment the exact nature of the unobserved coefficients at (there 
fixed or random effects): in order to estimate an equation for the steady state a 
dynamic panel data equation of the following form is required, 
nP9 
Equation B. 8 Ayu 
= au + 2i AY1, r-I + 
X, 8144-k +X lZi, ý-m + Err jýl m-0 
4 Pesaran, M. H. (1997) "The role of economic theory in modelling the long run" Economic Journal, 
vol. 107, no. 440, January, pp. 178-9 
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If y represents output then the solution for the steady state regresses the growth of 
output on lagged growth and two vectors of explanatory variables, one which 
contains variables in level form (such as government expenditures) and a second 
which contains first differenced variables. This is a somewhat unusual dynamic panel 
data equation compared to those typically found in the literature but follows from 
specifying the regression as an Error Correction Model (ECM) with the long run 
component set to zero. To see this assume that output is cointegrated to some set of 
explanatory variables. A Granger ECM can be used to represent this relationship, 
W OD 
Equation B. 9 eyu 
= au + 8(y, xjr; 
-i - Yr, r-i) +I Ar AYi f-! + 
XQr AXrr-t + ei, 
Postulating no long run relationship between output and the error correction 
component of the regression (i. e. assuming that all variables are 1(0)) means that the 
coefficient S is assumed to be zero and can be dropped. For the vector of fiscal 
variables, z;,,, to added into equation (B9), so as to leave an equation if the form in 
equation (B8), requires the fiscal variables must also be stationary. King, Plosser, 
Stock & Watson (1991) demonstrate that for a number of key US macroeconomic 
time series when expressed a ratio to GDP this is indeed the case. ' Consumption, 
investment and output are found to be integrated to order 1, I(1), with drift but 
stationary when written as a ratio to GDP. Evidence that the growth rate, the set of 
conditioning variables and the fiscal variables (as a ratio to GDP) are 1(0) can be 
found in Appendix A (Section A4). 
B3.1 Fixed or Random Effects? 
A number of different estimation procedures for panel data are described in the 
literature each referring to a different size of N and T. However, these techniques are 
usually applicable to data with small T and large N (such as instrumental variables), 
or large N and T (such as slope heterogeneity) and so do not match the specifications 
of the data set used in this thesis. Judson & Owen (1997) discuss the benefits and 
s Additional advantages to expressing the data as a ratio to GDP can be found in Section 5.2. 
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costs of a number of alternative estimators in typical macro data sets and we follow 
their review of the literature closely here. Only fixed effects models are reviewed, 
given; the likely correlation between the country-specific characteristics and the other 
regressors and; the data set is likely to contain most of the countries of interest 
(Judson & Owen (1997)). To this list we add that the random effects estimators are 
consistent only when the data set has a large cross-section unit. It is felt that the 
reliance on such asymptotics precludes their use in this study. 
B3.2 Fixed Effects 
We begin by simplifying equation B8 to match regression equations more commonly 
discussed in the literature, 
Equation B. 10 Ay,, a, +. +, eyi,, _i +. 
Ix. + uir 
i=1........ N t=1........ T 
Eu;, =O, Eu,, uus = Qu2 if i=j, t=s Eu;, u;, =0 if itj, tos. 
Where y is a scalar, x;, is a Kxl vector of explanatory variables, ß is a 1xK vector of 
constants, a; is the unobserved country specific effect, ý, is the unobserved time 
specific effect and u; 1 is the stochastic error term. We further assume for simplicity 
that only individual effects are relevant, although adding time-specific effects adds 
little complication. 
Baltagi (1995) shows that Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimation of the 
fixed effects model leads to serial correlation between the error term and lagged 
dependent variables and inconsistent results. This bias approaches zero as the time 
dimensions approaches infinity (Nickell (1981)), but Pesaran & Smith (1995) show 
in a study with a time series element of 29 observations the bias is not serious. When 
a large time series is not available Anderson-Hsiao (1981) suggest two possible 
solutions; first differencing B8 to remove the fixed effects and estimating by 
instrumental variables (where lagged levels are commonly adopted as the most 
appropriate instruments 
- 
Arellano (1989), Arellano & Bond (1991) and Kiviet 
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(1995)); or secondly, using some form of Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator. The GMM estimators improve on the AH estimators by using all lagged 
values of the dependent variables plus lagged values of the exogenous regressors as 
instruments in order to gain efficiency. However, the properties of instrumental 
variables are such that they are efficient only in large N. The final estimation 
procedure discussed by Judson & Owen (1997) is one by Kiviet (1995) which 
subtracts the estimated bias from the LSDV coefficients. Unfortunately this 
procedure requires a balanced data set (each country to have identical T). 
Judson and Owen (1997) demonstrate using Monte Carlo techniques that the for 
macro-shaped data sets the bias in the parameter estimates of the x matrix are small 
B8 
and cannot be used to distinguish between estimators. This is interesting in the sense 
of this study as it is the estimates of these parameters which are the principal 
concern. The bias in the lagged dependent variables is found to display greater 
variation between estimators 6 The AH and GMM estimators are found to improve 
when N becomes large (as expected) while all estimators (except OLS) improve'as T 
becomes large. Judson & Owen argue that AH and corrected LSDV consistently 
outperform the others for typical macro-data sets, but show in an empirical example 
that these computationally more complex procedures inflate the standard errors of the 
parameters of interest (those on the x matrix) leading to a greater number of 
insignificant coefficients. As Judson & Owen write "the Anderson-Hsiao estimator 
seems to apply a cure that is worse that the disease. "' For this reason in this study we 
initially use LSDV estimators but test the robustness of the results to the use of AH 
estimators. We do not use the corrected LSDV approach because of the requirement 
of a balanced data set and the potential loss of efficiency in the parameter estimates 
that results from this reduction in observations. 
6 This is likely to affect our estimates of the long run coefficients (see Section B4 below). 
7 Judson & Owen (1997) pp. 16 
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B3.3 Heterogeneous Slopes 
The standard pooling techniques of the regression equation in either (B7) or (B8) 
B9 
assumes that the slope coefficients on ß and % are equal. " If slope homogeneity is an 
incorrect restriction then the estimated coefficients will be biased. The bias exists 
because of the serial correlation with the error term and leads to inconsistent 
estimates no matter the size of either the number of countries, N, or the time 
dimension, T (greater detail can be found in Pesaran, Smith & Im (1995), Pesaran & 
Smith (1995) or Lee, Pesaran & Smith (1997)). Pesaran, Smith & Im (1995) suggest 
that slope heterogeneity is commonplace, but argue that its effects are diminished if a 
reasonable time dimension (T greater than 25) is contained within the data set. Given 
the large number of regressors used in this study (leading to a problem with degrees 
of freedom) along with the moderately large time series element of the available data 
set, leads us to reject the use of techniques to correct for parameter heterogeneity 
here. However, we accept its possible presence and follow the advice given by 
Pesaran, Smith & Im that "it is perhaps more prudent to admit the limitations of 
one's data and be more cautious about the conclusions that can be drawn from 
dynamic panelsi'. 
B4 Long Run Parameter Estimates 
The long run parameter estimates of interest in this study can be easily calculated 
from the short-run estimates given in the estimation of a dynamic regression such as 
B8. Assume for simplicity that the estimated regression contains only one 
explanatory variable, x, and lags of the dependent variable growth, g. The estimated 
regression is then of the following form, 
8 Lee, Pesaran & Smith (1996) explain slope heterogeneity with regard to convergence of growth 
rates. They describe slope heterogeneity as the case where countries no longer grow at identical rates 
toward their conditional steady states as is assumed under slope homogeneity. 
9 Pesaran, M. H., Smith, R. & Im, K. (1995), "Dynamic linear models for heterogeneous panels" DAE 
Working Paper No. 9503. pp. 2. 
Judson R., Owen A. Estimating dynamic panel data models: A practical guide for macroeconomists' 
Federal Reserve Board Discussion Paper 97-3 p. (1997) 
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AwAA 
Equation B. 11 ga al g1_1 + a2 g1_2 + P1 xt + ß2 XI-1 
BiO 
The long run elasticity of the variable x with respect to growth, g, is then calculated 
as, 
A Y(l-al-a 
Equation B. 12 +A 
2) 
Kocherlakota & Yi (1996) and Kocherlakota & Yi (1997) demonstrate that the 
difference between the neoclassical and endogenous growth models rest on the 
significance of these long run parameters. This can be simplified by recognising that 
A in order for 1 to be equal to zero, the top part of the function 81 + ß2 must be equal 
to zero. The test is therefore simplified to one of testing whether the sum of the short 
run parameters estimates of x are significant. This test is performed using a Wald test 
and is very similar in style to that proposed by within a time series framework by 
Kocherlakota & Yi (1997). Unfortunately however, this simplification does not yield 
standard errors of the long run parameters themselves (which depend in part on the 
covariance terms between lagged values of x and the lagged explanatory variables). 
AA 
Equation B. 13 Ho :_ 
ý1 + ýZ 
AA=0 (1-a, 
-a2) 
TTIN 
c A. 2 
say Lo 
